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ABSTRACT 
 
The aftermath of the Pulp Mills judgment raised questions about the 
inadequacy of instruments at the International Court of Justice‘s disposal to deal with 
disputes having science-heavy or factual-complex evidence involved. In other words, 
the questions was whether and to what extent a court of law, especially one with some 
diplomatic contours as the ICJ, could properly grapple with complex evidence when 
called to settle a scientific dispute. In recent times, several disputes brought before the 
Court have touched upon scientific evidence and highly technical matters. Accordingly, 
the question sparked interest in the scholarship. The problem of how courts of law 
operate whenever they meet science can be traced back to the eighteen century, almost 
as a consequence of the industrial revolution, and has been present ever since. The ways 
to deal with those problems depend, to a certain extent, on the contours of the legal 
system in which they arise. While the Anglo-Saxon system favoured the use of party-
appointed experts, le juge de la codification of civil law systems would not conceive the 
idea of letting the parties almost exclusively responsible for identifying the ―truth‖. 
Both systems had problems in taming science within the courtrooms. Paradoxically, 
since the evidentiary system of the International Court of Justice appears to be a blend 
between the two systems, it is not a surprise to see some of those problems being 
mirrored in the international level. Although the appearance of experts before 
international courts is not a recent feature, the growing number of technical questions 
underlying disputes shed new lights on the potential problems arising with their 
appearance. This seems to be true particularly if one considers that experts can perform 
different functions before international tribunals. In the context of the ICJ, experts (a) 
may offer technical assistance to the parties in their pleadings appearing as members of 
the defensive teams; (b) may be called by the parties to give evidence before the Court 
in the quality of pleaders; (c) can be called through an specific procedure and be tested 
by the technique of cross-examination; (d) can help the Court to gather the factual 
information of a dispute (fact-finding function); (e) can be called in order to help the 
Court to understand the technical or scientific evidence put forward by the parties in a 
dispute (fact-assessment function); and (f) can perform an specific technical function 
related to their knowledge such as the preparation of maps or helping the parties to 
demarcate their boundaries. 
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In the light of these potential and varied functions, an examination of the  
instruments at the ICJ‘s disposal might prove to be useful in the context of the growing 
numbers of scientific disputes. In order to perform this examination, this study is 
structured in three parts. The first chapter offers a perusal of instruments for the use of 
experts available to the ICJ to deal with technical and scientific evidence. The primary 
focus is to draw a framework on the limits and the problems related to each instrument 
employed by the Court. In the second chapter, the examination targets to other two 
tribunals dealing with interstate disputes. The idea of examining the rules and the case 
law of other tribunals has as main purpose the comparison between instruments. Given 
the several possibilities of international adjudicative bodies to examine, my focus will 
be on two tribunals which are, to more or less extent, more similar to the context in 
which the ICJ operates: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and 
interstate arbitration. In the third chapter, I examine three procedural values which 
appear strictly connected to the appearance of experts in a judicial proceeding, namely 
transparency, due process and the independence and impartiality of the adjudicative 
body. Drawing from the practice of the ICJ and the comparison between legal 
instruments, I test each instrument at the Court‘s disposal in the light of such values. I 
conclude with some suggestions on how the ICJ could improve, taken these procedural 
values into account, its method of employing experts to deal with technical and 
scientific evidence. 
If one looks to the way the Court and the parties availed themselves of experts 
in its recent case law (2006-2016), it appears to exist a continuous development and 
refinement of the techniques and procedures regarding experts. Comparing the 
procedures employed by the parties and by the Court in the Pulp Mills case (whose oral 
hearings took place in 2009) with those in the Whaling (2014) and Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua (2016, still pending) cases, one can identify a more active approach assumed 
by the Court. The evolutionary approach finds confirmation in the fact that the Court, 
for the first time since the Corfu Channel case, has resorted to article 50 and nominated 
two independent experts to gather evidence in locu.  
This ―evolution‖ might be attributed to two relevant factors. First, one is left 
with the impression that a prolific dialogue has occurred between parties, Court and 
scholarship. The second factor contributing to the amelioration of the procedure on 
experts is due to the fact that disputes touching upon technical issues were and are still 
being brought by States before the ICJ.  
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The argument developed in this thesis is that whatever should be the avenue 
explored by the Court, it should be put to the test of three procedural values: 
transparency, due process and independence. That would certainly add, to a greater or 
lesser extent, to the fairness of the proceedings, to the correctness of the judgment, to 
the effectiveness of the decision-making process and, ultimately, to the over-arching 
legitimacy of the judicial activity. The second main general proposal espoused by this 
thesis after the examination conducted is that the Court would benefit from a blended 
approach to the problem, combining techniques of common law and civil law, or more 
specifically, combining the use of ex parte and ex curiae experts when dealing with 
cases of a complex background. That seems to be the successful lesson taught by 
arbitral tribunals settling interstate disputes. A combined approach would also shield the 
Court from criticisms which allege that the method of testing evidence by the use of 
party-appointed experts is too heavily influenced by the common law system. The 
combined use of experts does not only strike a balance between the civil law and 
common law approaches to the procedure, but also between the values to be protected 
by the proceedings. In practical terms, the ICJ seems to be well equipped to improve the 
cross-examination of party-appointed experts with the use of assessors or ex curiae 
experts so as to receive technical advice. This solution would not require to Court to 
adopt a measure too far-off from its present procedure. If it is true that there is a strong 
likelihood that technical and scientific matters might appear again in the docket of the 
World Court, then it seems also true that experts still have an important role to perform 
in the proceedings before the ICJ. Testing the procedures for refining the fact-finding 
and fact-assessment by the Court through procedural values might constitute an 
adequate and useful way for refining the procedure regarding the appearance of experts. 
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“Quando ti metterai in viaggio per Itaca  
devi augurarti che la strada sia lunga,  
fertile in avventure e in esperienze.  
I Lestrigoni e i Ciclopi  
o la furia di Nettuno non temere,  
non sarà questo il genere di incontri  
se il pensiero resta alto e un sentimento  
fermo guida il tuo spirito e il tuo corpo.  
In Ciclopi e Lestrigoni, no certo,  
nè nell‟irato Nettuno incapperai  
se non li porti dentro  
se l‟anima non te li mette contro. 
 
Devi augurarti che la strada sia lunga.  
Che i mattini d‟estate siano tanti  
quando nei porti - finalmente e con che gioia -  
toccherai terra tu per la prima volta:  
negli empori fenici indugia e acquista  
madreperle coralli ebano e ambre  
tutta merce fina, anche profumi  
penetranti d‟ogni sorta; più profumi inebrianti che puoi,  
va in molte città egizie  
impara una quantità di cose dai dotti. 
 
Sempre devi avere in mente Itaca -  
raggiungerla sia il pensiero costante.  
Soprattutto, non affrettare il viaggio;  
fa che duri a lungo, per anni, e che da vecchio  
metta piede sull‟isola, tu, ricco  
dei tesori accumulati per strada  
senza aspettarti ricchezze da Itaca.  
Itaca ti ha dato il bel viaggio,  
senza di lei mai ti saresti messo  
sulla strada: che cos‟altro ti aspetti? 
 
E se la trovi povera, non per questo Itaca ti avrà deluso.  
Fatto ormai savio, con tutta la tua esperienza addosso  
già tu avrai capito ciò che Itaca vuole significare” 
(Itaca - Costantino Kavafis) 
 
 
 
“There is no luckier thing that can happen to a young person setting out in life than that 
some giant in the field should choose to bestow friendship and to spare the time to 
talk”. (Rosalyn Higgins about Oscar Schachter) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In April 2010 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered a judgment 
which would inaugurate a wide debate on the relationship between science and law. The 
Pulp Mills case was, from this viewpoint, a watershed. In that occasion, the Court, while 
admonishing the parties for the way they presented technical evidence
1
 as not being the 
most adequate considering the special circumstances of the dispute, also employed a 
dubious instrument for getting scientific input – the so-called ghost experts2.  A 
significant amount of criticism accompanied the judgment – either by scholars, either by 
dissenting voices within the courtroom. 
The Pulp Mills judgment and criticism that followed raised questions about the 
inadequacy of instruments at the Court‘s disposal to deal with disputes having science-
heavy or factual-complex evidence involved. In other words, the questions was whether 
and to what extent a court of law, especially one with some diplomatic contours as the 
ICJ, could properly grapple with complex evidence when called to settle a scientific 
dispute. 
Since Pulp Mills several disputes brought before the Court have touched upon 
scientific evidence and highly technical matters. Accordingly, the question sparked 
interest in the scholarship. The growing attention on how an international tribunal 
confronts the issue can be identified also beyond the ICJ. For instance, in January 2015, 
a delegation of judges from the International Court of Justice visited Hamburg to hold a 
meeting with their counterparts of the International Tribunal from the Law of the Sea 
                                                 
1
 On the framework of the evidence law before the ICJ see A Riddell and B Plant, Evidence 
Before the International Court of Justice (BIICL 2009); M Benzing, ‗Evidentiary Issues‘ in A 
Zimmerman and others (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (OUP 
2012) 1234; E Valencia-Ospina, ‗Evidence before the International Court of Justice‘ (1999) 1 Forum du 
Droit International 202, 205; H Thirlway, The International Court of Justice (OUP 2016) 99; M Lachs, 
‗Evidence in the Procedure of the International Court of Justice‘ in Essays in honour of Judge Taslim 
Olawale Elias (Nijhoff 1992) 265-276; L Ferrari-Bravo, La prova nel processo internazionale, (Jovene 
1958); NH Alford, ‗Fact-finding by the World Court‘ 4 Villanova Law Review 38. Specifically on the 
adversarial framework of evidence of ICJ, see S Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International 
Court (Martinus Nijhoff 2006)1338ff; JJ Quintana Aranguren, Litigation at the International Court of 
Justice: Practice and Procedure (Brill 2015) 383ff;  R Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart 
2012) 930; C Santulli, Droit du contentieux international (LGDJ-Montchrestien 2005); JF Lalive 
‗Quelques remarques sur la preuve devant la Cour Permanente et la Cour Internationale de Justice‘ (1950) 
7 Annuaire suisse de droit international 77-103; Rosenne, ‗Fact-finding before the International Court of 
Justice‘ in S Rosenne (ed) Essays on International Law and Practice (Brill 2007) 31M Benzing, Das 
Beweisrecht vor internationalen Gerichten und Schiedsgerichten in zwischenstaatlichen Streitigkeiten: 
The law of evidence before international courts and arbitral tribunals in inter-state disputes (Springer 
2010).  
2
 Simma B, ‗The International Court of Justice and Scientific Expertise‘ (2012) 106 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 230. 
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(ITLOS), which was named ―Legal and practical issues involved in the handling of law-
of-the-sea cases‖3. One of the topics of this meeting  was the handling of evidence in 
technical disputes. Equally noteworthy is the fact that in the occasion of the celebration 
of the 70
th
 anniversary of the International Court of Justice, a wide group of legal 
experts, scholars, judges and practitioners gathered together in the Great Hall of Justice 
and one of the themes discussed was precisely fact-finding, ―notably in scientific-related 
disputes‖4. These two events are indicative of a broad interest on the topic. 
The problem of how courts of law operate whenever they meet science can be 
traced back to the eighteen century, almost as a consequence of the industrial 
revolution, and has been present ever since
5
. The ways to deal with those problems 
depend, to a certain extent, on the contours of the legal system in which they arise. 
While the Anglo-Saxon system favoured the use of party-appointed experts
6
, le juge de 
la codification
7
 of civil law systems would not conceive the idea of letting the parties 
almost exclusively responsible for identifying the ―truth‖. Both systems had problems in 
taming science within the courtrooms. Paradoxically, since the evidentiary system of the 
International Court of Justice appears to be a blend between the two systems
8
, it is not a 
surprise to see some of those problems being mirrored in the international level. As 
aptly observed by an author, ―scientific disputes pose new challenges within the 
rationalist conception of adjudication in the international setting‖9.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 ―President Golitsyn welcomes delegation of judges of the International Court of Justice to 
Hamburg‖, ITLOS/Press 223 – 27 January 2015 (available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_223_EN.pdf). 
4 L Malintoppi, ‗Fact Finding and Evidence Before the International Court of Justice (Notably 
in Scientific-Related Disputes)‘ (2016) 7 JIDS.421-424. 
5
 See, generally, T Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony (2008) 73 
Brooklyn Law Review 881; D Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence (CUP 2008); JH 
Langbein, ‗Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence‘ (1996) 96 Columbia L Rev 1168. 
6
 T Golan, Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in 
England and America (Harvard University Press 2007). 
7
 JOLOWICZ, On Civil Procedure, Cambridge, 2000, p. 185; LECLERC, Le juge et l‘expert: 
Contribuition à l‘étude des rapports entre le droit et la science, Paris, 2005; ANSANELLI, La consulenza 
tecnica, in: La prova nel processo civile (Taruffo ed.), Milano, 2012, p. 993. 
8
 In this regard, Lachs pinpointed that ―[i]t has been recalled on several occasions that the 
Court aimed to 'hold a middle course between those two systems'. This goal has been maintained 
throughout the existence of the two Courts‖ (Lachs [n 1] 265). In this regard, see Riddell and Plant (n 1) 
11-12; Valencia-Ospina (n 1) 203-204; Lachs (n 1)  
9
 CE Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: 
Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality (CUP 2011) 341. 
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Although the appearance of experts
10
 before international courts is not a recent 
feature, the growing number of technical questions underlying disputes shed new lights 
on the potential problems arising with their appearance
11
. This seems to be true 
particularly if one considers that experts can perform different functions before 
international tribunals.
12
 In the context of the ICJ, experts (a) may offer technical 
assistance to the parties in their pleadings appearing as members of the defensive teams; 
(b) may be called by the parties to give evidence before the Court in the quality of 
pleaders; (c) can be called through an specific procedure and be tested by the technique 
of cross-examination; (d) can help the Court to gather the factual information of a 
dispute (fact-finding function); (e) can be called in order to help the Court to understand 
the technical or scientific evidence put forward by the parties in a dispute (fact-
assessment function); and (f) can perform an specific technical function related to their 
knowledge such as the preparation of maps or helping the parties to demarcate their 
boundaries. 
In the light of these potential and varied functions, an examination of the  
instruments at the ICJ‘s disposal might prove to be useful in the context of the growing 
numbers of scientific disputes. An adequate use of experts might have an impact on the 
judicial activity of the ICJ in at least three aspects. 
First, experts might assist the court in identifying the relevant facts of the 
dispute. As stressed by Hersch Lauterpacht ―the manner in which facts are marshalled in 
relation to any particular topic may be decisive for the elaboration of the governing 
legal principles‖13. Accordingly, an appropriate ascertainment of complex facts might 
allow the Court to properly exercise its judicial function of applying international law to 
                                                 
10
 The argument has been calling attention of the legal literature in recent times. See, in this 
regard JR Rodriguez, L‟expert em droit international (Pedone 2010). G White, The use of experts by 
International Tribunals (Syracuse University Press 1965); L Savadogo, Le recours des juridictions 
internationales à des experts (2004) 50 Annuaire français de droit international 231-258; JG Devaney, 
Fact-finding before the International Court of Justice (CUP 2016). On the appearance of experts in 
international decision-making process see M Ambrus and others (eds) The role of 'experts' in 
international and european decision-making processes: advisors, decision makers or irrelevant actors? 
(CUP 2014). 
11
 ―There is no question that modern international relations, and hence modern diplomacy and 
modern international litigation, is daily becoming increasingly concerned with scientific and 
technological facts. The law too, all law including international law, has to face this‖, in ROSENNE, 
Fact-finding, p.237. 
12
  It has been similarly observed that ―expert evidence is presented before a tribunal in cases 
involving complicated facts that require elucidation or solution by persons having, by virtue of their 
specialization, training, vocation or experience, a special and intimate knowledge of these or similar 
facts‖ (VS Mani, International Adjudication: Procedural Aspects (Nijhoff 1980) 234:). 
13
 H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Stevens & 
Sons 1958) 36. 
11 
 
these facts. It thus, contributes to the main function of the Court that is to settle disputes 
between States.  
Second, an appropriate use of experts may enhance the authority of the 
judgment by increasing the perception that the assessment of the facts underlying the 
dispute has been conducted accurately and diligently.
14
 Additionally, given that ―a 
decision which is not convincingly reasoned (...) will lack authority in the eyes of the 
parties‖15, it could be equally held that that a decision which is not convincingly rooted 
on an accurate factual analysis of the would also lack authority in the parties' 
perception.  
Third, in a context of potential competition among international courts, it is 
submitted that the Court should perform a guiding role. As observed by one author, 
―[t]he ICJ, to keep its place at the forefront of the international legal system, must act 
decisively and with deftness to find a solution to the challenge presented by [scientific] 
cases‖16.  
The last set of considerations regards the procedure adopted to examine the 
problem. From the outset, it should be observed that several approaches and 
methodologies might be employed to address the problem of use of experts by the ICJ. 
For instance, when the Court is called to settle complex disputes dealing with 
environmental issues, one could look at the problem through the lens of the 
precautionary principle, the uncertainty of evidence and its effects in the burden of 
proof
17
. The appearance of experts in the proceedings also touches upon the rationale of 
epistemic studies and the decision-making process adopted by international courts
18
. 
                                                 
14
 On the issue of legitimacy see T Treves, ‗Aspects of Legitimacy of Decisions of International 
Courts and Tribunals‘ R Wolfrum and  V Röben  (eds) Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008)  
169 ff, and, more broadly T Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, (OUP 990). 
15
 JG Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (CUP 2011)  293. 
16
 D Peat, ‗The Use of Court-Appointed Experts by the International Court of Justice‘ (2014) 
84 British Yearbook of International Law 300. 
17
 That was the path followed by Caroline Foster (n 9) in her book. See also JE Vinuales, Legal 
Techniques for Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental Law (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 437-507. 
18
 See in this regard the debate between MM Mbengue, International Courts and Tribunals as 
Fact-Finders: The Case of Scientific Fact-finding in International Adjudication (2011) 34 Loyola 53  
Alvarez, ‗Are International Judges Afraid of Science?: A Comment on Mbengue‘ (2012) 34 Loyola of 
Los Angeles Intl & Comp L Rev 84, see also J D‘Aspremont and MM Mbengue, ‗Strategies of 
Engagement with Scientific Fact-finding in International Adjudication‘ (2014) 5 JIDS 240–72. See also, 
PM Haas, ‗Ideas, experts and governance‘ W G Wergner ‗The politics of expertise: applying paradoxes of 
scientific expertise to international law‘ J Lawrence 'The structural logic of expert participation in WTO 
decision-making process', all in M Ambus and others (eds) The role of 'experts' in International and 
European Decision-making processes (CUP 2014); L Gradoni, La science judiciaire à l‘OMC ou les 
opinions du «juge Faustroll» autour des organismes génétiquement modifiés et de la viande de bovins 
12 
 
Notwithstanding the vast array of options to speculate the handling of experts, in this 
work the problem will be addressed from the more traditional viewpoint, which 
considers experts as a procedural instrument available to the Court. I look at the 
problem from an evidentiary viewpoint. Moreover, it must be specified at this stage that 
the present study will focus on the role of experts in contentious proceedings – although 
experts may also be employed in the context of advisory proceedings.  
In order to offer an answer the questionings abovementioned, this study is 
structured in three parts.  
The first chapter offers a perusal of instruments for the use of experts available 
to the ICJ to deal with technical and scientific evidence. The primary focus is to draw a 
framework on the limits and the problems related to each instrument employed by the 
Court. 
In the second chapter, the examination targets to other two tribunals dealing 
with interstate disputes. The idea of examining the rules and the case law of other 
tribunals has as main purpose the comparison between instruments. Given the several 
possibilities of international adjudicative bodies to examine, my focus will be on two 
tribunals which are, to more or less extent, more similar to the context in which the ICJ 
operates: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and interstate 
arbitration. In determining the exact scope of analysis, I chose not to focus on the vast 
amount of practice relating to the use of experts in the case law of the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization
19
. Although some of the ideas arising 
from that context might have been useful, the particular characteristics of this 
compulsory judicial system and the law they it might not be an adequate element of 
comparison. Thus, it was left out of the examination. 
                                                                                                                                               
traités aux hormones, in M  Deguergue and C Moiroud (eds.) Les OGM en questions. Science, politique et 
droit (Sorbonne 2013)287-317; S Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof and Truth in the Law (CUP 
2014). 
19
 See, in this regard, DA Baker, M Goldstein, MJ Pereyra and C Wakoli, When Science Meets 
Law: the rule of law in the development of the panel's expert consultation process, in G Marceau (ed), A 
History of Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO (CUP 2015) 457 ff; M Cossy, ‗Panels‘ consultations with 
scientific experts: the right to seek information under Article 13 of the DSU‘, in R Yerxa and B Wilson 
(eds) Key Issues in Wto Dispute Settlement: The first ten years (CUP 2005) 204-220; CA Thomas, ‗On 
Facts and Phantoms: Economics, Epistemic Legitimacy, and Wto Dispute Settlement‘ (2011) 14 Journal 
of International Economic Law 295-328; P Lièvre and PC Mavroidis, ‗Le recours à des experts et ses 
mésaventures en droit de l'OMC'‘in MA Frison-Roche and A Abello, Droit et économie de la propriété 
intellectuelle (LGDJ 2005) 201-220; J Pauwelyn, ‗Expert Advice in WTO Dispute Settlement‘ in GA 
Bermann and PC Mavroidis, Trade and Human Health and Safety (eds) (CUP 2006) 235-256; GZ 
Marceau and JK Hawkins, ‗Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement‘ (2012) 3 JIDS 493-507. 
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In the third chapter, I examine three procedural values which appear strictly 
connected to the appearance of experts in a judicial proceeding, namely transparency, 
due process and the independence and impartiality of the adjudicative body. Drawing 
from the practice of the ICJ and the comparison between legal instruments, I test each 
instrument at the Court‘s disposal in the light of such values. I conclude with some 
suggestions on how the ICJ could improve, taken these procedural values into account, 
its method of employing experts to deal with technical and scientific evidence.
14 
 
CHAPTER 1 
EXPERTS UNDER THE STATUTE, RULES, AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The International Court of Justice has at its disposal several tools and 
mechanisms to assess or produce evidence
20
. In particular, in the course of its seventy 
years of existence, the World Court
21
 has developed a significant procedural practice 
relating to the use of experts. The main purpose of this chapter is to identify and 
illustrate this practice. 
Experts may perform different functions in a international judicial proceeding. 
Just to offer some examples, experts may be called by the parties to illustrate the 
technicalities underlying their arguments; they may help the court to produce the 
evidence that was not sufficiently presented by the parties; experts may also evaluate 
the evidence that was produced during the proceedings and. All these two functions 
have been performed by different categories of experts in a considerable number of 
cases before the ICJ. Even if there is already a significant amount of practice relating to 
the use of experts, some points remain open to discussion.  
The present chapter aims not only at presenting the relevant Court‘s practice, 
but also at identifying the main legal problems raised in connection to the use of 
experts. It will analyze each category of experts existing in the Court‘s practice. It is 
possible to identify at least five different categories of expert: (1) the party-appointed 
expert; (2) the expert counsel; (3) the independent expert envisaged in article 50 of the 
Statute; (4) the invisible or ―phantom‖ expert; (5) assessors envisaged under article 30 
of the Statute and (6) the expert appointed by the Court to help the parties to implement 
                                                 
20
 As ―evidence‖ it is understood the generic name for the adversarial presentation of facts 
underlying a dispute. In this sense, S Rosenne, ‗Fact-finding before the International Court of Justice‘ in S 
Rosenne (ed) Essays on International Law and Practice (Brill 2007) 31. On the evidence before the 
International Court of Justice see, generally, M Bezing, ‗Evidentiary Issues‘ in A Zimmermann and others 
(eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (OUP 2012); A Riddell and B 
Plant, Evidence Before the International Court of Justice (BIICL 2009); JG Devaney, Fact-Finding 
before the International Court of Justice (CUP 2016); M Lachs, ‗Evidence in the Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice‘ in Essays in honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias (Nijhoff 1992) 265-
276; JJ Quintana, Litigation at the International Court of Justice (Brill 2015). 
21
 About the continuity of the two Courts: S Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the 
International Court 1920-2005 (Brill 2006) 73 ff. See also O Spiermann, Historical Introduction in 
Zimmermann and others (n 1) 69-70. 
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the Court‘s judgment. These six categories together form what can be called the ICJ‘s 
framework of expertise.  
The analysis of each category of expert shall be carried out in the following 
way. In the first place, the respective normative base shall be identified. This will be 
followed by the study of the relevant practice of the PCIJ and of the ICJ. When 
examining this practice special attention will be paid to the Court‘s criteria about the 
probative weight given to experts and the role they performed in settling a certain 
dispute. 
The analysis of this general framework of expertise shall permit to identify the 
problems, the criticism and the shortcomings inherent in the use of these different 
categories of experts. 
 
2. The general regime of expertise in the ICJ: the six categories. 
 
The Statute of the ICJ contemplates the possibility of having recourse to 
experts in three provisions. Article 43 establishes that experts can be heard in the oral 
proceedings. Article 50 empowers the Court to entrust any ―individual, body, bureau, 
commission, or other organization‖ with giving an expert opinion. Article 51 is related 
to the questions that can be asked to experts and witnesses. 
Having regard to the Court‘s practice, it is possible to identify six different 
ways in which experts can participate in the proceedings. Despite the different doctrinal 
views over the characterization of these figures, the main distinction between them is 
whether or not their presence is requested by the parties or by the Court: experts ex 
parte or experts ex curiae. 
Since the parties have a major role in the production of evidence in ICJ 
proceedings, in the next paragraph I will start the analysis of the relevant practice by 
presenting the means at the disposal of the parties for having recourse to expertise. I 
will then address the instruments available to the Court. 
The parties have at their disposal different options to handle technical or 
scientific evidence in the proceedings. Experts can be nominated by the parties as 
witnesses (a) or as counsels (b).  
The Court has basically two ways of using experts: as ―informal‖ or ―invisible‖ 
experts (c) or as independent experts under Article 50 (d). 
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The last section will address the experts that the Court appoints to assist the 
parties in implementing its judgments(e). 
 
a. Experts ex parte. 
 
Article 43 of the Court's Statute provides that "the oral proceedings shall 
consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents, counsel, and 
advocates". The parties have basically two possibilities to use experts during the oral 
proceedings
22
: a) experts appointed by the parties to testify before the Court following a 
specific procedure (hereinafter called party-appointed experts) and; b) experts who are 
part of a delegation, or as they are commonly called, "expert counsel". 
 
2.1. Party-appointed experts. 
 
2.1.1. Witnesses, Witnesses-Expert and Experts (Arts 57 and 64 of the Court's Rules).  
 
The resort to witnesses and experts in the oral proceedings is not recurring in 
the practice of the ICJ
23. As Rosenne remarked ―it was rare for an international tribunal 
to obtain evidence from witnesses‖24. Yet, in recent times, the growing number of 
disputes raising technical and scientific questions has enhanced the role of witnesses 
and experts in the proceedings before international tribunals. This is particularly true 
when one observes that also affidavits
25
 sometimes can be considered, as mentioned by 
                                                 
22
 Rosenne (n 21) 1137. 
23
 Up until the moment this thesis was written, the 12 cases (out of more than a hundred cases 
in the Court's docket) that have involved the examination of witnesses or experts are: (1) Corfu Channel 
(United Kingdom v. Albania), (2) Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand); (3) South West Africa 
cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa: Liberia v. South Africa), (4) Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya), (5) Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States 
of America); (6) Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta); (7) Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), (8) Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. 
(ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), (9) Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador/Honduras), (10) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro); (11) Whaling in the Antarctic 
case (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), (12) Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Croatia v. Serbia). In the case law of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, witnesses were heard in the German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia case (P.C.I.J., Series A, Judgment n
o
 7). 
24
 Rosenne (n 21) 1307. 
25
 According to two authors, affidavits ―are a hybrid form of evidence most frequently used in 
common law jurisdictions which consist of evidence given under oath before a notary or another public 
official recorded by him in a formal instrument drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the 
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judge Torres Bernárdez, ―as a form of witness evidence, but one not tested by cross-
examination‖26. 
The Statute of the ICJ, in the abovementioned Article 43, distinguishes 
between witnesses and experts. This distinction can also be found in Article 64 of the 
Court's Rules, which establishes that witnesses and experts have to make different 
solemn declarations before their appearance in the Court.  Article 64 sets forth that 
[u]nless on account of special circumstances the Court decides on a 
different form of words, 
(a)  every witness shall make the following declaration before giving any 
evidence: 'I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will speak the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth'; 
(b)  every expert shall make the following declaration before making any 
statement: 'I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will speak the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and that my statement will be in 
accordance with my sincere belief'. 
The text differentiates the duties of witnesses and experts. It is expected that 
witnesses provide evidence regarding the facts of a controversy, whereas experts 
provide their opinion according to their ―sincere belief‖,  on the basis of their specific 
knowledge. As the Court had opportunity to clarify, the witness is ―called to establish 
facts within her personal knowledge which might help the Court to settle the dispute 
brought before it‖27, while experts are called ―to assist the Court in giving judgment 
upon the issues submitted to it for decision‖28 or ―to give to the Court a precise and 
concrete opinion upon the points submitted to them‖29.  
In this context, a third hybrid figure emerged in the Court's practice, that of the 
witness-expert
30
. In cases where a person gives its declaration about certain facts but 
also assesses these facts from a technical or scientific point of view, this person is 
                                                                                                                                               
national law of the deponent or of the party deposing the affidavid. In shor, an affidavit is testimonial 
evidence in written form‖ (A Riddell and B Plant, Evidence Before the International Court of Justice 
(BIICL 2009) 279). About the use of affidavits in international tribunals, see C Amerasinghe, Evidence in 
International Litigation (Nijhoff 2005) 189-203; M Bezing, ‗Evidentiary Issues‘, in Zimmerman and 
others (n 21) 125. 
26
 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 40, Dissenting opinion of Judge Torres Bernárdez, para 36. 
27
 Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters case (Djibouti v. France) (Judgment) 
[2008] ICJ Rep para 12. 
28
 Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case 
concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep para 
65. 
29
 Corfu Channel case (Order of 17th December) [1948] ICJ Rep 126. These two quotations 
were used by the Court in reference to experts nominated by the Court. However, they seem to apply 
more broadly to all experts, including experts appointed by the parties.  
30
 S Talmon, ‗Article 43‘ in Zimmerman and others (n 1) 1160. See also S Murphy, ‗The ELSI 
Case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of Justice‘ (1999) 16 Yale Journal of International 
Law 391,443. 
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invited to make a  declaration as a witnesses, in the sense of Article 64 (a), and also as 
an expert, in the sense of Article 64 (b). As defined by President Higgins, ―the term 
[expert-witness] refers to a person who can testify both as to knowledge of facts, and 
also give an opinion on matters upon which he or she has expertise‖31.  
However, as was stressed by some authors
32
, the boundaries of this distinction 
are hard to draw in practice. As pointed out by Tams, even the distinction between 
experts and witnesses ―has often become blurred‖33, especially in disputes that deal with 
facts of technical nature. There is no procedural distinction between the two figures 
apart from the declarations that have to be made by them. In the context of the South 
West Africa cases, Sir Percy Spender delineated the main consequence of this 
distinction:  
It is not possible, it seems to me, for a witness, who has been sworn as an 
expert and also as a witness of fact to, as he goes along, indicate: now I am 
speaking as to fact, now I am giving an expert opinion; and it is inevitable that the 
person who is giving evidence as an expert will both deal with facts and also 
express his opinion upon the facts. (...) There is, moreover, no reason why that 
person should not give evidence as an expert, notwithstanding the fact that he 
happens to be a governmental official. That may bear upon the weight to be given 
to his evidence, but it does not bear upon the admissibility of his evidence
34
.  
The main distinction between experts and witnesses is, therefore, the probative 
weight that the Court can give to their statements, depending on the nature of their 
testimonies.  
In four recent cases (Bosnian Genocide, Whaling in Antarctic, Croatian 
Genocide and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica), the three terms (―experts‖, 
―witnesses‖ and ―witness-experts‖) were employed by the Court. In the Whaling in 
Antarctic and in Construction of a Road in Costa Rica cases, the Court referred only the 
term ―expert‖. In the cases on genocide, the two categories ―witness‖ and ―expert 
witness‖ were used. 
                                                 
31
 R Higgins, Speech by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins to the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly (2 November 2007) 7. The speech of Judge Higgins offers an example of a situation in which 
this mixed figure can be used: ―The category of ‗witness-expert‘ is not actually mentioned in the Statute 
or the Rules, but was recognised in the Corfu Channel case and subsequently used in the Temple of Preah 
Vihear case and South-West Africa cases. The term refers to a person who can testify both as to 
knowledge of facts, and also give an opinion on matters upon which he or she has expertise. In the Bosnia 
v. Serbia case, the witnesses and experts were examined and cross-examined in court. We heard 
testimony as to the structure of the military organizations, the relationship between the army of Republika 
Srpska and the Yugoslav army, the destruction of cultural heritage, and estimations of the war casualties‖. 
32
 In Riddell and Plant (n 1) 32: ―The fragility of the boundary between opinion and fact has 
caused difficulty in some cases, and has led to the creation of the third hybrid category of witness-expert‖.  
33
 C Tams, ‗Article 51‘ in Zimmermann and others (n 20) 1263. 
34
  South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa)(Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments), Documents, CR 1965/2, p. 123. Emphasis added. 
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For the purposes of this work, while the focus will be on experts, i.e. persons 
who ―give an opinion on matters upon which he or she has expertise‖, the figures of 
witnesses, experts and witness-experts shall be analyzed together.  
 
2.1.2. Procedure for appointment and examination. 
 
The Statute and Rules of the Court contain provisions governing the treatment 
of evidence given by witnesses and experts
35
. However, the procedure of presentation 
and examination of witnesses and experts during the oral part of the proceedings does 
not follow a pre-determined path. In fact, the rules about the examination of witnesses 
and experts are very general and they essentially allow the Court to define the path to be 
followed. As provided by Article 58 (2) of the Court's Rules: 
[t]he order in which the parties will be heard, the method of handling the 
evidence and of examining any witnesses and experts, and the number of counsel 
and advocates to be heard on behalf of each party, shall be settled by the Court 
after the views of the parties have been ascertained in accordance with Article 31 
of these Rules. 
Essentially, this provision prescribes that an ad hoc procedure will be 
established by the Court for each case after consultation with the parties. The recent 
(Croatian) Genocide case showed that the during the proceedings the parties can change 
their views as regards the number and the method of presentation of witnesses and 
witnesses-experts
36
. 
When witnesses or experts are indicated by the parties ―before the opening of 
the oral proceedings‖37, through a document containing ―indications in general terms of 
the point or points to which their evidence will be directed‖38, they will present their 
evidence during the oral proceedings. In the Bosnian Genocide case, the parties were 
required to provide the Court ―at least three days before the hearing of each witness, 
expert or witness-expert, a one-page summary of the latter‘s evidence or statement‖39. 
                                                 
35
 Arts. 57, 58, 63, 65, 70 and 71 of the Rules.  
36
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
case (Croatia v. Serbia) [2015] ICJ Rep paras 17-33. 
37
 Article 57, ICJ Rules. 
38
 Art. 57, ICJ Rules: ―Without prejudice to the provisions of the Rules concerning the 
production of documents, each party shall communicate to the Registrar, in sufficient time before the 
opening of the oral proceedings, information regarding any evidence which it intends to produce or which 
it intends to request the Court to obtain.  This communication shall contain a list of the surnames, first 
names, nationalities, descriptions and places of residence of the witnesses and experts whom the party 
intends to call, with indications in general terms of the point or points to which their evidence will be 
directed.  A copy of the communication shall also be furnished for transmission to the other party‖. 
39
 Bosnian Genocide case (n 23) para 53. 
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In the Whaling and Croatian Genocide cases, the parties had to submit to the Court in 
advance the content of their statements in written form. 
The Rules also assures the parties the possibility to appoint an expert or a 
witness
40
 not only before the beginning of the hearings, but also during the hearings
41
. It 
must be mentioned that this last option is more restrictive than the first, since the Court 
or the other party can block this appointment, as it is provided by Article 63.1 of the 
Rules. The Court once denied the right of the party to appoint a witness deeming ―the 
evidence to be obtained from Mrs. Borrel did not appear to be that of a witness called to 
establish facts within her personal knowledge which might help the Court to settle the 
dispute brought before it‖42. 
Despite the broad powers that the Court has to determine the procedure to be 
followed, the parties maintain a number of rights. One of them is the right to comment 
upon the expertise presented. This main right is expressed in Article 51 of the  Statute 
and also in Articles 58 and 65 of the  Rules. 
 Article 51 provides:  
[d]uring the hearing any relevant questions are to be put to the witnesses 
and experts under the conditions laid down by the Court in the rules of procedure 
referred to in Article 30.  
According to Article 58,  
[t]he Court shall determine whether the parties should present their 
arguments before or after the production of the evidence;  the parties shall, 
however, retain the right to comment on the evidence given. 
Finally article 65 prescribes: 
[w]itnesses and experts shall be examined by the agents, counsel or 
advocates of the parties under the control of the President.  Questions may be put 
to them by the President and by the judges. 
These three rules might be considered as a guarantee of the principle of due 
process since they recognize the parties' right to contest and contradict the testimony of 
witnesses and experts during their examination. 
The method of examination of experts is of extreme importance because it 
serves to test the evidence presented by them. That is the reason why the examination of 
experts has been conducted since the first case in which the parties appointed witnesses 
                                                 
40
 The parties' right to indicate witness or experts stems from Article 43 of Court's Statute.  
41
 This right is assured by Article 63, 1,  of Court's Rules: ―The parties may call any witnesses 
or experts appearing on the list communicated to the Court pursuant to Article 57 of these Rules.  If at any 
time during the hearing a party wishes to call a witness or expert whose name was not included in that 
list, it shall so inform the Court and the other party, and shall supply the information required by Article 
57. The witness or expert may be called either if the other party makes no objection or if the Court is 
satisfied that his evidence seems likely to prove relevant‖.  
42
 Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters case (n 27) para 12. 
21 
 
and experts, the Corfu channel case
43
. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that agents 
and counsels are responsible for examining the witnesses and experts, but experts 
cannot examine experts in order to challenge the data presented. As noted by Tams, 
experts ―will often be instrumental in preparing the examination [of other experts]‖44, 
but they are not allowed to ask questions. A possible explanation for this phenomenon 
might be that the examination of experts by other experts may escape from the control 
of the parties. In a context of technical disputes which growingly requires the 
confrontation between experts, that seems to be a shortcoming of the present rules. 
Based on a system similar to that applied before common law courts
45
, the 
presentation and examination of witnesses and experts in four recent cases adhered the 
following procedure of cross-examination
46
:  
1
o
 The party that called the witness or expert performs the examination-in-
chief. This stage can be skipped if the witness confirms his or her own previous written 
statement. 
2
o
 The other party has the option to cross-examine the expert and the 
testimony. As we see further ahead, to waive the right of cross-examination might carry 
some implications.  
3
o
 The party that called the witness or expert can perform the re-examination. 
This is a recent development in the Court's procedure
47
. 
4
o
 The judges question the witnesses and experts. 
The procedure above delineated is the one followed in the Court‘s recent 
practice. It can be changed depending on the necessities of each case: as mentioned 
before, the method of examination of witnesses and experts is ―highly flexible‖48. In 
general, this four-step procedure has been regarded by commentators as an 
improvement in the Court‘s procedure49 since it favours the testing of the evidence 
                                                 
43
 Corfu Channel case (n 23) 7. 
44
 Tams (n 33) 1266. 
45
 Tams (n 14)1268. 
46
 Bosnian Genocide case (n 23) para 58; Whaling in the Antarctic (n 23) para 20; Croatian 
Genocide (n 4) para 33. In the Croatian Genocide case, the first phase was slightly changed since the 
witnesses were not examined by the party that had appointed them, but in fact were only asked to confirm 
his or her written testimony or statement.  
47
 The first case in which the re-examination was performed is the Bosnian Genocide case (n 4) 
para 57. 
48
 Tams (n 33) 1268. 
49
 J D‘Aspremont and MM Mbengue, ‗Strategies of Engagement with Scientific Fact-finding in 
International Adjudication‘ (2014) 5 JIDS 240–72. 
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presented by experts but also the right to reply, essential component of the principle of 
due process. 
Besides, the active approach taken by judges in asking questions to experts and 
witness in recent cases is a sign of a more proactive role of the Court in examining the 
evidence. Performing this examination, the Court seems to distinguish from the 
previous reluctant approach in which judges avoided to ask questions ―suggesting that 
this may reveal their line of thought and perhaps prematurely put on guard one or both 
parties as to the reasoning they may follow in the final decision‖50. 
 
2.1.3. Assessing the role of party-appointed experts in the Court‘s case law. 
 
Until very recently, the presence of witnesses or witness-experts in the 
proceedings before the ICJ were seen with some degree of skepticism because of the 
―limited reliance‖ that the Court appeared to placed on them51. Moreover, it was 
generally associated with an unnecessary slowness in the proceedings
52
. Some authors 
called it ―superfluous‖ and of ―questionable value‖53. In this sense, Talmon argued that 
[w]itnesses will often duplicate what has been pleaded already by the 
parties. A lot of time and effort is usually spent on calling into question the 
credibility and reliability of the other party's witnesses. It is thus not surprising that 
the Court has made little to no reference to the testimony of witnesses in its 
judgments
54
. 
During its first forty years of activities of the Court, only in six cases the 
parties appointed experts or witness. However, in none of them did experts perform a 
crucial or fundamental role. In fact, very little reference was made to their presence or 
their examination during the oral proceedings. It is interesting to note that, in all of these 
six cases, the parties had experts who were also part of their delegations as ―expert 
assessors‖, a variant of the expert counsel which is enlisted in the party's defensive 
team. 
The first case in which the parties appointed experts was the Corfu channel 
case. The Court did not gave authoritative weight to the evidence given by party-
appointed experts in its judgment but it took into account the fact that they disagreed. 
The observed that ―certain points have been contested between the Parties which make 
                                                 
50
 Lachs (n 1) 269. 
51
 Tams (n 33) 1263. 
52
 R Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart 2013) 971. 
53
 Talmon (n 30) 1158. 
54
 Ibid. 
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it necessary to obtain an [independent] expert opinion‖55. Thus, in the first case in 
which experts were appointed by the parties their disagreement led the Court to 
nominate its own independent experts to clarify the controversial technical points in 
dispute. 
The second case in which the parties appointed experts to participate in the oral 
hearings was the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. 
Thailand)
56
. This was the first case in which a witness gave evidence both in the quality 
as witness and as expert. The Judgment did not make any reference to this distinction 
nor did the parties mentioned it. Besides, the Court did not address in the judgment the 
role played by experts and witnesses for the assessment of facts.  
However, some judges emphasized the fact that on certain issues experts has 
shown an agreement
57
. Interestingly, some judges raised the issue as to what approach 
the Court should assume when confronted with a disagreement between the opinions of 
the experts
58. For instance, judge Wellington Koo observed that ―[t]he conflicting 
character of the two expert recommendations presents a perplexing problem, and the 
difficulty has been further increased by the outcome of the examination and cross-
examination of the experts and witnesses at the oral hearing‖59. He also noted:  
All the foregoing questions are of a technical character and call for an 
independent expert or experts to supply reliable answers. I am of the opinion that 
the Court would have been well advised, under Articles 44 and 50 of the Statute, to 
send its own expert or experts to investigate on the spot and make a report of their 
observations and recommendations, as was done in the Corfu Channel case (I.C. J. 
Reports 1949). Such a report would have been of great assistance to the Court in 
deciding the case by law on the basis of all the relevant facts of a technical as well 
as other character. I for one feel unable to reach a final conclusion satisfactory to 
myself without knowing the answers to the technical questions which I have 
defined above and which, in my view, bear a vital importance for a correct 
determination of one of the crucial issues in the present case
60
.  
The words of judge Koo are quite incisive about the problem that the Court 
would later characterize as ―the clash of expert opinions‖, a problem that appears 
relatively often when experts from different parties appear before the Court. In the 
specific case of Preah Vihear, the main disagreement between experts was about the 
correct lines to be traced in interpreting cartographical maps and geological documents. 
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 Corfu Channel [Order] (n 29)124. 
56
 Temple of Preah Vihear (n 23) 8. 
57
 Temple of Preah Vihear (n 4), Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy Spender, 122, and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Wellington Koo, 51. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Temple of Preah Vihear (n 4), Judge Wellington Koo Dissenting Opinion, 99. 
60
 Temple of Preah Vihear (n 4), Judge Wellington Koo Dissenting Opinion 100. 
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The problem underlined by judge Koo is a problem that the Court has also faced in its 
more recent judgment. 
During the oral phase of the South West Africa cases a great number of persons 
was called to witness and the oral hearings took more the two months
61
. Professors from 
different universities, sociologists and ethnologists testified before the Court in order to 
define the status of the relationship between South West Africa and South Africa. 
Despite of this massive use of experts of witnesses by the parties, the Court made no 
reference to the appearance of the experts in its judgment. As a result, besides other 
critics to the appearance of witnesses
62
, scholars started to question the necessity of 
having experts and witnesses in the proceedings, especially due to the fact that the 
hearings in the South West Africa cases prolonged extensively the duration of the case. 
 The only significant point about the weight of the evidence presented by 
experts was made, again, by a few judges in their individual opinions. They took into 
consideration statements that were given by experts and that were not contested by the 
other party. In this regard, judge Tanaka noticed that one of the parties ―neither 
produced any evidence in contradiction thereof nor disputed [the testimony given by a 
witness-expert] in cross-examination‖63. Judge van Wyk assumed the experts' 
―uncontested testimony‖64 to be true. 
In the Continental Shelf  (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, technical 
questions arose regarding the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf between 
the parties. Both parties had experts in their delegations and an expert was called by 
Libya to testify pursuant to Articles 57, 63 and 65 of the Rules. It is interesting to note 
that the Court took into consideration the fact that experts appointed by Tunisia had 
made declarations against the argument sustained by this State. In the words of the 
Court:  
To appreciate the Libyan argument, it is first necessary to set out briefly a 
comparatively recently developed theory known as "plate tectonics", presented to 
the Court by Libya. Before doing so, however, the Court would mention that 
Tunisia has criticized the Libyan argument for its reliance upon that theory. 
                                                 
61
 South West African cases, I.C.J. Reports 1966, Pleadings, vol. VIII, pp.56-84. 
62
 About the South West African cases, Leo Gross wrote that "[t]he Court could exercise a 
more effective control over the conduct of oral hearings and the presentation of experts and witnesses 
without interfering with the right of the parties to make as full a statement of their case as they deem 
necessary. But the Court could ask the parties to elucidate the points which in the Court's views need 
clarification". See GROS, The International Court of Justice and the United Nations, RCADIH, 1967, p. 
431. 
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 South West African cases, I.C.J. Reports 1966, Judge Tanaka Dissenting Opinion, p. 322. 
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 South West African cases, I.C.J. Reports 1966, Judge van Wyk Separate Opinion, p. 178. 
25 
 
However, the Court notes that the experts consulted by Tunisia agree with the 
international geological community on the basic principles of plate tectonics; 
Tunisia has rather disputed some of the deductions sought to be made from the 
theory, and contended that the reference to it is irrelevant in the present case
65
.  
Thus the Court gave relevance to the fact that an expert or witness made 
declarations contrary to the official position sustained by the party that appointed him. 
As it will be shown, the same approach was taken by the Court in subsequent cases. 
Another problem raised by the case concerned the existence of a disagreement 
between experts on certain scientific issue. This issue was addressed by judge ad hoc 
Jiménez de Aréchaga. According to him, ―the Court was placed in the situation of being 
asked to decide this case exclusively on the basis of the conflicting scientific evidence 
presented to it by expert oceanographers and geologists‖66. The Court was however able 
to avoid the problem, since, as noted the judge, ―the decision of this case is to be based 
on legal principles, putting aside the expert evidence submitted by the Parties‖67. 
 
a. The evaluation of witnesses in the Nicaragua Case. 
 
Despite the fact that in the Nicaragua case there were no questions of a 
scientific nature in dispute and therefore no experts presenting evidence, the way in 
which in this case the Court dealt with the witnesses presented is relevant for several 
reasons. One of these reasons is the fact that the Court identified some general criteria 
for evaluating the probative weight of witness testimony. 
On account of the absence of the United States in the proceedings, the Court 
was particularly cautious with the evidence presented by Nicaragua
68
, which called five 
witnesses to testify before the Court
69
. Another consequence of the Defendant's non-
appearance was the absence of cross-examination of the witnesses. The Court, 
nonetheless, noticed that ―the evidence of the witnesses presented by the Applicant at 
the hearings was not tested by cross-examination; however, those witnesses were 
subjected to extensive questioning from the bench‖70. 
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 In the first place the Court emphasized the importance of the ―objectivity‖ of 
the information given by witnesses:  
The Court has not treated as evidence any part of the testimony given 
which was not a statement of fact, but a mere expression of opinion as to the 
probability or otherwise of the existence of such facts, not directly known to the 
witness. Testimony of this kind, which may be highly subjective, cannot take the 
place of evidence. An opinion expressed by a witness is a mere personal and 
subjective evaluation of a possibility, which has yet to be shown to correspond to a 
fact; it may, in conjunction with other material, assist the Court in determining a 
question of fact, but is not proof in itself
71
.   
With regard to the weight to be given to a certain testimony, the Court also 
drew an important distinction: 
In the general practice of courts, two forms of testimony which are 
regarded as prima facie of superior credibility are, first the evidence of a 
disinterested witness - one who is not a party to the proceedings and stands to gain 
or lose nothing from its outcome - and secondly so much of the evidence of a party 
as is against its own interest
72
. 
For this reason, when the Court evaluated the testimony given by members of 
Nicaragua's government, it considered ―that the special circumstances of this case 
require it to treat such evidence with great reserve‖73. The criterion developed by the 
Court in this case has subsequently been followed by other international tribunals
74
. 
Once again if ones try to transpose the criteria established by the Court to 
experts rather than witnesses, the question becomes that of determining which kind of 
expert testimony can be regarded as prima facie of superior credibility. It may be 
argued, for instance, that a disinterested expert and an expert that offers evidence 
against the interest of the parties that called him can be regarded as having a ―superior 
credibility‖. 
 
b) The use of experts in the Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) case.  
 
A complex dispute involving Italian procedural law, bankruptcy and 
dissolution of business corporations, the ELSI dispute involved the participation of 
witnesses and experts testifying on behalf of both parties in dispute. The United States 
of America claimed that Italy had damaged its foreign investment with respect to an 
Italian company which had Americans shareholders. As a consequence, Italy would 
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have violated certain provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between the two Parties. In order to cope with the technical evidence in the case, the 
United States called two witnesses and an expert; Italy called an expert
75
, who was 
cross-examined by the parties and answered questions asked by the Court. 
The ELSI case was the first one in which the Court (more precisely, an ad hoc 
chamber of the Court) made a distinction between ―counsels‖,  ―witnesses‖ or ―experts‖. 
In the specific case, when Mr. Giuseppe Bisconti was addressing the Court on behalf of 
the United States (as a counsel) with regard to matters of fact within his knowledge as a 
company lawyer, the Italian agent requested the Chamber of the Court to treat Mr. 
Bisconti as a witness. The President of the Chamber acceded to this request and thus 
Mr. Bisconti was cross-examined and made the solemn declaration reserved to 
witnesses
76
.  
According to Murphy, besides the probative value that the difference between 
counsel and witness entails, this status' modification raises a practical question, namely 
―[c]ross-examination disrupts the flow of a party's presentation and tilts the presentation 
in the direction sought by the other party. In the ELSI case, the use of witnesses who 
were subject to cross-examination compromised the ability of the United States to 
present a clear, uninterrupted presentation of the facts‖77. 
The Court did not offered any indication in the judgment about the value of the 
experts. Once again, some indications can be found in judges' opinions, and particularly 
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel. According to him, the parties' experts 
disagreed regarding their financial analysis and legal conclusions, but not only. In judge 
Schwebel opinion ―the experts of Italy differed between themselves‖78. However, the 
majority of the Chamber did not take notice of this disagreement.  
 
c. The use of witnesses and expert witnesses in the Genocide cases. 
 
In the two Genocide cases before the ICJ (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro, henceforth the Bosnian Genocide case; and Croatia v. Serbia, 
henceforth the Croatian Genocide case) the parties had recourse to witnesses, 
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witnesses-experts and experts. The function of these categories during the proceedings 
was essential to furnish the Court with elements of fact that aimed to prove the 
constituent elements of genocide, in particular the "dolus specialis". While the Court in 
the past had little interaction with the witnesses testifying before it, in this case the 
Court has assumed a more active approach with regard to witnes: judges asked more 
questions to the witnesses and experts, particularly regarding the method used to obtain 
the information; at the same time, the Court offered more indications on the evidential 
weight and the role of witnesses and experts in the Court's decision. 
A specific problem appear regarding the examination of witnesses in the 
Croatian Genocide case. In that instance, the parties agreed that some of the witnesses 
did not need to be cross examined
79
. Croatia waived its right to cross-examine all of 
Serbia's witnesses. As a consequence their evidence to the Court was presented only in 
the form of written testimony. In turn, the Court stated that it did not wish to question 
the witnesses and witness-experts that the parties were not intending to cross-examine. 
A member of the Court asked the parties how this evidence should be treated
80
. The 
Court did not clarify if there was a difference in the evidential weight of a witness 
statement not cross-examined as opposed to an affidavit, as it had been suggested by 
Serbia. Recalling its previous decisions, the Court observed that ―affidavits will be 
treated 'with caution'‖81, adding that ―[i]n determining the evidential weight of any 
statement by an individual, the Court necessarily takes into account its form and the 
circumstances in which it was made‖82. 
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The absence of cross-examination appears to have had consequences in the 
Court's evaluation. For instance, the Court concluded that ―the statement of Stjepan 
Peulić, a witness called by Croatia to give oral testimony but whom Serbia did not wish 
to cross-examine (...) and whose accounts have not been otherwise contradicted, may be 
given evidential weight‖83. The fact that the Court took into consideration the absence 
of cross-examination of a certain witness rather than refuting their testimony was 
repeated  in two other passages of the judgment
84
. Nonetheless, when analysing Serbia's 
allegations, even if it mentioned the fact that ―Croatia waived its right of cross-
examination‖85, the Court made a general statement pointing out that it 
will accord evidential weight to the statements by the eight individuals 
called by Serbia to testify before it. However, it should be emphasized that the fact 
that Croatia declined to cross-examine those witnesses in no sense implies an 
obligation on the Court to accept all of their testimony as accurate. Moreover, 
Croatia clearly stated that its decision not to cross-examine the witnesses did not 
mean that it accepted their testimonies as accurate; on the contrary, it expressed 
significant reservations in relation to some of them
86
. 
In the Genocide cases the Court referred to its previous case law to assess the 
evidential weight of testimonies. As recognized by judge Donaghue, ―[i]n past cases, 
the Court has provided guidance about the criteria that it uses to evaluate witness 
statements‖87. For instance, the Court referred to the fact that it must assess whether 
statements ―were made by State officials or by private persons not interested in the 
outcome of the proceedings and whether a particular affidavit attests to the existence of 
facts or represents only an opinion as regards certain events‖88. The Court also stated 
that ―testimony of matters not within the direct knowledge of the witness, but known to 
him only from hearsay, [is not] of much weight‖89.  
In the same sense, the Court, referring to the Nicaragua case, stated that it  
will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for this 
case and also materials emanating from a single source. It will prefer 
contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct knowledge. It will give 
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particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct 
unfavorable to the State represented by the person making them
90
.  
The three aforementioned criteria (direct knowledge,  unfavorable statements 
and materials emanating from a single source) were used in different occasions in the 
Bosnian and Croatian Genocide cases.  
The Court applied these criteria, for instance, when it had to ascertain whether 
Serbia and Montenegro (the Respondent) had supplied militarily the army of Republika 
Srpska (VRS). The Court noted that ―the Respondent generally denies that it supplied 
and equipped the VRS‖, but "one of the witnesses called by the Respondent (...) 
testified that the army of the Republika Srpska was supplied from different sources 
‗including but not limited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia‘‖91. 
In several occasions in the Croatian Genocide case the Court gave evidential 
weight to statements made by persons who had direct access to the facts, recognizing 
that it was ―bound to give some evidential weight‖92 to this kind of testimony. On the 
other hand, the Court did not give evidential weight to statements when the witness 
―does not appear to have witnessed [a fact] directly‖93. This does not invalidate the 
evidential weight of the witness testimony in general, but only regards those facts whom 
he or she did not directly witness. 
The second reference to its own case law concerned the special value given to 
cross-examined evidence which comes from other international bodies. In the Bosnian 
Genocide case, the Court pointed out that:  
The Court moreover notes that evidence obtained by examination of 
persons directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-examined by judges 
skilled in examination and experienced in assessing large amounts of factual 
information, some of it of a technical nature, merits special attention. The Court 
thus will give appropriate consideration to the Report of the Porter Commission, 
which gathered evidence in this manner. The Court further notes that, since its 
publication, there has been no challenge to the credibility of this Report, which has 
been accepted by both Parties
94
. 
And in the Croatian Genocide case, the Court said that: 
The Court considers that it must give evidential weight to the first of the 
above-mentioned documents, by reason both of the independent status of its author, 
and of the fact that it was prepared at the request of organs of the United Nations, 
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for purposes of the exercise of their functions. The Court notes that Croatia has not 
disputed the objective nature of that report, even though it does not agree with 
certain of its factual findings
95
. 
In the Bosnian Genocide case, the Court gave ―special attention‖ to, among 
others, two kinds of evidence: the testimonies and evidence presented in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Final Report 
of the United Nations Commission of Experts nominated by the Security Council to 
analyze breaches committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
96
. The Court 
recognized that ―[t]he fact-finding process of the ICTY falls within this formulation, as 
'evidence obtained by examination of persons directly involved', tested by cross-
examination, the credibility of which has not been challenged subsequently‖97. These 
two groups of evidence (ICTY judgments and hearings, U.N. Commission of Experts) 
were very frequently used by the Court as were the testimonies given by the witnesses 
who participated in the elaboration of those documents.  
The same happened in the Croatian Genocide case, where the Court gave 
special attention both to ICTY judgments and to the Report on the situation of human 
rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Court also gave ―evidential weight 
to certain statements cited by Serbia from persons who directly witnessed such attacks 
and gave evidence before courts in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the years 
following Operation ìStorm‘‖98. 
In the Bosnian Genocide case the Court also gave especial attention to the 
evidence presented by one of the experts appointed by Bosnia who already had 
participated in the ICTY proceedings. As stated by the Court, ―Mr. Riedlmayer‘s report 
together with his testimony before the Court and other corroborative sources detail the 
destruction of the cultural and religious heritage of the protected group in numerous 
locations in Bosnia and Herzegovina‖99. Despite the fact that Serbia and Montenegro 
contested the evidence presented by him through cross-examination, the Court 
considered that ―Mr. Riedlmayer‘s findings do constitute persuasive evidence as to the 
destruction of historical, cultural and religious heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
albeit in a limited geographical area‖100. 
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 To appoint an expert that had already presented a report before other tribunals 
and to submit him to cross examination was an interesting strategy used by the Bosnia. 
The fact that Mr. Riedlmayer had already presented a report on the occasion of the 
Miloševic trial before the ICTY would be enough to take that report into consideration 
as evidence. In calling him to testify and, therefore, submitting him to cross-
examination, the Applicant played a card that might have enhanced the value of the 
expert's testimony, thus being qualified by the Court as ―persuasive evidence‖. 
Another element that can be stressed is the parties' main function in defining 
the procedure to be followed concerning the presentation and examination of experts 
and witnesses during the hearings. These choices proved to be fundamental and carried 
out consequences to the evidential evaluation of experts and witnesses. A clear example 
was the waiving of the right of cross-examination in the Genocide case by Croatia. 
 
e The use of experts in the Whaling in the Antarctic case. 
 
The Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) was another case in which 
―vast amounts of highly technical scientific evidence‖101 was adduced before the Court, 
whose task was to verify whether the Japanese whaling programme (JARPA II) could 
be considered as ―for the purposes of scientific research‖ under the terms of Article VIII 
of the Whaling Convention
102
. In this case the parties had recourse to experts appointed 
in accordance with Articles 57 and 64 of the Court‘s rules. The Court‘s criticism of the 
use of expert counsels in the Pulp Mills case seems to have been taken into account by 
the parties in the Whaling in the Antarctic case and neither party resorted to expert 
counsel. 
With regard to the party-appointed experts, the first issue which is worth 
examining concerns the selection of the individuals appointed as experts. One may 
wonder whether the expert's backgrounds have any impact on the conviction of the 
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Court. In this respect, it may be interesting to note that one of the experts appointed by 
Australia was a member of the Australian government
103
. From a theoretical viewpoint, 
it could be suggested that this close relationship with the government could undermine 
the evidential weight of this expert opinion. 
A different question is whether it would be appropriate for the parties to 
appoint, as experts, individuals who were directly involved in the case, having acted as 
experts of one of the parties in relation to the programme or activity which gave rise to 
the dispute. Thus, for instance, Japan had refrained from appointing as experts (or 
witnesses) the Japanese scientists who were involved in JARPA II. One might suggest 
that their presence would have been useful in order to better understand the scientific 
premise of the programme. The Court did not fail to notice their absence. However, it is 
hard to infer from the judgment what would have been the Court‘s preference on this 
point. When examining the use of lethal methods in the JARPA II program the Court 
stressed that it "did not hear directly from Japanese scientists involved in designing 
JARPA II".
104
 A member of the Court asked Japan what analysis it had conducted on 
the feasibility of non-lethal methods prior to setting the sample sizes for each year of 
JARPA II. Japan did not offer any documents to clarify this issue and, eventually, the 
Court concluded that ―[t]he absence of any evidence pointing to consideration of the 
feasibility of non-lethal methods was not explained‖.105 From these two passages, one is 
left with the impression that the Court tacitly criticized the absence of a certain type of 
expert, i.e. an expert that had participated in the JARPA II program and which Japan could 
have utilised to sustain its position. In this respect, the ―non-explanation‖ of this absence 
appears to have weakened Japan‘s argument. However, as a counter-argument, one could 
say that the decision not to appoint Japanese experts who had participated in the 
development of the JARPA II program was justified by the need to avoid a ―biased 
witness‖.106 In particular, it could be argued that, if Japan had appointed experts who 
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had participated in the JARPA II program, the Court would have given little evidential 
weight to the evidence presented by them since, as the Court had noted in a previous 
case, ―a member of the government of a State (...) tends to identify himself with the 
interests of his country, and to be anxious when giving evidence to say nothing which 
could prove adverse to its cause‖.107 
The last observation raises a general issue about the possibility of transposing 
some of the criteria established by the Court with regard to the evidential weighing of 
―ordinary‖ witnesses to that of witness-experts108. The judgment did not say anything on 
this point. Interestingly, the Court appeared to take into consideration the fact that the 
expert‘s opinion diverged from the position taken by the State that appointed him. Thus, 
the Court took into account the criticism of the expert appointed by Japan, Mr. Walløe, 
with reference to the transparency of the activities performed by the JARPA II 
programme.
109
 The idea of giving relevance to expert opinions which contradict the 
State‘s position can be compared to the criterion according to which weight must be 
given to declarations made by State‘s officials when these declarations are unfavourable 
to the State.
110
 
With regard to the Court‘s general approach to the assessment of expert 
opinions, an aspect which emerges from the judgment is that the Court seemed to give 
particular importance to the existence of an agreement between the opinions expressed 
by the experts appointed by the parties. For instance, when assessing the transparency of 
the Japanese programme, the Court observed that ―[t]he evidence shows that the JARPA 
II Research Plan lacks transparency in the reasons for selecting particular sample sizes 
for individual research items. This is a matter on which the experts called by the two 
Parties agreed, as described above‖.111  It also emphasized that ―the process used to 
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determine the sample size for Minke whales lacks transparency, as the experts called by 
each of the Parties agreed‖.112 
By the same token, the Court gave relevance to the fact that the opinion 
expressed by an expert appointed by a party had not been contested by the other party. 
Thus, when assessing whether the number of whales killed was reasonable according to 
the scientific purposes of the JARPA II programme, the Court, referring to the opinion 
expressed by the expert appointed by Australia, noted the fact that ―Japan did not refuse 
this expert opinion‖.113 
It is certainly not surprising that the Court attached importance to the existence 
of an agreement between experts or to the fact that the opinion of one expert was not 
contested by a party. If the parties bear the burden of proof, it is fair to give importance 
to the agreement of the experts presented by them in regard to the facts and 
circumstances of the case. Put differently, it seems quite logical that when the experts 
appointed by the parties share a scientific evaluation it is difficult for the Court to take a 
different view. However, the overall impression is that the evidential weight given by 
the Court to expert opinions was directly related to the extent that they allowed the 
Court to identify the emergence of a consensus regarding a certain fact or scientific 
data. Using this logic, the interest in having experts in the proceedings lies in the fact 
that they also allow the existence of an agreement with regard to the scientific facts in 
dispute to be revealed. Accordingly, the evidential weight of expert opinions appears to 
be closely connected to their contribution to the emergence of that agreement. In this 
respect, the ―search‖ for consensus appears, to some degree, to have a greater role than 
the ―search‖ for scientific truth. This seems to conform to the adversarial logic that 
governs the Court‘s proceedings. 
Having said this, two observations are in order. First, it is clear that the 
importance attached to the emergence of a consensus regarding a certain fact or 
scientific data should not diminish the role played by the Court in the assessment of the 
evidence. Significantly, in its judgment in Whaling in the Antarctic, the Court appears 
to have made recourse to technical arguments which had not been previously discussed 
between the experts. Secondly, it might well be that the agreement of the experts do not 
reflect the agreement of the parties, for instance because the opinion of one expert 
contradicts the views expressed by the party who appointed him. It may also be that the 
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expert opinions reveal a consensus over a view which does not entirely reflect that of 
either parties. In both cases it seems reasonable that the Court attaches importance to the 
agreement of the experts irrespective of the position of the parties. 
As noted by some authors,
114
 a problem arises when experts take different 
positions on controversial questions of technical and scientific nature, a situation which 
has been labelled by the Court as ―the clash of expert opinions‖.115 
In the past, as the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project and Pulp Mills cases show, 
when confronted with divergent scientific evidence, ―the Court [did] not find it 
necessary to resolve the clash of expert opinions‖116 and clearly stated the "[t]he Court 
is unable to accept the position that in order to decide this case, it must first make a 
determination upon a disagreement between scientists of distinction as to the more 
plausibly correct interpretation of apparently incomplete scientific data"
117
. Some 
authors suggested that in those situations, the Court prefers to circumvent the problem 
and rely on legal techniques.
118
 
This approach was also followed in the Whaling in the Antarctic case. In order 
to avoid taking a position on issues over which experts had expressed divergent views, 
the Court referred to different arguments. For instance, with regard to the problem of the 
reliability and value of data collected in JARPA II, the experts appointed by the parties 
offered contradictory opinions and the Court considered that ‗[t]his disagreement 
appears to be about a matter of scientific opinion‘119. With regard to the experts‘ 
disagreement about the determination of the criteria in order to establish the meaning of 
the expression ‗scientific research‘, in the sense of Article VIII of the Whaling 
Convention, the Court relied on the distinction between questions of fact and questions 
of law. It found that since the interpretation of the expression ‗scientific research‘ was a 
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question of law,
120
 it was for the Court to solve this question, without decisively taking 
into consideration the indications offered by the experts. In the Court‘s view, even if, 
―as a matter of scientific opinion, the experts called by the Parties agreed that lethal 
methods can have a place in scientific research, while not necessarily agreeing on the 
conditions for their use‖, ―[t]heir conclusions as scientists, however, must be 
distinguished from the interpretation of the Convention, which is the task of this 
Court‖.121 
As a general assessment, however, in comparison with the approach taken in 
the past practice, it was rightly observed that ―the Court‘s change of approach in the 
Whaling in the Antarctic case is to be welcomed, as it offers the opportunity for a more 
rigorous treatment of complex scientific evidence‖122. 
 
f. The Certain Activities and Construction of a Road cases. 
 
Technical questions were raised during the joint proceedings of the cases 
Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River 
(Nicaragua v. Costa Rica). The first case concerned, inter alia, Nicaragua‘s violations 
of international obligations as a result of its dredging activities performed in the 
Colorado River. The second case was related to Costa Rica's violation of its obligations 
through the construction of a road along the San Juan River. Both parties had scientific 
advisers and experts as part of their delegations, but they also nominated party-
appointed experts to present reports and to be cross-examined during the hearings in 
accordance with Articles 57 and 64 of the Court‘s rules. The use of experts in these 
cases demonstrates some similarities with the use of experts in the Whaling in the 
Antarctic case. 
One interesting feature of this case relates to the appointment of experts. 
Before the oral hearings on the Construction of a Road case, Nicaragua suggested the 
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appointment of ―a neutral expert on the basis of Articles 66 and 67 of the Rules‖.123 
Costa Rica did not agree with the request and, in response, asserted ―that there [was] no 
basis for the Court to exercise its power to appoint an expert as requested by 
Nicaragua‖. It was not the first case in which the Court was asked by one of the parties 
to appoint experts to collaborate with respect to an assessment of the factual background 
of a dispute
124
. Nor was it the first time that the Court preferred not to appoint neutral 
experts without offering the reasons for its decision. It is clearly a matter for 
speculation, but the disagreement between the parties on the appointment of experts is 
probably factor taken into account for the decision not to appoint independent experts. 
On the one hand therefore, the Court preferred not to appoint independent 
experts, on the other, the Court assumed a more active role in indicating the kind of 
expert evidence it would be interested in hearing from. Through its Registry and at the 
beginning of the proceedings, the Court suggested that the parties call experts who 
offered technical support to the legal teams in the writing phase: 
the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court would find it useful if, 
during the course of the hearings in the two cases, they could call the experts 
whose reports were annexed to the written pleadings, in particular Mr. Thorne and 
Mr. Kondolf. The Registrar also indicated that the Court would be grateful if, by 15 
January 2015 at the latest, the Parties would make suggestions regarding the 
modalities of the examination of those experts
125
.  
 
Putting it another way, the Court suggested to the litigants that they should 
repeat the approach taken by the parties in the Whaling in the Antarctic case. It appears 
that there is a line of continuity in the Court‘s thinking, in terms of the Court's 
discouragement of the use of expert counsel in the Pulp Mills case and its active 
statement of willingness to receive a certain kind of expert evidence in the Certain 
Activities and Construction of a Road cases. In doing so, one could argue that the Court 
seems to indicate a "preferable practice" with regard to the appointment of experts. 
Moreover, the Court nominally pointed out whom it would find particularly useful to 
hear during the oral phase. A second unfolding conclusion of this passage of the 
judgment reinforces the idea that it is not sufficient that the parties adduce technical and 
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scientific evidence through written evidence and reports; instead it made clear that this 
evidence should be properly tested by the procedure of cross-examination. 
Another issue related to evidence raised in this case was the availability of the 
parties in relation to the organization of a site visit – an issue connected to the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case. Although there was an agreement between the 
parties as to the possibility of the Court carrying out a site visit, Nicaragua "reiterated its 
proposal that the Court appoint an expert to assess the construction of the road, and 
suggested that the expert be included in the Court‘s delegation for any site visit"126. 
Costa Rica replied to this proposal stating that "the appointment of an expert by the 
Court was unnecessary"
127
. Ultimately, "the Registrar informed the Parties that the 
Court had decided not to carry out a site visit". One could only speculate whether the 
absence of agreement between the parties on the site visit was decisive in the Court‘s 
decision not to perform it.  It is also a matter of speculation whether the fact that Costa 
Rica refused the appointment of experts carried any particular significance for the 
Court. 
As to the role of experts in the cases at issue, it appears that they performed a 
relevant function, especially if one considers that the Court made reference to the 
evidence presented by them in several passages of the Judgment. In particular, the 
agreement between party-appointed experts was referred to on two occasions. Firstly, 
the Court gave weight to it in order to determine the existence of a certain factual 
situation with relation to the use of one of the caños
128
. Secondly, experts were used to 
confirm that the activities carried out by Nicaragua "would not have a significant impact 
on the flow of the Colorado River". Indeed, the Court observed that "this conclusion 
was later confirmed by both Parties‘ experts".129 The Court concluded that 
"[h]aving examined the evidence in the case file, including the reports 
submitted and testimony given by experts called by both Parties, the Court finds 
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that the dredging programme planned in 2006 was not such as to give rise to a risk 
of significant transboundary harm, either with respect to the flow of the Colorado 
River or to Costa Rica‘s wetland"130.  
 
In referring to the agreement between the party-appointed experts, the Court 
seems to reiterate the criterion adopted in the Whaling in the Antarctic case which 
consists of attributing evidential weight to the consensus emerging between the parties 
through the expert opinions. 
On the other hand, the Court did not refer to experts' opinions only when 
agreement had been reached between them. The Court took note and seemed to attribute 
evidential weight to the declaration contrary to the interests of the party which 
appointed the expert, thus reiterating the approach taken in Whaling in the Antarctic. In 
relation to Costa Rica's allegation of harm caused by Nicaragua's dredging activities, the 
Court used the statement of "[Costa Rica's] main expert [observing] that 'there is no 
evidence that the dredging programme has significantly affected flows in the Río 
Colorado'".
131
  
In the Construction of a Road case, the Court made reference to the evidence 
presented by experts in three passages without giving any evidential weight to them
132
. 
Indeed, the Court seemed to pay careful attention to the language they used when the 
statements of the experts coincided with those of the party. The Court seemed to be 
aware that the expert evidence presented by party-appointed experts corresponded to the 
positions sustained by the States. This correspondence between expert-opinion and 
State-argument seems to reinforce the doubt cast on the impartiality of an expert 
nominated by a party in the proceedings. 
If, on one hand, the agreement between the experts was relevant to determining 
the existence of some sediment eroding from the road to the river, on the other hand the 
disagreement between experts was also noted by the Court: 
"The Court further observes that there is considerable disagreement 
amongst the experts on key data such as the areas subject to erosion and the 
appropriate erosion rates, which led them to reach different conclusions as to the 
total amount of sediment contributed by the road". 
The Court preferred to avoid making a deliberation on the value of the 
conflicting opinions by observing that: 
 The Court sees no need to go into a detailed examination of the scientific 
and technical validity of the different estimates put forward by the Parties‘ experts. 
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Suffice it to note here that the amount of sediment in the river due to the 
construction of the road represents at most 2 per cent of the river‘s total load, 
according to Costa Rica‘s calculations based on the figures provided by 
Nicaragua‘s experts and uncontested by the latter (see paragraphs 182 to 183 above 
and 188 to 191 below)
133
. 
 
In the last part of this passage, the Court referred once more to the criterion 
which takes into account uncontested expert evidence, which was also used in the 
Whaling in the Antarctic case. 
One can argue that the main open question relates to the event that there is 
disagreement between the party-appointed experts. This question was not resolved by 
the Court in the Certain Activities and Construction of a Road cases. However, it does 
not appear that the problem of conflicting expert-opinions was a central issue in these 
cases. In examining the quantity of sediment added to the river, the Court concluded 
that, on the ground that the construction of the road was contributing at most to 2 per 
cent of the river's total load, "significant harm cannot be inferred therefrom"
134
. Unlike 
Whaling case, where the Court had preferred not to resolve the question at stake by 
referring to questions of law, the Court resolved the disagreement by referring to the 
evidence adduced before it. 
 
2.1.4. Assessment. 
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the examination of the Court's case law 
regarding the use of experts, witnesses and expert-witnesses in the sense of Article 64 of 
the Rules of the Court. 
Firstly, there has been a growth in the use of experts, witnesses and witnesses 
experts in the Court's case law.  
Secondly, the Court seems to have found an adequate procedure for the 
appointment and examination of the experts, which is structured in the four 
aforementioned phases. This procedure guarantees an intense participation of the parties 
from the beginning of the proceedings, when defining the procedure to be followed. It 
also guarantees the active participation of the Court. The growing number of questions 
coming from the bench to witnesses and experts appear to confirm this more proactive 
role of the Court. The recent trend to combine written statements and oral examination, 
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particularly in the Croatian Genocide and Whaling cases, which was defended in 
doctrine
135
, has contributed to the improvement of the procedure because at the same 
time that it serves the reliability of the evidence presented, it guarantees the due process 
by allowing the right to comment the evidence presented. 
Thirdly, since the Nicaragua case and especially after the Genocide and 
Whaling cases, it can be noted that the criteria used to evaluate the evidential weight of 
testimonies before the Court have been substantially clarified. This criteria help the 
parties to make a better use of experts in their cases. 
The use of experts, witnesses and expert-witnesses leaves some questions still 
open, however.  
The first question concerns the independence of experts and witnesses. These 
experts and witnesses are not paid by the Court and are, in most of the cases, paid by the 
parties to offer their testimony before the Court. It is true that, unlike counsels, they are 
cross-examined. However, at the end of the day, they are always speaking on behalf of 
the party who appointed them.  
The most fundamental problem that the use of experts and witnesses seems to 
reveal is the so called question of "clash of expertise". The problem is not new; it dates 
from the Corfu channel case and it occurred in a great number of cases. The problem 
was formulated by Kolb in the following words: "Experts tend to neutralize each other, 
each side producing those who support its case. The technical nature of their evidence 
does little to help the members of the Court, since they lack the necessary expertise to 
evaluate it"
136
. 
The criticism advanced by Kolb reveals two dimensions of the problem. The 
first is the clash per se, that means,  the tendency of experts to contradict each other 
when they appear in the proceedings. The second dimension is the fact that the Court, 
when confronted to such a clash of opinions, does not possess the instruments necessary 
to evaluate or assess this technical divergence. In short terms, the Court cannot decide 
over the technical disagreement. 
Manfred Lachs had already identified this problem in the nineties. He  offered 
a possible solution to the problem:  
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How far the Court should rely on these or other experts is a question of 
discretion, as it has happened in the past that experts of parties supporting the 
claims of each of them rely on different theories and offer explanations which are 
the result of different reasoning. In such instances, the Court might have to call on 
an expert for its own purposes in deciding the dispute, not only between the parties, 
but between the other experts appearing before it
 137
. 
However, it appears that the solution indicated by Lachs has not been followed 
by the Court. In fact, the disagreement of the experts indicated by the parties is a 
constant in cases raising problems related to scientific evidence. As we have seen, the 
most recent example occurred in the Whaling in Antarctic case.  
It is true that in certain cases ―the Court [did] not find it necessary to resolve the 
clash of expert opinions‖138. It remains, however, that the question of the clash of 
expertise is still an open one. 
 
2.2. Expert counsels. 
 
With the purpose of strengthening their arguments from a technical point of 
view, the parties under a dispute before the Court have been frequently making recourse 
to experts counsels. The expert counsel integrates the team of lawyers of a State and can 
plead before the Court in such a role. It is not rare to find in the list of a State‘s counsels 
a list of ―Scientific Advisors or Experts‖139 or ―Expert Advisor‖140. These experts have 
essentially two functions. The first is to contribute to the legal defense of the party by 
providing assistance on technical issues arising in connection to the dispute. The second 
is to offer the Court their expertise as a way to reinforce the party‘s arguments. In 
Rosenne‘s words ―[p]leadings cannot always be left to professional attorneys, especially 
when technical questions are involved‖141.  
From the normative point of view, the use of an expert counsel is implicitly 
admitted in Articles 42, paragraph 2, and 43, paragraph 5, of the Statute. These 
provisions set forth the possibility that the parties ―may have the assistance of counsel 
or advocates before the Court‖. Nothing excludes the possibility that the party‘s 
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delegation includes the presence of experts that participate in the oral phase before the 
Court
142
.  
An expert counsel differs from an expert witness in that the assessment of a  
witness must be made according to a specific procedure, which does not apply to expert 
counsels. In particular the requirement of cross-examination is not provided for in 
respect to the latter kind of expert.  Another element of distinction is the fact that the  
Rules do not require that expert counsels make the solemn declaration which is 
contemplated by article 64 of the Rules. This solemn declaration is recognized by the 
Court as an important element that creates a link between the Court and the experts. As 
stressed by judge Greenwood, ―a witness or expert owes a duty to the Court which is 
reflected in the declaration required by Article 64 of the Rules of Court. The duties of 
someone appearing as counsel are quite different‖143. 
Because they are accorded the same treatment as the party‘s counsels, it may 
be asked what is probative value of statements rendered by expert counsels. The Court 
had addressed this issue only in few cases. During the hearing of the Armed Activities 
on the Territory of Congo case (Congo v. Uganda), after the plead of a member of 
Uganda‘s defense team about technical questions, president Shi stressed the fact that the 
expert took the floor as a counsel and advocate and was be treated as such
144
. In an 
earlier case, the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) case, the president of the 
Chamber, Bedjaoui, observed that in regard to the probative value of an expert counsel 
―the person in question would be considered by the Chamber as speaking on behalf of 
the party he represented, and not as making a personal statement as expert‖145.  Very 
recently, in the Whaling in Antarctic case, the Court adopted the same approach when it 
stated that ―the Court has decided that the material prepared by Professor Zeh and 
attached to the letter from the Agent of Japan dated 31 May 2013 will not be treated as 
expert evidence but rather as any other observations of the Government of Japan‖146.  
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In regard of their probative value, Murphy sustained that ―[w]hether the ICJ 
actually sees a probative difference in information presented in the form of a statement 
by counsel or advisers, as opposed to a statement by an expert witness, is unclear‖147. 
However, it seems that the fact that the Court operated a distinction in recent judgments 
allows one to argue that they have a different probative value. It is true, however, that, 
as Bezing wrote, ―the exact role of party-appointed experts has not been specifically 
addressed by the Court‖148.  
The question of the relevance of expert counsels as a means of proof was 
squarely addressed by the Court in the Pulp Mills case (Argentina v. Uruguay). This 
case raised highly complex scientific evidence. For different reasons, it prompted a wide 
debate over the use of experts before the Court
149
. Among other issues, the Court had to 
verify the existence of environmental damage caused by the installation of a pulp mill 
on the border of Uruguay River. The Court preferred not to indicate its own experts 
(using the possibility envisaged in article 50), and it decided the case by simply relying 
on the proofs presented by the parties. In a well-known passage, the Court stated: 
 despite the volume and complexity of the factual information submitted 
to it, it is the responsibility of the Court, after having given careful consideration to 
all the evidence placed before it by the Parties, to determine which facts must be 
considered relevant, to assess their probative value, and to draw conclusions from 
them as appropriate
150
.  
Besides all the technical proofs presented before the Court through documents, 
the parties also made use of experts that pleaded before the Court as counsels. As such, 
they could not be cross-examined. The Court‘s reaction to the parties‘ approach was the 
following one:  
[r]egarding those experts who appeared before it as counsel at the 
hearings, the Court would have found it more useful had they been presented by 
the Parties as expert witnesses under Articles 57 and 64 of the Rules of Court, 
instead of being included as counsel in their respective delegations. The Court 
indeed considers that those persons who provide evidence before the Court based 
on their scientific or technical knowledge and on their personal experience should 
testify before the Court as experts, witnesses or in some cases in both capacities, 
rather than counsel, so that they may be submitted to questioning by the other party 
as well as by the Court
151
. 
                                                 
147
 MURPHY, The ELSI Case,  p.444. 
148
 BEZING, Evidentiary Issues, p. 1218. 
149
 See COUTASSE, SWEENEY-SAMUELSON, Adjudicating Conflicts over Resources: The 
ICJ's Treatment of Technical Evidence in the Pulp Mills Case, in 3 Goettingen Journal of International 
Law 447, 2011. 
150
 I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 168. 
151
 Pulp Mills, Judgment, para. 167. The Court‘s reprimand seemed to be heard. In the next 
case involving complex scientific issues appeared before the Court, the Whaling in Antarctic case, even if 
the parties had appointed ―scientific experts‖ to integrate their delegations, these experts do not 
46 
 
Thus, the Court clearly distinguished between expert witnesses and expert 
counsels.  The consequence of this distinction in terms of evidentiary weight level is 
that it is possible to affirm that experts witnesses have a higher probative value in 
comparison to experts counsels, particularly because of the possibility of cross 
examination. The value of the expert witnesses opinion is not valuable only by itself, 
but as a result of the process of examination by the parties and also by the Court. 
In another passage of the judgment, the Court addressed the question of the 
probative value of the different ―interpretations‖ given by the expert‘s counsels. The 
Court said: ―in assessing the probative value of the evidence placed before it, the Court 
will principally weigh and evaluate the data, rather than the conflicting interpretations 
given to it by the Parties or their experts and consultants‖152. This passage highlights 
another element. In cases in which scientific questions are at stake, it is expected that 
both parties will offer scientific expertise to prove their arguments on questions of fact 
and, consequently, the Court will be faced with conflicting expert evidence.  In these 
situations, the probative value of the expert‘s counsels tend to be almost pointless. This 
appears to be  the final conclusion arrived at by the Court. The absence of expertise in a 
case can be inadvisable but their presence is not decisive if presented in such a way. 
 Whether parties will continue to use expert counsels or not, the position held 
by the Court in respect to their use by the parties shows the importance assigned by the 
Court to elements such as the possibility of cross-examining experts. 
 
 
II) Experts ex curiae. 
 
 
2.3  Invisible Experts, informal experts or experts ―fantômes”. 
 
In order to evaluate technical and complex evidence underlying a case, the ICJ 
has made recourse to a figure known as the invisible experts, ―experts fantômes‖153 or 
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internal ‗unofficial‘ experts154. As the name suggests, this category of experts are 
invisible and it is not well known when they were or were not used by the ICJ; also 
unknown is the content of their reports. Nevertheless, it is known that sometimes, 
during the deliberation stage, the Court utilized the assistance of experts who do not 
officially participated in the procedure. The main ―proofs‖ of their existence are 
references made by some judges
155
 or by the Court‘s Registrar. In the words of a former 
President of the Court, Jennings,  
the Court has not infrequently employed cartographers, hydrographers, 
geographers, linguists, and even specialized legal experts to assist in the 
understanding of the issue in a case before it; and has not on the whole felt any 
need to make this public knowledge or even to apprise the parties
156
.   
The actual Registrar of the Court, Couvreur, explained that this kind of experts 
is employed by the Registry as ―agents of short duration‖, who do not participate in the 
procedures. Their function is to assist the Registrar or the judges in an individual way. 
An example referred by Couvreur was the study of cartographic material in cases 
dealing with territorial and maritime delimitation
157
.  
This kind of expert is  not expressly contemplated by the Rules or the Statute. 
However, the Court‘s power to make use of them could, in theory, be based on a broad 
reading of article 62 of Court‘s rules, which states: 
1. The Court may at any time call upon the parties to produce such 
evidence or to give such explanations as the Court may consider to be necessary for 
the elucidation of any aspect of the matters in issue, or may itself seek other 
information for this purpose. 
Thus, it could be held that the Court would not be acting beyond its powers 
when it seeks qualified information with the purpose to elucidate any aspect of the 
matter in issue. Other problems may appear, however. 
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The way in which the Court made use of this category of experts has been 
criticized because it does not observe to the criteria of transparency and procedural 
fairness
158
. When the Court employs experts fantômes, the parties a) do not know the 
identity of these experts (and one can argue that sometimes experts can be influenced in 
their specific beliefs and research choices); b) do not know the opinion given by the 
experts to the Court; c) do not know the doubts and questions that the judges have, 
which is an important element in regard to the full comprehension of the facts and the 
thinking of the Court; and finally d) do not have the opportunity to offer any counter-
arguments against the proof presented by these experts.
 159
 
In addition, besides these shortcomings, even when the Court did use invisible 
experts, their presence is not a guarantee of a full understanding of the complex and 
scientific facts in dispute.  This point was made by judge Simma and Al-Khasawneh in 
their joint dissenting opinion in the Pulp Mills case
160
. They keenly criticized the 
Court‘s methods of fact-assessing, holding that 
 under circumstances such as in the present case, adopting such a practice 
would deprive the Court of the above-mentioned advantages of transparency, 
openness, procedural fairness, and the ability for the Parties to comment upon or 
otherwise assist the Court in understanding the evidence before it
161
. 
The two judges argued that in some cases the consultation of this category of 
experts may be excusable ―if the input they provide relates to the scientific margins of a 
case‖; however, they stressed that the situation changes when the case deals with 
complex scientific evidence
162
. In their opinion, in adopting this solution, the Court was 
neglecting two essential values to guarantee the good administration of justice: 
transparency and procedural fairness, which are important because ―they require the 
Court to assume its overall duty for facilitating the production of evidence and to reach 
the best representation of the essential facts in a case, in order best to resolve a 
dispute‖163. 
Another problem that arises because of the use of this kind of experts is related 
possibility of invisible experts committing errors in the performance of their functions. 
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Due to it, some argue that when the Court made use of experts fantômes ―it does 
manifest itself when the Court delivers its judgment‖164. The cases referred to are 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain and Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
165
, both dealing with 
boundaries. According one author, in the case Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon 
v. Nigeria), the Court reached different conclusions from that submitted by the parties, 
suggesting, therefore, that it had recourse to its own experts in that delimitation. The 
author sustained that ―[t]he feeling of the parties is that it would have been difficult for 
the members of the Court to reach those conclusions without some sort of technical 
assistance‖ and, on account of it, he argued that the Court ―has shown itself to be 
particularly vulnerable to making errors is in its depiction of maritime boundary lines‖ 
because of a possible inadequate use of experts
166
. Other authors made reference to the 
Court‘s technical ―errors‖ originated from bad use of expertise167. This is a criticism that 
derives from the scarce transparency in this procedure. 
The fact that the experts fantômes exist and have been used by the Court is a 
clear sign demonstrating the Court‘s need of technical input. As pointed out by Simma 
―the Court on its own could not possibly assess and weigh such complex evidence 
without expert assistance‖168. One could ask why the Court still utilizes this kind of 
figure to aid in the deliberation despite the criticism directed against this figure. The 
Court never indicated it explicitly, but it is possible to speculate. The experts fantômes 
offer the Court some advantages in contrast to other procedures contemplated in the 
Statute and the Rules: essentially, time and flexibility in the proceedings. The process of 
nomination and examination of the expert phantom is, in theory, faster than any 
procedure available and allows the judges a direct and flexible approach to the proofs 
presented. In particular, it allows the Court to call who it wants, in the way it wants, to 
answer whenever questions it wants. The utilization of experts fantômes is a quick and 
flexible way to furnish the Court with high technical assistance.  
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Despite these advantages, this method has the already indicated limits and, 
putting into a balance, it is a question of choice between celerity and flexibility, on the 
one hand, and transparency and judicial fairness, on the other.  
 
2.4. Court-appointed experts under article 50 of the Statute. 
 
2.4.1. Article 50 of the Statute. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Under Article 50 of its Statute, the Court ―may, at any time, entrust any 
individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the 
task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion‖. Connected to the idea of a 
permanent judicial body in contrast to arbitration,  the Court was endowed with efficient 
instruments in order to seek by itself relevant evidence. This stronger evidentiary power 
granted to the tribunal may be regarded as reflecting a civil law approach to the proof
169
. 
Article 50 provides the Court with powers to control the proceedings and interfere 
directly in the production of evidence. These powers are now considered inherent to the 
judicial functions.
170
 In this vein, Anzilotti deemed that Article 50 mirrored ―a general 
principle of procedure‖.171  
The power conferred to the Court by Article 50 is further regulated in a number 
of provisions of the Court‘s Rules. The provision which relates specifically to the 
experts appointed by Article 50 is Article 67 of the Rules:  
Article 67 
          1. If the Court considers it necessary to arrange for an enquiry or an 
expert opinion, it shall, after hearing the parties, issue an order to this effect, 
defining the subject of the enquiry or expert opinion, stating the number and mode 
of appointment of the persons to hold the enquiry or of the experts, and laying 
down the procedure to be followed.  Where appropriate, the Court shall require 
persons appointed to carry out an enquiry, or to give an expert opinion, to make a 
solemn declaration. 
          2. Every report or record of an enquiry and every expert opinion 
shall be communicated to the parties, which shall be given the opportunity of 
commenting upon it. 
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Article 50 gives the Court a broad power to appoint individual, body, bureau, 
commission, or other organization that it may select to conduct an inquiry or give a 
specific technical opinion. In doing so, the provision does not set out a specific 
procedure to be followed nor establishes the number of experts
172
 or institutions that the 
Court can consult while making use of these powers. In fact, the expert procedure shall 
be settled ad hoc through an order, according to paragraph 1 of Article 63 of the Rules. 
The vagueness of this provision implies that a wide discretion is given to the Court on 
all these matters. Moreover, while the parties have the right to appoint their own 
experts, they do not have a right to have experts appointed by the Court. It is up to the 
Court to take this decision. There is no kind of restriction as to the subject matter over 
which the Court may decide to have recourse to experts. The Court can have an 
expertise on different matters, such as maritime delimitation, environmental damage, 
whale hunting or even linguistics. It has been argued, for instance, that the powers given 
to the Court by Article 50 could also be used in obtaining an expert opinion on a 
question of municipal law
173
.  
The text of Article 50 does not fix a time limit within which recourse to experts 
must be made. Even after the hearing of the party-appointed experts
174
, the Court has 
the possibility to nominate its own experts. The Corfu Channel case is a precedent in 
this respect. As noted by an author, ―[r]esort to independent experts in addition to, or in 
the absence of, experts called by litigating states is well established as an acceptable and 
helpful procedure in appropriate cases‖175. Moreover, the independence of the experts is 
an element of legitimacy of the procedure
176
. In conclusion, the Court has full control 
over the use of experts under Article 50. As Tams observed, ―it is clear that when 
applying Art. 50, the Court enjoys a wide margin of discretion and retains a 
considerable degree of control‖177.  
The only limitation to the exercise of the power under Article 50 concerns the 
issue of jurisdiction. It is clear that the Court cannot appoint experts to assess questions 
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of facts over which the Court does not have jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction 
was raised in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Application for Revision and Interpretation). Tunisia asked the Court to 
appoint experts to determine the exact co-ordinates of its frontier with Lybian Arab 
Jamahiriya, a matter already dealt with in the previous judgment on the merits of the 
dispute. The Court observed that Article 50 ―must be read in relation to the terms in 
which jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court in a specific case; the purpose of the 
expert opinion must be to assist the Court in giving judgment upon the issues submitted 
to it for decision‖178. Therefore, the Court held that if experts were appointed in this 
case the Court would be extending its jurisdiction.  
Article 67 of Court‘s Rules establishes that the Court, before appointing 
experts, must hear the views of the parties. It is not clear, however, for which purposes 
the Court shall hear the parties. Taking the Court‘s practice into account, it can be 
argued that the purpose is to hear the parties‘ views over the exact question that the 
experts will be called upon to address. Nonetheless, it cannot be excluded that the 
parties could have a say on all the three elements that the Court has to decide, namely a) 
the subject of the enquiry or the expert opinion, b) the number and mode of appointment 
of the experts c) the procedure to be followed. The relevant practice does not clarify 
what is the parties‘ role in this respect.  
Article 67 of the Rules also confers to the parties the right to comment upon 
the expert‘s reports. This assures that something similar to a cross-examination takes 
place. In this respect, it enhances the probative value of the expert report. 
It is interesting to note that the procedure established by the Rules in regard to 
Article 50 allows for transparency and the parties‘ participation in the experts 
examination. Both aspects are highly commendable. This also explains why recently a 
large part of the legal literature advocates a greater use of this provision
179
.  
 
2.4.2. The use of article 50‘s experts by the Court. 
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Despite the wide discretion granted under article 50, the ICJ has not made 
frequent recourse to independent experts in practice. In fact, the cases are only four: i) 
the Chorzow Factory case, from 1928; ii) the Corfu Channel case, from 1949; iii) the 
Gulf of Maine case, from 1984; and the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case
180
, now pending 
before the Court. 
The practice concerning the application of Article 50 can essentially be divided 
in two categories. The first category refers to cases in which the task assigned to experts 
by the Court is that of producing evidence. The second category relates to cases in 
which experts have been given a more limited role, such as that of assisting the Court in 
the assessment of the evidence produced by the parties or that of helping the Court in 
the assessment of the amount of reparation to be given by one of the parties.  
 
a. Chorzow Factory case.  
 
The Chorzow Factory case was the first case in which the Court made use of 
its power to nominate independent experts. In this case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice recognized that Poland had violated German national‘s rights when 
expropriating a German-owned industrial property inside Poland
181. After the merits‘ 
judgment, the Court, by an Order dated 13
th
 September 1928, nominated experts to 
enable ―the Court to fix, with a full knowledge of the facts (...) the amount of the 
indemnity to be paid by the Polish Government to the German Government‖182. Three 
experts were nominated to answer the specific questions asked by the Court in the 
order; the governments of Germany and Poland each appointed an assessor to follow the 
experts‘ inquiry. The experts never delivered their report because the parties reached an 
extrajudicial agreement over the question of reparation. 
The Factory at Chorzow is a classical case in which an international court uses 
experts to determine the precise amount of restitution to be paid, a frequent situation in 
the arbitral practice
183
. In cases involving the estimation of values to be due and the 
assessment of the amount of damages, ―the employment of independent expert 
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assistance is frequently desirable and sometimes obligatory, if the tribunal is to 
discharge its function satisfactorily‖184. 
In regard to the nomination of experts, there is no clear indication in the 
Court‘s documents about how the experts were chosen or whether the parties had 
participated in that process. However, it is noteworthy that the parties in their pleadings 
asked to have recourse to experts to assess the amount due. The Court probably took 
this into account when decided to appoint the experts at the compensation phase. 
On account of the absence of an experts‘ report in this case, any indication 
about the value of their opinion is also lacking. However, some elements can be 
extracted from the judges‘ individual opinions. For instance, it is interesting to note that 
a judge questioned ―whether it is worth while to delay the settlement of the case and to 
incur the difficulties connected with an expert report‖185. In judge Nyholm‘s opinion, 
the amount of evidence put before the Court was sufficient to allow it to give an 
immediate decision. Besides, he argued that after the presentation of the experts‘ 
opinion the Court could reopen the discussion of the merits
186
. Another interesting 
opinion is that of Lord Finlay. In his dissenting opinion he sustained that specific 
questions should not have been asked to the experts. For this reason he disagreed with 
the Court‘s judgment.  
 
b. The Corfu Channel case. 
 
In spite of this precedent in the PCIJ, the leading case, one that still remains a 
benchmark
187
 on the question of the use of experts by the ICJ, is the Corfu Channel 
case. This case is considered as ―the outstanding example of the use of experts by the 
ICJ‖188. The case is especially important because the Court made use of experts in two 
different situations. They were used not only for evaluating the compensation (as in the 
Factory at Chorzow), but also for determining the facts underlying the dispute. 
In this case, two British destroyers struck mines in Albanian waters and 
suffered damage, including loss of life. One of the questions that the Court had to 
address was whether or not Albania participated in the laying of the mines in the 
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channel and/or whether or not Albania was aware of it. In order to provide an answer to 
this question, the Court had to assess a range of technical issues as, e.g., the exact 
position of the swept channel or the type of mines laid in the water.  
Summing up the procedure, the United Kingdom filled its application in May 
1947 and, after the written proceedings and the hearing of parties‘ experts, an expert 
committee was appointed by the Court in December 1948. The first report of the 
committee was delivered in January 1949. A site visit by the experts was carried out in 
the same month. In February 1949 the parties submitted considerations about the reports 
presented and some Judges addressed questions to the expert committee. After the 
Judgment two other experts were nominated to help the Court in the compensation 
phase. 
The Court stressed the fact that a huge amount of evidence had been put before 
it by the parties, including maps, photographs and sketches
189
. As mentioned, both 
parties made use of expert witnesses. However, the Court, after noting that some points 
were contested by the parties
190, found that it was ―necessary to obtain an expert 
opinion‖191. Here lies an important element that can be extracted from the Corfu 
Channel case: the disagreement of the parties about technical questionsand the 
appointment by the Court of  its own independent experts as a response to that 
disagreement
 192
. 
In July 1948, the Registrar informed the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish 
ambassadors at The Hague and the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands that the Court or 
the parties of the Corfu Channel case ―may find it necessary to have recourse to experts 
on a number of difficult points‖193. The Registrar asked the ministers to ―draw up a list 
of naval officers who, if necessary, would be available for this kind of work‖194. During 
a meeting on 16
th
 November, President Guerrero informed the parties‘ Agents that the 
Court was considering appointing its own experts, but a decision had not yet been taken. 
                                                 
189
 About the standard of proof in this case, see DEL MAR, The International Court of Justice 
and standards of proof, in BANNELIER, CHRISTAKIS, HEATHCOTE, The ICJ and the Evolution of 
International Law: The enduring impact of the Corfu Channel case, New York, 2011, pp. 
190
 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.9.  
191
 Corfu, Judgment, p. 9. 
192
 And especially the disagreement of expert‘s parties, as was pointed by judge Winiarski in its 
dissenting opinion. See I.C.J. Reports 1949, Judgment, Dissenting opinion of Judge Winiarski, p. 46. 
193
 Corfu Channel case, Correspondence, Tome V, p. 170. 
194
 Ibid. 
56 
 
On that occasion the President also informed that the Court would transmit to the parties 
a copy of a draft order and hear oral argument upon it
195
.  
Thereafter, by an Order of 17
th
 December 1948, the Court made use of the 
powers provided by articles 48 and 50 of its Statute and appointed three naval 
experts
196
. 
The Court‘s method in choosing the experts was not completely transparent. As 
previously mentioned, it is possible to find in the Court‘s correspondence letters from 
the Registrar addressed to the Foreign Offices of different States asking for indications 
on naval experts. Nevertheless, neither in the Court‘s judgment nor in the Order are 
there indications on the criteria employed to choose the experts. Also, there are no 
indications whether the parties participated in the process of appointing the experts. It is 
established, however, that the parties participated in the elaboration of the questions 
submitted to Court‘s experts197. 
The mentioned Order listed eight specific questions that had to be answered by 
the experts after the analysis of the documents put before the Court.  Besides the 
questions, the Order also set forth some procedural steps to be followed by the 
Registrar, such as for instance those concerning the access to the documents or the time-
limit to deliver the report. The Order also established general guidelines to be followed 
by the experts when executing their functions.  Two of them deserve particular 
attention: 
―VI. The Experts shall bear in mind that their task is not to prepare a 
scientific or technical statement of the problems involved, but to give to the Court a 
precise and concrete opinion upon the points submitted to them.  
VII. The Experts shall not limit themselves to stating their findings; they 
will also, as far as possible, give the reasons for these findings in order to make 
their true significance apparent to the Court. If need be, they will mention any 
doubts or differences of opinion amongst them.‖198 
The judges‘ intentions in drawing these two ―guidelines‖ were, above all, to set 
precise limits to the work that the experts were called upon to perform. Point VI recalled 
the experts‘ functions in the proceedings, i.e., to answer precisely the questions 
addressed to them, avoiding a general analysis of the evidence. Point VII had essentially 
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two functions. When the Court asked the experts to ―give reasons‖ for their opinions, it 
meant they had to offer technical opinions based upon scientific knowledge. The second 
element that must be highlighted here is the consideration that highly complex factual 
situations can carry some degree of indetermination and uncertainty and the Court was 
aware of it.  
Summing up, the Order asked the experts to perform an ―assisting function‖ in 
the proceedings, that means, to analyze all the documentation offered by the parties and 
also the evidence produced by the experts appointed by the parties. It was a specific 
function of assessment and evaluation of evidence that already was at the Court‘s 
disposal. 
However, the report presented to the Court on 8
th
 January 1949 made clear that 
some of the conclusions drawn by the expert committee ―cannot be made without 
inspection of the locality‖199. Because of it, by a decision dated 17th January 1949, the 
ICJ requested the experts to make ―any investigations and, so far as possible, any 
experiments which they may consider useful with a view to verifying, completing and, 
if necessary, modifying the answers given in their Report filed by them on January 8
th
, 
1949‖200. 
The expert committee visited the Corfu Channel and investigated in loco, 
presenting a second report on 8
th
 February 1949. Thus, it is possible to affirm that the 
experts in the Corfu Channel case performed two different functions: first to evaluate 
the evidence (phase 1) and then to produce evidence by visiting the locations where the 
minefield was laid to offer the Court relevant data in dispute (phase 2). 
As regards to the procedure of examining the reports, the same decision from 
17
th
 January established the right of the parties to comment upon the experts‘ 
observations. Besides, the Court‘s experts were accompanied to the sites by one expert 
of each party
201
.  These two elements shows that the parties were offered the possibility 
to participate to the work of the experts and to comments their views. 
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After the presentation of the second report, occurred on 8
th
 February 1949, 
some judges asked the experts individual questions. The experts were not examined in 
an oral proceeding, but offered written answers to the judges‘ queries. 
In some passages of the report the experts were strongly emphatic about the 
conclusions their arrived at. They used expressions as ―we consider it beyond any doubt 
that‖, ―[o]ur conclusion, therefore, is definite‖, ―[t]here is no doubt that‖, ―[t]he only 
remaining possibility‖202. At the same time, the experts made it clear when they did not 
have at their disposal sufficient data to answer a specific question
203
, and when 
questions ―cannot possibly be answered‖204.  
The Court expressly recognized the high evidentiary value of the experts‘ 
reports. In a well known passage it observed that ―[t]he Court cannot fail to give great 
weight to the opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in a manner giving 
every guarantee of correct and impartial information‖205.  
In doing so, the Court established an important precedent in regard to the 
evidentiary value of experts.  
Two elements arise from the examination of the dissenting and individual 
opinions. The first one is the general agreement about the importance of the experts‘ 
opinion as a way of proof. The second element that was stressed by several judges is 
that an opinion given by an expert is not absolute.  
Judge Azevedo, although giving much importance to experts‘ opinions206, 
pointed out that some conclusions cannot be drawn from them and stressed that there is 
―always a risk of error‖207. Likewise, Judge Krylov remarked that the experts‘ opinions 
operate in the field of probability
208
. Also, as stated by Judge Badawi Pacha in its 
dissenting opinion, ―[o]n every side, then, there are unknown and vague facts, and this 
is why, when the Experts state that the operation must have been observed from a 
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certain point under certain conditions, they merely express a scientific probability or 
certainty, provided all the required conditions are fulfilled‖209.   
Furthermore, ad hoc judge Ečer strongly criticized the conclusions at which the 
experts arrived. In his opinion ―we are in the sphere of indirect evidence, indications 
and presumptions. The conclusions of the Experts themselves are based on indications, 
presumptions and conjectures‖210. That is the reason why, in the judge‘s opinion, 
―[a]ccording to a quite general rule of procedure, the Court is not bound by the opinion 
of experts. The Court may accept or reject it; but it must always give sufficient 
reasons‖211. Summarizing, judge Ečer argued that the opinion presented by the experts 
are circumstantial, being based on an ensemble of conditions that do not offer ―direct 
evidence‖ that Albania knew about the minefield. 
 The Corfu Channel case, being the only case where the Court employed 
independent experts for an in locu examination, also offers a contribution to the 
discussion about the duration of the expertise‘s proceeding. If one considers that the 
experts were nominated in December, that they presented their last report in February 
and were queried by the judges in the same month, it is possible to affirm that the 
procedure related to the experts‘ participation did not necessarily take an extensive 
amount of time.  
Once determined Albania‘s responsibility in the minelaying, it was up to the 
Court to determine the exact amount of compensation owned by the country to the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom presented its claim and Albania did not appear 
in this phase of the proceedings, arguing that the Court did not have jurisdiction over 
the determination of compensation. In the Court‘s opinion the ―estimates and figures 
submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom raise questions of a technical 
nature which call for the application of Article 50 of the Statute‖212. 
By an Order of 19 November 1949, the Court appointed two Dutch experts 
with the specific purpose to examine the ―the figures and estimates stated in the last 
submissions filed by the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the amount of 
its claim for the loss of the Saumarez and the damage caused to the Volage‖ 213. Once 
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again it is impossible to find any indication in the Court‘s decision or in its 
correspondence about the criteria which were employed for the selection of experts. 
It is interesting to note that in the Order the Court made express reference to 
the fact that ―the Government of the People's Republic of Albania has failed to defend 
its case and whereas, therefore, the Agent of the Government of the United Kingdom 
has asked that the Court decide in favor of the claim of his Government‖214. Therefore, 
it is possible to argue that the Court appointed experts to mitigate Albania‘s absence in 
the proceedings. They were used as an instrument to verify the exactness of the 
documents presented by the United Kingdom. In their conclusions, the experts asserted 
a higher value of the damages than that claimed by the United Kingdom. The Court 
decided to maintain the amount asked by UK taking into consideration the principle ne 
ultra petita
215
. 
 
c. The Gulf of Maine case 
 
The second case in which the Court made use of the power offered by Article 
50 in ICJ‘s case law dates back to 1984 in the context of the Gulf of Maine case. In this 
case, Canada and the United States asked the Court to delimit the maritime boundary 
that divides the continental shelf and fisheries zones of the two countries. Through a 
Special Agreement, the parties established that ―[t]he Parties shall request the Chamber 
to appoint a technical expert nominated jointly by the Parties to assist it in respect of 
technical matters and, in particular, in preparing the description of the maritime 
boundaries and the charts referred to in paragraph 2‖216. The Special Agreement also 
contained instructions that had to be observed by the experts
217
. These instructions were 
of a technical nature and included the choice of the common values to be used or 
specifications concerning the use of specific computer programs. 
By an Order made by the Chamber on 30
th
 March 1984, a British naval officer 
was appointed as technical expert to assist the Chamber in respect of technical matters 
and, in particular, of the preparation of the description of the maritime boundary and the 
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charts referred to in Article II, paragraph 2, of the Special Agreement
218
. The same 
Order established that the expert had to be present at the oral proceedings, being 
available for consultations with the Chamber if necessary
219
. The choice of the expert 
occurred through a parties‘ joint letter dated 12 October 1983; the Court only 
homologate it according to the Order. As in the Corfu Channel case, the expert report 
was attached to the Judgment.  
It is interesting to note that the expert appointed in this case could be consulted 
by the Chamber "as it may deem necessary for the purposes of this Article" the Court‘s 
deliberations, unlike the experts of the Corfu Channel case. For this reason, when 
performing its solemn declaration, besides the normal text foreseen in article 63, the 
expert had to add that he ―will refrain from divulging or using, outside the Chamber of 
the Court, any documents or information of a confidential character which may come to 
my knowledge in the course of the performance of my task‖220. Also, it must be stressed 
that the parties had no opportunity to make any comments on the expert report. This 
happened essentially because of the nature of its participation in the proceeding.  
The parties did not show any disagreement as regards the use of the expert in 
this case. The Gulf of Maine case is a case in which the experts‘ participation is limited 
and also controlled by the terms established by the parties in the special agreement. In 
this case the expert performed functions which were substantially very similar to those 
performed by the experts appointed for the purposes of assisting the parties in the 
implementation of the judgment
221
. 
 
d. The Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case. 
 
The ICJ has decided, for the third time in its history, to use the powers granted to 
it by article 50 and appointed two experts through an Order with the view to  
to collect, by conducting a site visit, all the factual elements relating to the state of 
the coast between the point located on the right bank of the San Juan River at its 
mouth and the land point closest to Punta de Castilla, as those two points can be 
identified today.
222
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It was the second time that the Court use experts to perform a in locu visit and 
gather evidence to decide a dispute. The procedure followed by the Court seems 
particularly interesting for some reasons. I will dwell upon some of them but, since the 
dispute is still pending, the totality of the examination remaiss limited. 
 The first interesting point lied in the fact that it sheds some light of possibilities 
resorted to an expert in the contentious proceedings before the Court. It is a function 
related to the gathering of evidence and factual elements in order to ascertain the facts 
of a given dispute. The function seems to be particularly relevant when one considers 
that the parties ―were unable to reach agreement on the starting point of the maritime 
boundary‖223. Unless the Court decides otherwise, the function to be performed by the 
two experts is essentially connected to fact-finding and not the assessment of the 
evidence. It is not possible to conclude drawing from the elements given by the two 
orders whether the two experts will also participate in the assessment of the evidence. It 
would be particularly interesting to understand how these experts will be employed in 
the future and also the evidential weight attributed to them. 
A second interesting point regards the procedure followed by the Court in order to 
identify the necessity of an expertise and the role of the parties in establish the 
procedure. While in the past the Court has refrained from appoint experts when one of 
the parties were manifestly contrary to such a situation, in the present dispute the Court 
has appointed experts even if one of the parties argued that ―there was no need to carry 
out a site visit, asserting that, since the location of the starting-point of the land 
boundary on the Caribbean coast‖.224 This seems to be an important fact which 
demonstrates that the decision of appointment of parties does not completely depends 
on the agreement of the parties in regard, particularly if the Court deems that  
there are certain factual matters relating to the state of the coast which may be 
relevant for the purpose of settling the dispute submitted to it, which concerns in 
particular the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Parties in the 
Caribbean Sea, and that, with regard to such matters, it would benefit from an 
expert opinion.
225 
It remains to be seen the exact functions these experts will perform in the 
settlement of the dispute. 
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2.4.3. Assessment  
 
Some conclusions can be drawn after the analysis of the ICJ‘s case law in 
regard to the use of the independent experts set out in Article 50.  
The first is that the Court has used experts to produce evidence only in two 
occasion, the second one still pending before the Court. The fact that the Court rarely 
participated actively in the process of production of evidence shows the reluctance of 
the Court to play a major role in this respect. 
Despite the scarce practice, in all the four cases it was possible to identify that 
the parties had participated actively in the procedures. The parties had a role in 
determining the questions to be made to the experts, in the phase in which the experts 
went in locu, and also in commenting the expert report. At the same time, it must be 
recognized that the way in which the Court had made use of this instrument conforms to 
the basic principles of procedure like the good administration of justice, transparency 
and judicial fairness.  
In regard to the probative value of the reports of Article‘s 50 experts, it is clear 
that because of its nature and of the role played by the parties in the proceedings this 
category of experts has great evidential value.  
 
2.5. Assessors 
 
Assessors are mainly the product of a common law tradition, markedly 
developed in the legal practice of the United Kingdom
226
. By definition, an assessor is a 
"person learned in some particular science of industry, who sits with the judge on the 
trial of a cause requiring such special knowledge and gives his advice"
227
. 
Notwithstanding the predominance of the use of party-appointed experts in common 
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law courts – as is clearly favoured by the adversarial system – assessors are employed in 
certain specific situations, particularly in nautical disputes
228
 and patents proceedings 
229
. They can sit with the judge during oral hearings or provide assistance during the 
production of the judgment. Thus, their role is more closely linked to fact-assessment 
than to fact-finding. There may be cases, however, in which assessors participate in the 
gathering of evidence underpinning a case
230
. 
The origins of the assessor at the international level can be traced to interstate 
arbitral practice. One of the first references concerned the use of assessors by one of the 
commissions established by article 7 of the Jay Treaty of 1794. On that occasion, the 
Commissars recognised their inability to decide the exact value of the damages suffered 
by American ship-owners due to the capture of the vessels by the United Kingdom. 
Clearly inspired by the practice of the Admiralty Court of the United Kingdom
231
, the 
Commissars appointed two assessors, one of each nation, to help the commission. 
Similarly, the Treaty of Washington, which governed the Alabama Claims Arbitration, 
provided in its article X
232
 that the arbitral tribunal appoints a "Board of Assessors" to 
calculate the amount owed by the United Kingdom to the United States. It is 
conceivable that the role of assessors in these two leading cases of international 
arbitration during the XIX
th
 century led to the insertion of this instrument in the 1907 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Curiously 
however, the Hague Convention provided for the potential of assessors being appointed 
by the parties to assist Commissions of Inquiry
233
, but not arbitral tribunals. The 
possibility of having recourse to assessors was also examined during the debates 
concerning the creation of the International Court of Prizes. In particular, article 18 of 
the proposed Convention relating to the creation of an International Prize Court 
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provided that the belligerent captor was ―entitled to appoint a naval officer of high rank 
to sit as Assessor, but with no voice in the decision‖234.  
Assessors were permanently introduced into the realm of international 
litigation in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). A 
commentator considered the inclusion of assessors in the Statute ―something of an 
anomaly, resulting from an historical accident‖235. That is so because if one looks at the 
debates within the Advisory Committee of Jurists, oddly enough, the reference to 
―assessors‖ can be found in discussions about the composition of the Court rather than 
in discussions about evidentiary matters. Throughout the debates, it emerged clearly that 
the position of an ―assessor‖ should be different from that of a judge, with assessors 
only being endowed with ―advisory powers‖236. In the final version of the Statute of the 
PCIJ, assessors were entrusted with the function of assisting the work of special 
chambers addressing particular matters (labour, communication and transit)
237
. In 
practice, assessors were never used by the PCIJ
238
, arguably because of the rare recourse 
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to the technical chambers of the Court. When, in 1945, the Statute was revised, the 
possibility of using assessors was extended to the full Court
239
.  
 
2.5.2. Assessors under article 30 of the Statute. 
 
Article 30(2) of the Statute of the ICJ states that ―[t]he Rules of the Court may 
provide for assessors to sit with the Court or with any of its chambers, without the right 
to vote‖. Article 9 of the Rules of the Court complements this provision by regulating 
the use of assessors in contentious proceedings. This provision equally applies to 
chambers and to advisory proceedings
240
.  
The nomination process for an assessor is regulated in detail. Article 9(2) of the 
Rules states that the President of the Court is responsible for ―tak[ing] steps to obtain all 
the information relevant to the choice of the assessors‖, who ―shall be appointed by 
secret ballot and by a majority of the votes of the judges composing the Court for the 
case‖. There is no specific provision providing for involvement of the parties in the 
selection of assessors. However, article 9(2) could be interpreted to the effect that the 
―information relevant to the choice of assessors‖ which the President must obtain, also 
includes the views of the parties as regards their selection. 
Article 30 of the Statute does not specify the exact stage of the proceedings 
when assessors are appointed. The only temporal restriction results from article 9(1) of 
the Rules, according to which ―the Court may, either proprio motu or upon a request 
made not later than the closure of the written proceedings (...) decide to appoint 
assessors to sit with it without the right to vote‖241. This restriction applies only to the 
parties and deals with the ―request‖, rather than the period in which assessors may be 
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appointed by the Court itself. Therefore, assessors may be appointed to sit with the 
Court during all the phases of the proceedings. The participation of assessors in the 
deliberation stage is expressly regulated by article 21 of the Rules of the Court which 
recognizes that ―only judges, and the assessors, if any, take part in the Court's judicial 
deliberations‖. As observed by an author, ―the assessor may participate in the private 
deliberations of the Court and in this fashion, presumably, in the drafting of the 
judgment‖242. However, if an assessor is appointed with the specific task of giving the 
Court technical or scientific input, it is expected that the assessor would refrain from 
participating in those parts of the deliberations unrelated to these matters. 
As previously mentioned, assessors have not yet been used in the practice of 
the ICJ, nor of its predecessor. Their potential role in a case has received occasional 
mentions by individual judges. For instance, in his separate opinion in the Western 
Sahara advisory opinion, Judge Petrén regretted that "the Court did not feel the need to 
seek other information than that submitted to it by the interested States. It did not 
arrange for experts in Islamic law or in the history of northern Africa to sit with it as 
assessors, as its Statute would have allowed" 
243
. 
A possible reason for the non-use of assessors can be traced to the fact that 
assessors are too close to being adjudicators: they sit with the judges, evaluate the 
technical arguments submitted by the parties and are not subjected to any form of 
control from the parties
244
. Their roles lies ambiguously in the middle, between an 
expert advising the Court and a non-voting adjudicator. This impression is reinforced by 
the content of the solemn declaration assessors have to make before exercising their 
activities. Similar to the solemn declaration made by judges rather than that of experts, 
the Rules establish that assessors must perform their duties "honourably, impartially and 
conscientiously, and that [they] will faithfully observe all the provisions of the Statute 
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and of the Rules of the Court"
245
. This declaration differs from the one that article 50 
experts must make, being instead very close to the ones the judges and the registrar are 
required to make. This seems to reflect the fact that assessors' position in the Court's 
organization is closer to that judges or officials in the registry than that of an article 50 
expert occasionally appointed by the Court. 
In principle, both assessors and Court-appointed experts may be used for 
assisting the Court in dealing with scientific and technical issues 
246
. Unlike experts ex 
parte, the fact that they are not appointed by one of the litigating parties makes their 
expert opinion, at least theoretically, more impartial. Yet, despite some common 
features, they appear to perform slightly different functions. Taking into account the 
distinction between the production of evidence and the assessment of evidence 
247
, it can 
be argued that the function of assessors appears to be closely related to the assessment 
of the evidence, while the function of experts envisaged in article 50 is broader as it 
includes the obtaining and production of such evidence. This is confirmed by the 
practice of the Court, particularly in the Corfu Channel and Maritime Delimitation in 
the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean cases. In those instances, article 50 experts 
were called to gather evidence, rather than to closely assist the Court in assessing and 
evaluating evidence.  
There are also differences in the procedure governing the activity of these two 
figures. The first difference lies in the fact that assessors can sit with the Court, even 
during deliberations. Another difference relates to the possibility for the parties to 
comment on their opinions. While article 67(2) of the Rules of the Court envisages the 
right of the parties to comment upon the content of the contribution offered by experts, 
as "every report or record of an enquiry and every expert opinion shall be 
communicated to the parties, which shall be given the opportunity of commenting upon 
it" 
248
, nothing is said in this respect in article 30 of the Statute nor in article 9 of the 
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Rules with regard to assessors. This is a point to which I shall revert later. At present, it 
may be interesting to note that in practice, the differences between assessors and Court-
appointed experts may be blurred. Thus, in the Gulf of Maine case the way the expert 
was employed bore some similarities with an assessor. The order nominating a single 
expert in that instance established that the expert's purpose was "to assist the Chamber 
in respect of technical matters and, in particular, in preparing the description of the 
maritime boundary and the charts referred to in (...) the Special Agreement" 
249
. In 
addition, the order established that the expert ―shall further be available for such 
consultations with the Chamber as it may deem necessary‖ 250. The expert prepared the 
report and the charts which were annexed to the final judgment, and yet the parties had 
no opportunity to comment upon them. For these reasons some commentators suggested 
that the expert in the case was actually an assessor as opposed to an article 50 expert
251
. 
However, the Chamber of the Court expressly referred to article 50 instead of article 30 
of its Statute in the order nominating that expert.  
The need for technical inputs explains the use by the ICJ of another category of 
expert, the so-called "invisible experts" or "ghost experts". As observed by Thirlway, 
"such an expert has not, strictly speaking, 'sat with the Court', but has been consulted by 
its members, and in particular by the Drafting Committee, in preparing the judgement" 
252
.  
Although criticized for its lack of transparency and possibly in contravention of 
the requisites of due process 
253
, the employment of invisible experts demonstrates the 
Court's willingness of having technical input after the closing of the oral hearings. 
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Adjudicating Conflicts over Resources: The ICJ's Treatment of Technical Evidence in the Pulp Mills 
Case, Goettingen Journal of International Law, vol. 3 (2011), p. 447 and PEAT, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 
288. 
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Significantly, assessors could perform the same function; but compared to invisible 
experts, they would have the advantage of offering a more transparent contribution to 
the work of the ICJ. 
 
2.6. The experts appointed after the judicial phase.  
 
Besides the experts set forth in Article 50 of the Court's Statute, the Court 
appointed experts to help the parties in the execution of the Judgment. The Court 
stressed that the function of these experts was not ―to assist the Court in giving 
judgment upon the issues submitted to it for decision‖254, but actually to assist the 
parties in implementing its Judgment.  
The two cases in which this kind of experts were appointed by the Court were 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) and Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger). In 
both cases, by virtue of a previous agreement, the parties requested the Court to 
nominate, in its Judgment, three experts to assist them in the demarcation of the 
frontiers defined in the Judgment
255
. The Court accepted the task but preferred to 
execute it through an Order after ascertaining the views of the Parties, ―particularly as 
regards the practical aspects of the exercise by the experts of their functions‖.256 
The first element that can be drawn from this limited practice is that, as 
stressed by the Court, this kind of expert is not an expert in the sense of Article 50 and, 
thus, does not fall within the scope of Article 68 of the Court's Rules
257
. The Court also 
pointed out that ―there is nothing in the Statute to prevent the Court from exercising this 
power, the very purpose of which is to enable the Parties to achieve a final settlement of 
their dispute in implementation of the Judgment which it has delivered‖258 and, finally, 
it underlined that ―the Court has already exercised such a power in the past‖259. 
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 Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the 
Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 228, para. 65. 
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 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, para. 176;  Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso/Niger), Judgment, para. 113. 
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These indications can raise some questions about the powers of the Court on 
the appointment of experts. Apart from the power under Article 50 the parties may 
confer to the Court a different power regarding to the appointment of experts. These 
experts do not enter in any of the categories examined previously. As indicated before, 
this power is directly related to the parties' participation in the proceedings and it serves 
to make effective the parties' rights in the proceedings.  
It was argued that the fact that the Court used this power through an Order 
could mean that this power could found its legal basis in Article 48 of the Court's 
Statute
260
 which establishes that ―the Court shall make orders for the conduct of the 
case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its arguments, 
and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence‖. However, the Court 
did not mentioned this provision.  
The limited practice regarding this category of experts may raise doubt on the 
procedures followed by the Court for the identification of these experts. Since it occurs 
essentialy by agreement between the parties, one might speculate that they might 
perform an active role in this process. The absence of public elements on this issue does 
not allow much speculation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE USE OF EXPERTS BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
 
1. Introduction: methodological approach. 
 
Comparisons between international tribunals have proven to be an useful 
instrument in order to assess and, ultimately, improve the activity of a given 
international tribunal
1
. The purpose of this chapter is to employ this instrument in order 
to identify how other international tribunals dealing with interstate disputes employ the 
available instruments granted by their rules and developed by their practices.  
The two ―judicial bodies‖ analyzed were the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS) and the interstate arbitration. The first on account of the similarities 
between the ICJ. ITLOS is a permanent tribunal, working under a sovereign-guided 
logic, which works under the strict logics of its permanent rules and presumably taking 
into account its own developed case law. The choice of arbitration is justified by the fact 
that arbitral tribunals have been called to settle dispute possessing a high level of 
complexity. Besides, arbitration is at the origins and come of its logic until the present 
day permeates the logic of the permanent international judicial settlement
2
. 
 
2. The use of experts in Inter-state Arbitration. 
 
The origins of modern inter-state adjudication might be traced directly to the 
phenomenon of international arbitration
3
. Steadily employed by States throughout the 
                                                 
11
 C Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (OUP 2007) 83-118.  
2
 S Forlati, The International Court of Justice: An Arbitral Tribunal or a Judicial Body? 
(Springer 2014). 
3
 For the purposes of this chapter, when the term "arbitration" is employed it makes reference 
to inter-state arbitration. This term can be distinguished from commercial arbitration or investor-state 
arbitration, modalities of arbitration not examined in this work. With regard to the bridge between 
international arbitration to international adjudication, see, generally O Spiermann, International legal 
argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: the rise of the international judiciary (CUP 
2005), S Forlati, The International Court of Justice: An Arbitral Tribunal or a Judicial Body? (Springer 
2014) and AA Cançado Trindade, "Reflections on a Century of International Justice and Prospects for the 
Future" in G Gaja and JG Stoutenburg (eds) Enhancing the Rule of Law through the International Court 
of Justice (Brill 2014) 1-32. On interstate arbitration, in general, see JG Merrills, International Dispute 
Settlement (CUP 2011) 83-115 and JL Simpson and H Fox, International Arbitration: Law and Practice 
(Stevens and Sons 1959). 
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XIX
th
 century to settle their disputes
4
, international arbitration developed its own praxis, 
literature and discourses. It represented, for a long period, the jurisdictional power of 
international law
5
. The trend favouring the use of international arbitration culminated in 
the adoption, in 1899 and 1907, of the Hague Peace Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes (Hague Conventions) which, inter alia, set up the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration
6
 (PCA) and also crystallized a definition of arbitration which is 
accepted hitherto: ―the settlement of differences between States by judges of their own 
choice and on the basis of respect for law‖.7  
As the definition highlights, the choice of arbitration, together with the rules of 
procedure that arbiters will apply, is the cornerstone of international arbitration. In 
practice, the greater discretion to establish the procedure has implied a greater discretion 
to engage experts. That is perhaps the reason why arbitral tribunals, unlike the ICJ, are 
so prone to resort to independent experts in order to obtain technical and scientific 
assistance. As noted by two authors "arbitral tribunals may in principle play a 
particularly useful role where extensive fact-finding is required, whereas it has been 
suggested that the ICJ has preferred to base its judgments upon largely uncontested facts 
rather than to engage extensively in the fact-finding commonly expected of a tribunal of 
first instance"
8
. 
Just by way of illustration, in two of the most well known arbitrations of the 
XIXth century, experts played an important part. In one of the commissions established 
by Article 7 of the Treaty of Jay of 1794, the commissars understood that they could not 
decide themselves the exact value of the damages suffered by American ship owners 
due to the capture of the vessels by the United Kingdom. Therefore, clearly inspired by 
the practice of the Admiralty Court of the United Kingdom
9
, the commission designated 
two assessors, one of each nation, to help the commission to perform its task. Still 
within the context of the Treaty of Jay, another commission, the one responsible for the 
                                                 
4
 H La Fontaine, Pasicrie Internationale: Histoire Documentaire des Arbitrages 
Internationaux (Stampfli & Cie 1902) 8; A de Lapradelle and N Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages 
Internationaux (Pedone 1905). 
5
 N Politis, La justice internationale (Hachette 1924). 
6
 Article 20 of the 1899 Hague Convention. 
7
 Article 15 of 1899 Article 15 of the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes and repeated in Article 37 of the 1907 Hague Convention. 
8
 C Gray and B Kingsbury, "Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-state Arbitration Since 
1945" (1992) 63 British YearBook of International Law117. 
9
 A de Lapradelle and N Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages Internationaux (Pedone 1905) 43. 
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identification and description of the River Saint Croix
10
, employed experts to describe 
geographical indications and prepare maps concerning the dispute
11
.  In a similar vein, 
the Treaty of Washington, which governed the Alabama Claims Arbitration, prescribed 
in its Article X the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to appoint a "board of Assessors" to 
calculate the amount due by the United Kingdom to the United States on account of its 
violations of neutrality obligations during the American secession war.
12
 
These emblematic cases, in conjunction with others that emerge from the early 
practice
13
, demonstrate the need that international arbitrators obtain technical input, 
which explains the frequent recourse to expertise. The historical dimension of the 
phenomenon may offer indications about the development of certain institutes, the 
introduction of specific procedures in international adjudication, and even shed some 
light on the reasons why a certain kind of expert rather than others was favoured during 
a particular period of time. Nonetheless, a deep examination of the features of the use of 
experts in the historical experience falls outside the scope of this work. Given the 
flourishing practice of arbitral tribunals in recent times, especially under the auspices of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
14
 and triggered by the Annex VII of the 
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
15
, the focus of the 
examination will be narrowed to inter-state arbitrations occurred in the second half of 
the XXth Century
16
. 
Two preliminary observations are in order. The first relates to the role and rules 
of the PCA in managing inter-state arbitrations. The second observation relates to the 
rules of evidence governing the field of interstate arbitration. 
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 River Saint Croix Commission (UK/US) (1978)28 RIAA 1-4. 
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 A de Lapradelle and N Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages Internationaux (Pedone 1905) 8-9. 
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People's Liberation Movement/Army) . 
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Along with investor-state arbitration, interstate arbitration is an important part 
of the docket of PCA. Several of the most relevant arbitrations dealing with expert 
evidence were conducted under the auspices of that institution. Not only the Rules of 
the PCA have been gaining a prominent role in influencing arbitral agreements (or 
compromis), but there also seems to exist an established practice with regard to the use 
of experts in arbitral tribunals established under its architecture. Therefore, it is relevant 
to examine the rules of the PCA with regard to the appointment of experts
17
. 
Accordingly, when examining each category of expert, I will refer to the respective 
regulation in the PCA rules. It is important to recall, however, that when the parties go 
to arbitration, these rules, which are adopted in the form of an arbitral compromis or, in 
recent practice, each tribunal's ―rules of procedure‖, may be modified and adapted to the 
particular circumstances of a case. 
Another particular feature to be taken into account regards the role of the 
International Bureau of the CPA. To some extent, the functions exercised by the Bureau 
are similar to those of the Registrar in permanent tribunals. It is not rare to find in the 
rules of procedure of tribunals a rule granting to the PCA Registry the function to 
―maintain an archive of the arbitral proceedings and provide appropriate registry 
services as directed by the Arbitral Tribunal.‖ In addition, such services include 
assisting arbitrators and the parties with the identification and appointment of experts. 
This task is improved by the maintenance, by the PCA, of a list of experts envisaged in 
the Option Rules for disputes relating to Natural Resources/Environment and relating to 
Outer Space Activities – to which I will revert later. 
The second point which deserves attention is that, unlike permanent tribunals, 
the rules of evidence governing international arbitration possess an ad hoc character. 
Hence, as observed by an author, "an obvious advantage of arbitration, as opposed to 
adjudication, is that the parties may choose their own rules of procedure and tailor them 
to the specific needs of a given case"
18
. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some 
general practices with regard to evidentiary issues which, some authors consider as 
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 With regard to the several instruments governing the activity of the PCA, the attention will 
be focused on the following instruments: a) the relevant rules contained in the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions; b) 2012 Rules of PCA; c) the 1992 PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between 
Two States; d) the 2001 PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources 
and the Environment; e) the 2011 PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer 
Space Activities. 
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constituting inherent powers of arbitral tribunals
19
. To some extent, these practices are 
reflected in the rules prepared by the International Law Commission
20
, UNCITRAL, 
and in the Rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Just to take some examples of 
general evidentiary rules, one may refer to the power of arbitral tribunals to "arrange all 
the formalities required for dealing with the evidence"
21
, to the obligation of the parties 
to co-operate with the tribunal in the production of evidence
22
 and the power of the 
tribunal to perform site visits
23
. Of particular interest is the rule which prescribes that 
"the tribunal shall be the judge of the admissibility and the weight of the evidence 
presented to it"
24
. Through this rule, a written-form of the practice developed in ICJ's 
case law, the two criteria thereby expert evidence can be analyzed are incorporated in 
the arbitral practice: admissibility and evidentiary weight. 
In parallel to these established rules and trends, as remarked by an author, 
"most arbitral tribunals will consult the parties at an early stage of the proceedings to 
understand their expectations as to the manner in which evidence is to be presented, and 
set forth in a procedural order some additional rules that take these expectations into 
account"
25
. While this is true, it should also be noted that the arbitral practice has not 
developed completely innovative forms of experts. The categories of expert used by 
arbitral tribunals do not depart from that established in the Statute and practice of the 
International Court of Justice. Rather the contrary, it seems to exist some 
correspondence between arbitral practice and the permanent judicial settlement of inter-
state disputes in relation to the categories of experts employed by international 
tribunals. What seems to differ, however, is the frequency with which these different 
categories are employed. 
Before examining the different categories of experts appearing in interstate 
arbitral practice, a terminological clarification is required. International tribunals refer to 
"experts", "technical assistants", "scientists", "expert witnesses" without drawing a clear 
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distinction between them. Therefore, it seems useful to maintain the same categories 
employed when examining the practice of the ICJ and of other permanent adjudicative 
bodies. Since similar categories display similar traits and present similar problems, the 
practice of international arbitration will be divided in (2.1) expert counsels; (2.2) party-
appointed experts; (2.3) expert-arbitrators, a category which does not exist in the 
practice of the ICJ; (2.4) tribunal-appointed experts and; (2.5) experts appointed after 
the adjudicatory phase. 
 
2.1. Expert counsel. 
 
One of the most recurrent practices in interstate arbitration consists in 
nominating scientists, historians, geographers, hydrographers, cartographers to integrate 
the defensive team of the parties
26
. As a matter of fact, ancient and recent arbitral 
practice confirm that it is difficult to find a defensive team in an arbitration without a 
"technical adviser" or "expert adviser". At times, these experts presented evidence orally 
before the Court without being cross-examined
27
. Sometimes, they submit their written 
reports and participate during the hearings without pleading.
28
 The absence of general 
rules governing the appearance of such experts in arbitration leaves to the parties a 
greater discretion in choosing how they will be assisted by them. 
Two questions have arisen in practice regarding the use of such a category of 
experts. The first regards the independence and impartiality of such an expert. The 
second is the role that expert counsels can perform during an arbitral proceeding.  
 
2.1.1. Independence and impartiality of experts counsels. 
 
While the presence of expert counsels assisting the parties is not envisaged in 
the general rules of international arbitration, the appearance of such a category of 
experts is sometimes identified in arbitral compromis. The content of these rules offer 
some indications about the role that expert counsels perform in the proceedings.  
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 Just for some illustrative examples, experts integrated the parties' delegation in the Trail 
Smelter (1941), Lac Lanoux (1957), Rann of Kutch (1968), Rainbow Warrior (1990), Barbados and 
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In the Gulf of St Lawrence arbitration, the compromis expressly provided that 
"chaque agent ainsi désigné sera habilité à nommer un adjoint pour agir à sa place le cas 
échéant et pourra être assisté de conseils, d'experts et du personnel qu'il jugera 
nécessaires"
29
. In a similar fashion, in the Rainbow Warrior affair, the agreement 
provided that "each Government shall be represented at the oral hearings by its Agent or 
deputy Agent and such counsel and experts as it deems necessary for this purpose"
30
. 
The last passage, which can be find in other agreements
31
, seems to convey the idea that 
this expert represents the interests of a party in the dispute. This idea is similarly 
expressed in the Canada/France Arbitration, where the award expressly prescribed that 
"les conseils et conseillers ci-après ont présenté des exposés oraux et donné des avis 
d'expert au nom des Parties"
32
. 
These normative excerpts allow some speculation about the impartiality and 
independence of such experts. If expert counsels "represents" and give evidence "in the 
name of the parties", it seems difficult to consider them fully impartial and independent. 
However, in opposition to the ICJ, the established use of expert counsel has not given 
rise to reactions in the arbitral practice. Differently from the Pulp Mills case, where the 
Court squarely reprimanded the use of expert counsels, such a problem did not appear 
yet in interstate arbitrations. 
Two are the possible reasons for explaining such situation. The first is that in 
international arbitration the parties are the ultimate masters of the procedure and have a 
broader power in establishing the way they will adduce evidence. Thus, if the parties 
agree in not prolonging the proceedings with sessions of examination and cross-
examination of experts and favour only the presence of written expert reports, there is 
no reason why an arbitral tribunal should offer resistance. Moreover, arbitrators are not 
necessarily interested in set out a procedural precedent. While the ICJ in the Pulp Mills 
was concerned in identifying a practice which it "would have found more useful"
33
 and 
thereby established a procedural precedent, this concern is not generally shared by 
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arbitrators. The second reason seems to be that, since arbitral tribunals are usually 
assisted by independent experts, expert counsels are not the only source of technical 
knowledge. Therefore, arguendo, arbitrators would not be concerned about the source 
of such an evidence since they have their own impartial source of technical or scientific 
knowledge to weigh such evidence. 
 
2.1.2. The role performed by expert counsels. 
 
It is difficult to precise the importance that expert counsels have had in forming 
the conviction of arbitrators on the technical features of a dispute. Little reference has 
been made to the evidence by them presented in arbitral awards. Nonetheless, some 
indications can be identified. 
Firstly, arbitral tribunals seem to take into account when expert counsels do 
agree in relation to a certain fact. In Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago
34
, for instance, 
the arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII UNCLOS used the agreement of the 
parties' experts to reinforce its decision with regard to the method of the delimitation of 
the EEZ and the continental shelf. The tribunal observed that "technical experts of the 
Parties have also been in agreement about the identification of the appropriate base 
points and the methodology to be used to this effect"
35
. The criteria of giving weight to 
the agreement between parties' experts corresponds to the attitude adopted by the ICJ 
with regard to party-appointed experts: the tribunal can use their agreement to reinforce 
a certain factual element. 
Another example on how the experts' agreement was used can be identified in 
the Delimitation Continental Shelf (United Kingdom/France) arbitration
36
. In that 
instance, the arbitral tribunal asked the parties to identify precisely the respective 
terminal points of each of the agreed segments in the English Channel and to give the 
relevant coordinates of the median line in those segments. The experts of the parties 
held meetings together in order to identify the points of agreement and disagreement
37
.  
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The agreement of the experts of the parties was decisively taken into account by the 
tribunal, which has made several references to the "line already agreed between the 
experts" throughout the award. The points which the experts of the parties disagreed on 
were then settled by the tribunal.  
In a very similar fashion, in the recent Guyana/Suriname Maritime Boundary 
arbitration, which will be examined further on in this chapter, at the second hearing, the 
expert hydrographer appointed by the tribunal held a meeting with the expert counsels 
of the parties and asked them information which was further provided. Again, the expert 
counsel was a fundamental instrument of collaboration with the tribunal-appointed 
expert in order to settle the dispute. 
In sum, if, as recognized by the  ICJ, "negotiations may help demonstrate the 
existence of the dispute and delineate its subject-matter"
38
 by ascertaining the respective 
positions of the parties, it appears that expert counsels may help to precise the factual 
content of a dispute and delineate the respective positions of the parties with regard to 
technical issues. 
 
2.2. Party-appointed experts. 
 
In the context of international arbitration, for party-appointed expert it should 
be understood the expert which is nominated by a party to give oral evidence during a 
hearing and it is examined or is, at least, made available for cross-examination
39
. 
Although some international rules and compromis may refer to them as "expert 
witnesses" or "independent expert witnesses" the term party-appointed expert avoids 
misinterpretation with other categories of experts
40
. In addition to the cross-
examination, sometimes these experts are required to make a solemn declaration, which 
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would reinforce their independence in relation to the parties. In practical terms, it could 
be contented that party-appointed experts are expert counsels which, through a specific 
procedure of swearing and public examination, acquire some independence and 
impartiality. 
The presentation of oral evidence by experts was not very frequent in the early 
practice of international tribunals
41
. Some examples can be referred to in recent practice, 
however. In the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Arbitration, in addition to the expert counsels 
integrating the defensive teams, Guinea-Bissau appointed an expert who answered to 
questions put by its own counsel
42
. In the Taba Arbitration, Egypt and Israel appointed 
experts which were cross-examined by the parties. The dissenting arbitrator in this case 
mentioned the testimony of one of the experts several times
43
, considering it a "very 
trustworthy expert witness"
44
 and its testimony consisting in "convincing expert 
evidence"
45
. In both cases the Tribunal did not refer to the evidence presented by the 
experts in the award. 
Several PCA rules regulate the appearance of witnesses (including "expert-
witnesses") during the oral phase of the proceedings
46
. These rules do not set out a 
specific procedure for expert's examination in the oral hearings. The procedure seems to 
vary significantly according to the agreement between the parties. In Abyei Arbitration, 
experts made oral presentations (sometimes very similar to those made by counsels), 
followed by one round of cross-examination. In the Guyana/Suriname, the examination 
of experts followed the four-step procedure according to which the expert is examined 
and cross-examined twice and judges can put question to the expert
47
. In the South 
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China Sea, party-appointed experts made an oral presentation in the first round of 
hearings and, due to the absence of one of the parties, were not cross examined. Judges 
put several written questions to those experts
48
, which had the opportunity to answer 
them orally in the second round of the hearings. As these examples demonstrate, the rite 
of examination changes according to the parties' will and the circumstances of each 
case. 
When it comes to who can act as party-appointed experts, an interesting rule 
can be found in Article 27(2) of 2012 PCA Rules. It reads as follows:   
Witnesses, including expert witnesses, who are presented by the parties to 
testify to the arbitral tribunal on any issue of fact or expertise may be any 
individual, notwithstanding that the individual is a party to the arbitration or in 
any way related to a party. Unless otherwise directed by the arbitral tribunal, 
statements by witnesses, including expert witnesses, may be presented in writing 
and signed by them
49
. 
This rule is interesting for two reasons. First, an individual which is "in any 
way related to a party" cannot be qualified as a expert witnesses. The second reason lies 
in the possibility of presenting writing statements. I will examine them separately. 
As to the first part of Article 27(2), clearly inspired in the respective 
UNCITRAL Rule
50
, it highlights the importance that may acquire the existence of a 
relation between the expert and a party. The purpose is to ensure that an expert who 
testifies before an arbitral tribunal possesses a component of impartiality and 
independence with regard to the party which appoints him or her. Interestingly, the rule 
does not only foresee an impact in the evidential weight to be given to the testimony of 
the expert which "relates to a party" – as provided by the practice of the ICJ51. It also 
prevents the expert from testifying, thus amounting to a question of admissibility. 
Problems of parties contesting the admissibility of an expert drawn on such a rule have 
not yet appeared in arbitral practice. 
As to the second part of Article 27(2), it seems to reflect another recent 
development of arbitration, that is the close connection between expert report and oral 
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testimony. In some recent cases, even before the ICJ, experts who testify before the 
Tribunal have presented a written report at the beginning of the proceedings. In some 
circumstances, expert which testifies must have presented a written report. Three clear 
examples can be find in the Rules of Procedure of South China Sea, Guyana/Suriname 
and Abyei arbitration, which clearly prescribed that "no expert witness may be heard 
unless he or she has provided a written expert report, which shall form part of the 
pleadings and shall stand as his or her evidence in chief"
52
. 
This rule may lead one to wonder whether the testimony of the party-appointed 
expert shall be exclusively connected with the report presented. This issue was raised in 
the Guyana/Suriname arbitration. In that instance, Guyana appointed an expert to testify 
before the Tribunal, which was examined and cross-examined in two rounds of 
examinations. During the cross-examination, counsel for Suriname started to ask 
questions not directly related to the written report presented by the expert. President 
Nelson intervened and observed that "I just would like to make the point that the 
function of this expert witness is to deal with his report and questions on report, and it's 
not to be assumed that he knows much about what has been depicted here, so I would 
like you to bear that in mind"
53
. This pronouncement may convey the impression that, 
unless otherwise agreed, the range of issues which the expert can touch upon is 
circumscribed by the written report. One can only wonder whether such an approach 
will become an established practice and, if so, will be followed by the ICJ. 
Although not vast, the appointment of this category of experts by the parties 
raised some interesting problems that find correspondence to the employment of party-
appointed experts before the ICJ: the question of impartiality of a party-appointed 
expert and the value attributed to their views. I will scrutinize them in turn.   
 
2.2.1. The question of impartiality of a party-appointed expert. 
 
While the specific procedure of oral examination, cross-examination and public 
oath can be considered elements which enhance the impartiality and independence of 
the party-appointed expert, doubts can always be casted by virtue of the connection 
between expert and party. That is usually a strategy that the opposite party employs to 
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reinforce its arguments and undermine the authority of the expert statement. Notably the 
reasons that might lead to contest the impartiality of a party-appointed expert lie in the 
fact that parties usually contact the expert during the preparation of his/her written 
report, pay for its services and, in some cases, even prepare the expert for the oral 
hearings. Some elements related to this topic appeared in arbitral practice. 
In some circumstances, the way in which party-appointed experts appeared 
before the tribunal could give rise to doubts on their impartiality. For instance, it is 
possible to find party-appointed experts integrating the defensive team of the parties  
which are examined before the arbitral tribunal. That was the case in the Abyei 
Arbitration. Here the distance between a party-appointed expert and a counsel seems to 
abridge, in spite of the cross-examination. Nonetheless, this did not prevent the Tribunal 
to quote the content of the testimony of party-appointed experts several times. 
In Guyana/Suriname, where an expert was appointed by Guyana, counsel for 
Suriname argued that "being an expert is one thing, being an advocate is another, and 
we would suggest that the Tribunal look with considerable caution when Dr. Smith, the 
expert geographer, becomes Dr. Smith, the advocate"
54
. However, the tribunal did not 
make any remark on this issue. On the contrary, it took into account the written report 
presented to it when determining the geographical configuration of the relevant 
coastlines
55. The tribunal‘s attitude seems to be important for two reasons. The first is 
that the tribunal gave weight to information offered by the party-appointed expert when 
it concurred with the information agreed by the parties. The second interesting element 
regards the language chosen by the tribunal when referring to the expert appointed by 
Guyana. It expressly called it "independent", without making any reference to the 
discussion held by the parties during the hearings about its independence. It is not easy 
to identify the reasons why the Tribunal held the expert independent. It is not even clear 
if the use of the expression "independent" carries a particular meaning.  
Another situation related to the independence and impartiality of a party-
appointed expert occurred in the South China Sea arbitration. In that instance, 
Philippines – which had technical experts integrating its defensive team – nominated 
two expert witnesses to present evidence orally. Following the procedure set out in the 
Rules of Procedure, the experts presented written reports and asked questions posed by 
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the Tribunal. As already mentioned, these experts had no apparent connection with 
Philippines. In his pleading, counsel for Philippines reinforced the independence of 
those experts when he contended that  
"we consider the two experts to be independent, and specifically in the 
sense that they have been asked to give their own statements, based on their own 
views and their own expertise. They will be speaking in that context, and they will 
also be available on Monday to respond to any questions that the Tribunal would 
like to put directly to them as experts"
56
.  
Still in the oral hearings, before requiring the solemn declaration, president 
Mensah reinforced that "as has been said by [the counsel for Philippines], you are 
appearing here as an expert independent witness"
57
. During the oral hearings, counsel 
for Philippines, in order to reinforce the authority of an argument, mentioned the 
information contained in an article published by one of the experts which "was written 
in 2013, before Professor Schofield was consulted by the Philippines". The fact that the 
expert sustained a certain position before the contact with one of the parties seems to 
reinforce his impartiality.  
This case may highlight the fact that a party may have an interest in showing 
the independence and impartiality of a party-appointed expert. This can be done by 
different means, ranging from the choice of experts, to their availability to offer 
evidence to the tribunal. There are other possible strategies that parties could find useful 
in order to demonstrate the impartiality of the expert witness, especially by choosing an 
expert not connected to the government appointing it. In this sense, international 
tribunals can have a role. For instance, the PCA maintains two lists of experts for 
Environmental and Outer Space disputes. As remarked in the introduction of such a 
documents "the parties are free to choose expert witnesses from the PCA Panel of 
Scientific and Technical Experts constituted under the PCA Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment"
58
.  
 
2.2.2. The use of the evidence offered by party-appointed experts.  
 
Being a recent practice of international tribunals, it is not easy to find clear 
indications in arbitral awards about the relevance of the information presented by party-
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appointed experts. In addition to importance attached to the agreement of the parties in 
Guyana/Suriname case, two other criteria may be identified, relating respectively to the 
case when the evidence offered by the experts coincide with the position sustained by 
the party which appointed them and to the case when the evidence offered by them is 
contrary to the interests of the that party. 
The Abyei arbitration seems to be the most clear example on how an arbitral 
tribunal extensively makes recourse to the reports and oral evidence presented by a 
party-appointed expert. In several passages reconstructing the complex factual 
background of the territorial dispute over the Abyei region, the Tribunal relied on the 
reports (and information emerging from the cross-examination) from experts from both 
sides.  
As to the case when the evidence is contrary to the position sustain by the party 
which nominate the expert, the most clear example occurred when the Tribunal 
affronted the question on the presence of a certain group (Ngok) over a certain area 
(goz). Reconstructing Sudan's arguments, one of which is that SPLM/A relied 
extensively on Ngok oral evidence, the Tribunal did not fail to note that "the oral 
evidence produced by the SPLM/A is inaccurate and unreliable and even according to 
Professor Daly, the SPLM/A‘s own expert, 'there is no way precisely to delimit the 
northern border of the Ngok territory in the goz.'"
59
. 
 
2.3. Expert arbitrator. 
 
In few cases, where highly technical facts underpin the dispute, it is possible 
that the tribunal is composed not only of jurists. Technicians may also sit on the bench 
of the tribunal. In such a cases, the expert does not only assist the tribunal, it integrates 
the tribunal and is bestowed with deciding powers. 
A most illustrative example in the second half of the XXth century happened in 
the Palena case, where Queen Elisabeth II was chosen to arbitrate a boundary dispute 
between Argentina and Chile. In that instance, the Queen appointed a tribunal 
constituted by three arbitrators: a jurist and two experts versed in geography and 
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cartography
60
. Another case in which an expert appeared as an arbitrator occurred in the 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India). The dispute concerning 
India's construction of an hydro-electric project designed to divert waters from a dam 
site on the Kishenganga/Neelum was solved by a tribunal constituted under the auspices 
of PCA.  In addition to the highly elevate number of witnesses and experts, one of the 
seven arbitrators was not a lawyer, but  a "highly qualified engineer"
61
. 
Although the practice of expert arbitrators may be rare, the Palena and Waters 
Kishenganga case allows some speculation on this category of expert. Two aspects 
merit to be highlighted. The first regards the site visit, the second the relationship 
between "legal" arbitrator and "technical" arbitrator and how this method of using 
experts could be transposed to the ICJ. 
With regard to the site visit, it is interesting to note the potential effect of 
having an expert arbitrator integrating the tribunal. If it is true that site visits are an 
instrument that enhances the appraisal of the realities and technical idiosyncrasies of a 
dispute
62
, the fact that an arbitrator is an expert in geography or geomorphology seems 
to enhance the potential effect of this instrument. Undoubtedly the arbitral tribunal 
would be equipped with highly technical knowledge to assess the evidentiary 
framework of the dispute.  
It seems troublesome to transpose the category of deciding-expert to the 
context of the ICJ. The Statute envisages two possibilities of changing the Court's 
composition for that purpose: the appointment of assessors or the nomination of a 
"technical" judge ad hoc. As to assessors, Article 30(2) of the Statute of the ICJ is clear 
in establishing the absence of the right to vote. When it comes to judges ad hoc, Article 
31(6) imposes the requirement of fulfillment of the conditions to regular judges. One of 
these conditions, set forth in Article 2 of the Statute, relates to the legal background of 
judges having "qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to 
the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in 
international law". In addition to these normative barriers, there is also a problem of 
judicial policy that touches the relationship between science and law. If it is true that the 
reticence in appointing independent experts under Article 50 by the ICJ can be 
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attributed to the fact that judges of ICJ do not want experts "deciding" a case, the 
measure of introducing deciding arbitrators would properly configure the reason for 
such a reticence.  
 
2.4. Tribunal-appointed experts. 
 
Differently from the practice of the International Court of Justice, the 
appointment of experts is a constant feature of interstate arbitration
63
. If one considers 
that a meaningful number of arbitrations dealt with territorial and maritime 
delimitations, the need for technical input may be easily explained. 
The power of arbitral tribunals to appoint experts and the modality thereby they 
will perform their functions are usually provided by Rules of Procedure or by the 
compromis. Frequently the power to appoint experts is envisaged in compromis even if 
the tribunal decide not to have recourse to such a power
64
. This fact suggests a certain 
acceptance of the presence of experts in the proceedings. Moreover, as noted by some 
authors
65
, the right of the tribunal to appoint experts seems to be an inherent power 
connected with its judicial function. 
Another rule frequently inserted in arbitral agreements provides that the 
"Tribunal désignera, après consultation avec les Parties, un expert technique pour 
l'aider"
66
 or that "the Court may employ experts, following prior consultation of the 
Parties"
67
. In general the parties show a willingness of having independent experts in 
the proceedings. This fact is of some important since, in some cases before the ICJ, 
while one of the parties is interested in having experts in the proceedings, the opposition 
by the other party seems to be taken into account by the ICJ in not appointing an 
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expert
68
. The most recent example of such an attitude can be found in the Certain 
Activities/Construction of a Road cases: while Nicaragua suggested the use of 
independent experts, Costa Rica refused it and the Court preferred not to appoint 
experts. 
Article 29 of the 2012 PCA Rules governs the appointment of experts in that 
instance: 
After consultation with the parties, the arbitral tribunal may appoint one 
or more independent experts to report to it, in writing, on specific issues to be 
determined by the arbitral tribunal. A copy of the expert‘s terms of reference, 
established by the arbitral tribunal, shall be communicated to the parties. 
This rule contemplates the general practice of previous consultation with the 
parties
69
 and the obligation  the parties to cooperate with the experts giving "any 
relevant information or produce for his or her inspection any relevant documents or 
goods that he or she may require of them"
70
. Still with regard to cooperation between 
parties and experts, the same rule envisages the possibility of conflicts between the 
parties and the expert. In that situation, it prescribes that "any dispute between a party 
and such expert as to the relevance of the required information or production shall be 
referred to the arbitral tribunal for decision"
71
. 
Article 29 also establishes the procedure for the participation of the expert in 
the proceeding. According to it, the expert shall produce a written report, that shall be 
communicated to the parties, "which shall be given the opportunity to express, in 
writing, their opinion on the report"
72
. It also establishes the right of the parties to 
"examine any document on which the expert relied in his or her report". The rule also 
envisages the possibility, upon requirement of a party and acceptance by the tribunal, 
that "the expert shall, after delivery of the report, participate in a hearing where the 
parties have the opportunity to put questions to him or her and to present expert 
witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue"
73
.  
The procedure prescribed by Article 29 can be traced to the general practice of 
appointment of experts before international tribunals. To some extent, it reflects the 
procedure adopted by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case. The innovative element 
resides in the last part of the provision, which prescribes the possibility of a further 
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confrontation between the court-appointed expert and party-appointed experts. Such a 
rule appears to be inspired by the practice of commercial and investment arbitration
74
, 
where several modalities of expert confrontation are a commonplace. There is no 
relevant practice in interstate arbitration. 
It is interesting to note that the "rebirth" of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
occurred concomitantly with a greater use of court-appointed experts by arbitral 
tribunals constituted under that institution. This fact is specially eloquent if one consider 
that, in the same period, the ICJ had little recourse to these experts. This is illustrated by 
the fact that, in the recent practice, experts were appointed by arbitrators in the 
Eritrea/Yemen (1999) Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (2006), Guyana/Suriname 
(2007), Abyei Arbitration (2009), Bay of Bengal (2014) and South China Sea (2016). 
Furthermore, some cases currently in the PCA docket involve maritime boundary and 
technical questions
75
, reason which allows one to expect more experts being appointed 
in the future. 
Given the vast practice with regard to the appointment of experts by arbitral 
tribunals, the examination of such a practice will be divided in sensitive topics instead 
of a case-by-case examination. It will be examined, then, issues with regard to the 
method of appointment of experts (2.4.1); the function that experts performed in arbitral 
proceedings (2.4.2); the importance attributed to tribunal-appointed experts by arbitral 
tribunals (2.4.3); issues arising from the parties' obligation to cooperate with experts 
(2.4.4) and finally some issues related to the power of arbitral use experts in site visits 
(2.4.5).  
 
2.4.1. Methods of choice and appointment of tribunal-appointed experts. 
 
The choice and appointment of experts to assist arbitral tribunals give rise to a 
set of questions. A first question  that deserves examination is (a) the method thereby 
experts are chosen and nominated by arbitral tribunals. Two are the main possibilities to 
that effect: experts chosen by the parties and experts chosen by the tribunal. A second 
question (b) regards the criteria, if any, adopted by international arbitrators, to choose 
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experts. A related problem touches upon the question of potential conflicts between 
experts which participated in previous arbitrations (c). At the end, the phenomenon of 
"listing" of experts will be examined (d). 
 
(a) Who appoints an expert? 
The first possibility of appointment of experts is through nomination by the 
parties. Besides the early practice of the Treaty of Jay arbitration, the main example is 
the Trail Smelter arbitration
76
 where each of the parties designated a scientist to help the 
tribunal in collecting and assessing the evidence related to transboundary air pollution 
produced by a Canadian smelter. In that case, the two experts (both of them of 
American nationality) offered an important assistance to the tribunal in assessing the 
degree and impact of the air pollution caused by an smelter. The Trail Smelter seems to 
be the only case where the two experts assisting the tribunal were directly chosen by the 
parties.  
One can only speculate on the reasons why this practice is not favoured in 
international arbitration. The most evident hypothesis lies in the fact that experts 
nominated by parties could taint the impartiality and neutrality of the work of the 
tribunal. However, the engagement of such experts in the Trail Smelter arbitrations does 
not seem to reinforce this argument. Not only the Tribunal praised the work of the 
experts in gathering data and preparing a report, but it also "expresse[d] the hope that 
the two Governments may see fit to make this valuable report available to scientists and 
smelter operators generally, either by printing or other form of reproduction"
77
. 
Therefore, the appointment of experts by the parties appears to be a possible technique 
for appointment of experts still valid nowadays where difficult situations require a 
different approach to be taken by an arbitral or permanent tribunal. Although it might, 
theoretically, threaten the neutrality of the activity of the tribunal, it guarantees the 
parity of arms in the proceedings.  
The second possibility for nomination of tribunal-appointed experts ascribes 
the choice to the own arbitral tribunal. This is the normal way in  inter-state arbitration. 
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Article 29.2 of the 2012 PCA Rules regulates the appointment of experts by the 
tribunal. It reads as follows: 
The expert shall, in principle before accepting appointment, submit to the 
arbitral tribunal and to the parties a description of his or her qualifications and a 
statement of his or her impartiality and independence. Within the time ordered by 
the arbitral tribunal, the parties shall inform the arbitral tribunal whether they have 
any objections as to the expert‘s qualifications, impartiality or independence. The 
arbitral tribunal shall decide promptly whether to accept any such objections. After 
an expert‘s appointment, a party may object to the expert‘s qualifications, 
impartiality or independence only if the objection is for reasons of which the party 
becomes aware after the appointment has been made. The arbitral tribunal shall 
decide promptly what, if any, action to take. 
Some interesting elements can be gleaned from this rule. First, the procedure 
not only involves the parties in choosing an expert, but also sets forth a procedure to 
object the tribunal's choice. Such a procedure can occur even after the nomination, 
provided that the party was not aware of the allegedly problems in the moment of the 
appointment. This rule seems to reflect the recent arbitral practice, where the choice of 
the experts and also the definition of the terms of the expertise are discussed (sometimes 
lengthy) with the parties
78
.  
In addition, the rule set three criteria for objecting to an expert: technical 
qualifications, impartiality and independence. In this sense, the rule seems to offer 
normative guidance on the qualities that experts should possess in order to perform their 
functions. 
 
 (b) How experts are chosen? 
 
It is not immediately clear what are the criteria, if any, adopted by arbitrators in 
order to choose experts. In the recent practice of international arbitration, the PCA 
seems to possess an important role in assisting judges in the indication of experts. When 
it comes to the ICJ, the Registrar played an important function in contacting 
governments which were not parties to the proceedings in order to identify potential 
experts to be chosen by the Court
79
.  
The question of nationality of the experts was taken into account in the Mount 
Fitzroy arbitration. Perhaps in order to guarantee the impartiality of the experts, one of 
the dispositions agreed by the parties was that the "the Parties shall not use the services 
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of lawyers or experts who are nationals of States bordering on the Argentine Republic 
or the Republic of Chile or who have the same nationality as any of the judges 
appointed by common accord"
80
. Apparently the nationality of an expert can, at least in 
theory, contribute to enhance the independence and impartiality of the choice. By 
contrast, in the referred Trail Smelter arbitration, although the dispute was between 
Canada and United States, Canada opted for nominating an expert of American 
nationality to assist the tribunal. 
Not only nationality, but language seems to be an important element to the 
choice of arbitrations. In the same Mount Fitzroy arbitration, the expert nominated was 
a Spanish professor from Madrid, with Spanish being the national language of the 
parties. The linguistic skills of an expert seems to be a corollary of its technical 
qualifications and may prove to be important for its appointment.  
 
(c) An invisible college of experts? 
 
Another interesting issue related to the identity of experts is the fact that some 
names are quite recurrent in their function of assisting international courts and arbitral 
tribunals. One of the most evident examples regards an expert who was nominated to 
assist three arbitrations related to maritime and boundary delimitation: Guinea/Guinea 
Bissau (1985), Guinea-Bissau/Senegal (1989), and Canada/France (1992). 
Interestingly, the same expert acted as an expert in the Gulf of Maine case before the 
ICJ. A possible reason for such an appointment lies in the fact that in those arbitrations 
several judges of ICJ acted as arbitrators (President Lachs, President Bedjaoui, twice, 
and judge Gros), and in one of the cases the arbitral tribunal had the same Registrar as 
the Court (Torres Bernárdez). As a curiosity, it is equally interesting that the same 
expert acted previously as an expert counsel for the UK in an arbitration, in which the 
later judge and president Jennings acted as a counsel
81
.  
More recently, the same expert, an hydrographer expert who had acted as a 
expert-counsel for Canada in the Canada/France arbitration, was appointed to assist the 
arbitral tribunal in three disputes: Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana/Suriname 
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and Bay of Bengal. In that instance, and considering that the arbitrators were not the 
same in those cases, it appears that the institution under which these arbitrations are 
constituted have an important role in suggesting the name of the experts. 
The existence of an invisible college
82
 of independent experts does not seem to 
be particular problematic, in principle. As a matter of fact, if one considers that the same 
person is appointed to draft charters and maps, conduct site visits and assess the 
evidence presented by the parties, the logic conclusion appears to be that its work is 
satisfactory and its technical qualifications are unimpeachable. Another element that 
seems to enhance its technical qualifications refers to arbitrations with similar 
backgrounds, such as the Guinea/Guinea Bissau and Guinea-Bissau/Senegal 
arbitrations, where the same geographical aspects constituted the object of the dispute. 
A possible problem might appear when the same expert has acted previously as 
expert counsel in arbitrations, thus giving rise to an eventual problem with regard to 
his/her impartiality. For instance, the expert who acted as a counsel for the UK against 
France in the Maritime Delimitation (UK/France), later acted as an independent expert 
in the Delimitation of Maritime Areas  between France and Canada. Nonetheless, the 
parties did not raise any objection in that circumstance. Had the parties identified a 
conflict of interests or considered that the expert could at any level act impartially, that 
situation could have been problematic.  
One could trace a parallel between the practice of counsels who become judges 
with expert counsel who become tribunal-experts. It is true that, given the technical 
nature of the task to be performed by an expert, such a problem tends to be minimized. 
Moreover, the fact that the parties are usually heard in regard to the nomination of the 
experts also attenuates this potential problem. If the parties do not object the choice of a 
certain expert, its impartiality and independence hardly could be tainted by the previous 
participation. Be that as it may, this fact reinforces the importance of knowing the 
identity of the expert who assists the tribunal. 
 
(d) Choosing experts from lists: a future practice? 
A last question with regard to the method for choice of experts regards the list 
of experts maintained by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. A similar phenomenon 
happens in the context of the UNCLOS, and will be examined in the next section of this 
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chapter. As referred previously, the PCA maintains two lists of permanent experts in 
two specific fields connected to two sets of optional rules (Environmental disputes and 
Space-related disputes). The rules establishing such lists read as follows: 
The Secretary-General [of the PCA] will provide an indicative list of 
persons considered to have expertise in the scientific or technical matters in respect 
of which these Rules might be relied upon. In appointing one or more experts 
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, the arbitral tribunal shall not be limited in its choice 
to any person or persons appearing on the indicative list of experts
83
. 
The list is constituted by names appointed by States members of the PCA. At 
the moment it is not an extensive list
84
. The maintenance and update of a list can be 
useful not only to arbitrators but also to the parties. Furthermore, at least theoretically, it 
enhances the legitimacy of the eventual choice. Nonetheless, and likewise ITLOS, the 
lists have never been used to appoint experts in interstate disputes. 
 
2.4.2) The functions of tribunal-appointed experts. 
 
In arbitral practice, tribunal-appointed experts were employed to execute 
several and distinct tasks, ranging from the preparation of a map of a frontier to assess 
the amount of air pollution produced by a smelter. In this section, I will try to illustrate 
the several possible functions to be carried out by tribunal-appointed experts when they 
are nominated to assist an arbitral tribunal. This survey allows a broader understanding 
of the possible uses of experts in interstate disputes.  
The participation of tribunal-appointed experts in arbitral proceedings can be 
regulated by several instruments: arbitral agreements, specific orders and the expert's 
terms of reference. Sometimes the function to be carried out by experts is clearly 
specified in the arbitration agreement. For illustration, in the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf (UK/France) compromis, it was detailed that "the decision shall 
include the drawing of the course of the boundary (or boundaries) on a chart. To this 
end, the Court shall be entitled to appoint a technical expert or experts to assist it in 
preparing the chart"
85
. Similarly, in the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Maritime Boundary
86
, 
the compromis set forth that the decision "doit comprendre le tracé de la ligne frontière 
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sur une carte. A cette fin, le Tribunal sera habilité à désigner un ou des experts 
techniques pour l'assister dans la préparation de cette carte". The broad provisions 
contained in arbitral agreements usually grant great discretion to the arbitral tribunal in 
deciding the exact terms of participation of an expert in the proceedings.  
Recent practice shows that the "terms of reference"
87
 usually state the exact 
and detailed function to be carried out by experts. The terms of reference are usually the 
outcome of the preliminary contact between the experts and the tribunal. Hence, the 
great advantage of the use of terms of reference is that the mandate to be executed by 
the expert is previously established, thus contributing to the transparency of the 
proceeding.  
It is possible to identify five main general functions carried out by experts in 
arbitral proceedings. They are the linguistic assistance (a); the fact-finding function (b); 
the fact assessment function (c); the fact-producing function (d); and helping the 
tribunal in the implementation of the award (e). The proposed framework of functions is 
not definitive nor the unique possible theoretical organization explain the functions 
performed by experts. As a matter of fact, these functions can be blended and experts 
might perform more than one function in the same arbitral proceeding. In any case, this 
division can be useful to illustrate the possible functions of experts in arbitral practice. I 
will examine each one of them in turn, trying to highlight the problems connected to 
each function. 
 
a) Linguistic assistance. 
Experts may be asked to offer linguistic assistance to arbitral tribunals. For 
instance, Article 7(2) of the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitral agreement established that 
"le Tribunal, en tant que de besoin, pourvoira aux traductions et aux interprétations, sera 
habilité à engager le personnel de secrétariat, à nommer des experts, et prendra toutes 
mesures quant aux locaux et à l'achat ou à la location d'équipements"
88
. In a similar 
way, in the Argentina-Chile Frontier Case, the arbitral tribunal made an order 
appointing the Cervantes Professor of Spanish in the University of London as "Court 
Expert in the Spanish language"
89
.  
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The practice of appointing expert for linguistic purposes does not seem to be a 
trend nowadays since that function has been incorporated by the institution which hosts 
the arbitration, especially the PCA. The linguistic requirement is sometimes an 
important component of the technical qualities of an expert since, as in 
Guyana/Suriname arbitration has indicated, they are sometimes required to deal with 
documents drafted in languages other than English and French. 
 
b) Fact-finding function. 
Usually performed with visits to in situ, the fact-finding function is 
characterized by the gathering of evidentiary data not known by the tribunal. Evidently, 
the scope and terms of this function varies according to the subject-matter of the 
tribunal. While in the Corfu Channel before the ICJ the fact-finding function required 
that the experts nominated by the Court visit the site in order to verify whether it would 
be feasible the mining of the channel by Albania, the fact-finding functions in arbitral 
tribunal usually conveys the character of collecting data related to territorial and 
maritime disputes. A clear exception is the obtaining of data related to the air pollution 
caused by a smelter in the Trail Smelter arbitration. Another clear example of fact-
finding function occurred in the Palena arbitration, where the experts appointed by the 
tribunal (together with the expert arbitrators) executed a photographical survey of the 
disputed area
90
.  
In the Guyana/Suriname Maritime Boundary arbitration
91
, an expert 
hydrographer was appointed to assist the Court since the beginning of the proceedings. 
At the beginning of the hearings, the expert held a meeting with experts from the parties 
and asked them information about geographical coordinates and the situation of a 
specific marker. The exact location of the "Marker B" was not clear and the information 
provided by the parties contrasted. By an order, the Tribunal decided that "the 
Hydrographer shall, after inviting the Parties' representatives to be present, conduct a 
site visit in Guyana"
92
 and that 
The Hydrographer's terms of reference for the site visit are to inspect 
what Guyana alleges to be Marker ―B‖ and the surrounding area, as he deems 
appropriate, and to gather data relevant to the issues that have arisen as a result of 
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his question to the Parties of 20 December 2006 and the Parties' subsequent 
correspondence
93
; 
The tribunal-appointed expert conducted a site visit with the Registrar and with 
the representatives of the parties. After the visit, the expert prepared a report which was 
submitted to the parties. The parties made comments on it and a "Corrected Report" was 
submitted to the Tribunal. Both parties accepted the content of such a report
94
. The same 
expert prepared a technical report which was annexed to the award containing the 
geographical description of the maritime boundary between the parties. 
The Guyana/Suriname can be considered as a successful use of tribunal-
appointed experts to perform a fact-finding function
95
. Equally important is the fact that 
the right of the parties to comment upon the evidence gathered by the expert was also 
satisfied. Undoubtedly these proceedings contributed not only to a greater transparency 
of the proceedings but also for a better acceptance of the evidence gathered by the 
expert.  
 
c) Fact-assessment function.  
The fact assessment function can be understood as the assistance given by 
experts to adjudicators in understanding and evaluating the technical and scientific data 
underlying a dispute. As a commentator observed, "the tribunal-appointed expert may 
play a key role in improving the tribunal's understanding of the issues at hand and, if 
party-appointed experts have also reported on these issues, in facilitating the tribunal's 
evaluation of any diverging views"
96
. Furthermore, this evaluation can also be translated 
in the assistance that experts may offer to adjudicators in order to prepare the questions 
to be posed to the parties. 
As contented by this commentator, an important feature of this function 
represents offering to the arbitral tribunal the appropriate instruments to evaluate and 
effectively strike a balance between the technical arguments espoused by the parties. A 
interesting situation in relation to the fact-assessment function occurred in the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (UK/France) arbitration
97
. In this case, the arbitral 
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tribunal was asked to identify the course of the boundary between the respective 
continental shelves of the parties. Both parties had technical advisors in their 
delegations and the tribunal appointed its own expert in the terms of the compromis. 
The tribunal, perhaps with the assistance of its own expert, requested the Parties to 
identify precisely the respective terminal points of each of the agreed segments in the 
English Channel and to give the relevant coordinates of the median line in those 
segments. The parties held meetings in other to trace a single line identifying the points 
of agreement and they also identified the points of disagreement. The Court observed 
that the parties "furnished the Court with a complete list of these base-points together 
with their coordinates, which were stated by the United Kingdom to have been agreed 
between the Parties' experts"
98
. In addition, the arbitral tribunal further stated that "the 
Court, through its own expert, has confirmed the appropriateness of these salient points 
used by the Parties, and has verified the coordinates given by the Parties for each of the 
points"
99
. This passage reveals a distinct aspect of the fact-assessment function that can 
be performed by an expert: the review and re-examination of the technical agreement 
reached by the parties during the proceeding. 
A potential problem of this function relates to the transparency of such 
technical advice. In some occasions, it is possible to verify how the arbitral tribunal 
used the technical knowledge of the expert. For instance, the award in the Guinea-
Bissau/Senegal arbitration referred to definitions and calculations described "selon 
l'expert du tribunal". By contrast, in other situations the analysis performed by an expert 
is not so crystal-clear. In circumstances in which there are conflicting technical 
evidence submitted by the parties, it would be interesting to have a written report on the 
content of the technical advice given by the tribunal-appointed experts. 
 
d) The "fact-production" function.  
Experts are regularly required to assist arbitral tribunals in calculating the 
coordinates of a boundary, to prepare maps illustrating the delimitation decided by the 
tribunal and to perform the test of proportionality required in maritime delimitations. In 
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executing these tasks, tribunal-appointed experts end up assisting the production of a 
new fact, which is the outcome of the judicial process. 
Probably the most common function of experts in interstate arbitrations, 
tribunal-appointed experts were employed to perform such a functions in at least ten 
cases
100
.These operations are usually assembled in a technical report which is annexed 
to the arbitral award. A clear example occurred in the dispute between 
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago involving the delimitation of the exclusive economic 
zone and the continental shelf. Both parties had experts and the tribunal appointed a 
hydrographer to give assistance in dealing with the technicalities of the judgment
101
. In 
its report, annexed to the judgment, the expert described the geographic coordinates of 
the maritime boundary between the parties
102
.  In other cases, the Tribunal explained in 
the award what was the exact function experts had performed. In the second stage of the 
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the Tribunal observed that "through its expert in geodesy [it] 
has calculated the ratio of the lengths of the coasts concerned, measured by reference to 
their general direction, and the ratio between the water areas it has attributed to the 
Parties"
103
. 
In Canada/France, the compromis provided for the appointment of a technical 
expert to assist the tribunal to trace the maritime spaces between the parties and to 
indicate the position of every point mentioned and their geographical coordinates
104
. 
The expert was appointed at the beginning of the procedure and annexed a technical 
report to the award. With regard to the surface of the concerned zone, the tribunal 
observed that  
"en ce qui concerne la superficie de la zone pertinent, les Parties ont 
présenté des chiffres différents, dont certains reposent sur une hypothèse. Mais 
l'expert géographique qui assiste le Tribunal a calculé que la superficie de la zone 
pertinente aux fins de la vérification des résultats, telle que cette zone a été 
déterminée par le Tribunal, est proche de 63 000 milles marins carrés. Le Tribunal 
                                                 
100
 Delimitation Continental Shelf (UK/France), Beagle Channel (Argentina/Chile), Maritime 
Boundary (Guinea/Guinea/Bissau), Delimitation of Maritime Areas (Canada/France), Mount Fitzroy 
(Argentina/Chile), Maritime Delimitation (Eritrea/Yemen), Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Maritime 
Boundary (Guyana/Suriname), Abyei Arbitration (Sudan/Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army), 
Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/India), South China Sea (Philippines/China). 
101
 "On 23 October 2005, after consultation with the Parties, the Tribunal appointed a 
hydrographer, Mr. David Gray, as an expert to assist the Tribunal pursuant to Article 11(4) of the Rules of 
Procedure." 160 para 37. 
102
  
103
 Maritime Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation) (Second Stage) (1999) 22 RIAA 373 
para 168. 
104
 Article 2 of the Compromis. Delimitation of maritime areas between Canada and France 
(1992) 21 RIAA 271. 
101 
 
considère que ce calcul est bien fondé. (...) En conséquence, les exigences du test 
de proportionnalité, en tant qu'aspect de l'équité, ont été satisfaites"
105
. 
This passages indicates three important elements to the evaluation of the role of 
the independent experts in this case. The first regards the importance of the expert in 
order to perform a necessary step for the delimitation of maritime boundaries, i.e., the 
calculation of the values to perform the proportionality test. The second is that, when 
confronted with conflicting values, the tribunal preferred the evidence and calculation 
offered by its own expert. The third element refers to the consideration that "the 
Tribunal considers this calculation well founded". Through this expression, the tribunal 
reveals the control performed by the tribunal over the evidence presented by the expert. 
 
e) Implementation of the award. 
Experts can also perform an important post-adjudicatory function in the 
execution and implementation of the award. This specific function will be analyzed 
further ahead in the section designated to this category of expert. 
 
2.4.3. Cooperation between parties and tribunal-appointed experts.  
 
It is possible to identify, especially in recent practice, a growing cooperation 
between the tribunal-appointed experts and the parties to a dispute. This cooperation has 
two aspects that I will examine in this section: the obligation to cooperate with experts 
imposed to the parties (a) and the interaction between parties and experts during the 
proceedings (b).  
 
(a) The obligation to cooperate. 
The frequent use of experts in international arbitration demonstrates the 
importance of the rule which establishes the duty to cooperate with experts. This rule 
can be found in several Rules of Procedure of arbitral tribunals – even when experts are 
not used in the proceedings
106
 – as well as in general instruments. In this vein, Article 
29(3) of the 2012 PCA Rules sets forth that "the parties shall give the expert any 
relevant information or produce for his or her inspection any relevant documents or 
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goods that he or she may require of them". This obligation seems to be connected with 
the general obligation of the parties to cooperate with tribunals in evidentiary matters. 
Some problems have arisen in relation to the duty to cooperate with experts in 
arbitral tribunals. During the hearings of Guyana/Suriname, the expert appointed by the 
tribunal posed questions to the parties. In that occasion, technical questions appeared, as 
noted by the President of the Tribunal: 
Now, there are a certain sort of questions that have been raised, quite a lot 
of them, and they are all of a technical nature, and that is for the Tribunal's expert 
hydrographer and others -- the respective hydrographer experts to discuss and if 
possible to provide responses to the questions. It would be helpful if the agents of 
the parties were to choose the experts who should attend
107
. 
In the subsequent day, the parties both demonstrated very willing to cooperate 
with the tribunal expert. However, counsel for Suriname noticed that the meeting could 
not be held immediately since the responsible for hydrographic expertise of its team was 
the Netherlands Hydrographic Service and it would take some days for bringing such an 
expert to Washington, where the hearings were being held. Counsel for Guyana 
objected, observing that Suriname's defensive team had been assisted by expert counsels 
who could participate in the joint meeting between experts. In deciding this controversy, 
the President of the Tribunal gathered with the Tribunal during the break. At the end of 
the hearing, the President announced that there will be a preliminary expert meeting in 
the following day. On its report of this preliminary meeting, the tribunal-expert clarified 
the information needed and the parties agreed to submit this information further. 
 
(b) The interaction between parties and tribunal-appointed expert. 
Another aspect in the Guyana/Suriname case related to the important role the 
party-appointed experts in interacting with the experts of the parties. This interaction 
occurred in a preliminary discussion and also during the site visits, which probably 
contributed to a better grasping of the technical components of the dispute. In this vein, 
and referring to this case, Judges Simma and Al-Khasawneh in their dissenting opinion 
in Pulp Mills pointed out that "the findings of the independent hydrographic expert were 
relied upon by the Tribunal in addition to the expert evidence submitted by the Parties 
in their pleadings" leading commentators to observe that the award was ―based on a 
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sound understanding and acknowledgement of the relevant technical points in the 
dispute‖ 108. 
Similarly, the arbitral tribunal benefited from the interaction between tribunal-
appointed experts and parties in the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration. The 
expert hydrographer not only assisted the tribunal from the beginning of the 
proceedings, but he also accompanied the tribunal during the site visits. At the end of 
the hearings, the expert put a question to the parties
109
. The possibility of experts asking 
questions directly to the parties seems to be a new feature of adjudication. In the past 
practice, this prerogative was exclusively reserved to judges. This fact, together with the 
other examples analysed, seems to demonstrate that the outcome of the collaboration 
between parties and experts might contribute to better shape and precise the content of 
the technical evidence underlying a dispute. It also, to some extent, facilitates the 
appearance of an agreement on common factual elements between the parties. 
 
2.4.4. Site visits. 
 
The use of tribunal-appointed experts sometimes coincides, in ancient and 
recent practice, with the use of another procedural instrument at international courts' 
disposal, namely the visit of the locations related to the dispute. Although considered an 
inherent power of international tribunals
110
, the 2012 PCA Rules expressly provides for 
the possibility of the tribunal "after consultation with the parties, [to] perform a site 
visit"
111
. When the arbitral tribunal is constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS, it may 
avail itself, as happened in recent practice
112
, of Article 6(b) of Annex VII which 
provides that ―[t]he parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral 
tribunal‖ and shall ―enable it when necessary […] to visit the localities to which the 
case relates‖. 
Site visits might be of particular interest for two reasons. The first is that it 
creates a new opportunity for the parties to introduce technical evidence, sometimes 
rather informally, through explanations given by their experts. This can be sometimes 
problematic, however. In the Bay of Bengal arbitration, "Bangladesh expressed its 
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concern regarding certain activities carried out by India during the site visit" and 
required the exclusion of certain material from the files of the case. After hearing India, 
"the Tribunal indicated that it did not intend to exclude material from the proceedings, 
but would determine the relevance, materiality, and weight of all evidence pursuant to 
article 12(1) of the Rules of Procedure"
113
. By this decision, the arbitral tribunal 
confirmed the admissibility of the evidence presented by the parties in the site visits. 
The second element that seems to surface in the arbitral practice, especially in 
the recent one, is that the site visits favour collaboration between the independent expert 
and the expert counsels.  Thus, in the Guyana/Suriname arbitration there was no clear 
agreement between the parties in relation to the site visit. As a matter of fact, Suriname 
"contended further that a site visit would have no value as it 'would not provide any 
enlightenment on the question of whether the current location of Marker ―B' is the same 
as its original location‖. Nonetheless, the Tribunal ordered a site visit to be conducted 
by its independent expert, which happened only in Guyana. In Guyana/Suriname, the 
site visit and the report annexed by the expert seem to have been fundamental in order 
to identify the "Marker B" and, consequently, to trace the boundary between the parties. 
 
2.5. Experts appointed after the adjudicatory phase. 
 
Another category of expert employed by arbitral tribunals is the expert 
nominated to perform a specific task after the tribunal renders its award
114
. 
There are no specific provisions for such an expert in the 2012 PCA Rules. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that such a power is comprised in the general power of 
every international tribunal to appoint experts. This power can also be expressly 
prescribed in the arbitral agreement. For instance, in the India/Pakistan Boundary 
arbitration
115
, the special agreement between the two countries specifically provided 
that  
"After the Tribunal has adjudicated upon the disputes, the boundaries 
shall be demarcated jointly by the experts of both Dominions. If there is any 
disagreement between the experts regarding the actual demarcation of the boundary 
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in situ, such disagreement shall be referred to the Tribunal for decision and the 
boundary shall be demarcated finally in accordance with such decision".
116
 
This excerpt is interesting not only because it expressly demonstrates the 
necessity for experts to complete the task of the tribunal, but also for the fact that it 
subjects the work of such experts to the authority of the tribunal in case of 
disagreement.  
That excerpt also leads one to wonder about the limits of judicial function of an 
arbitral tribunal, which even after rendering a judgment can have authority to decide 
problems arising from the expert task. One might possibly content that, by bestowing 
part of its functions to an expert or a group of experts, the tribunal would be delegating 
part of its inherent judicial function, ie, deciding on the evidentiary background of a 
dispute. Such a problem arose in the Mount Fitzroy arbitration. In that instance, the 
arbitral tribunal appointed a geographical expert, which accompanied the tribunal in the 
site visit, helped the tribunal to identify the frontier between the parties and to set the 
coordinates in the award. In the dispositif of the award, the tribunal determined that  
"the course of the line decided upon here shall be demarcated and this 
Award executed before 15 February 1995 by the Court's geographical expert with 
the support of the Mixed Boundary Commission.  
The geographical expert shall indicate the places where the boundary 
posts are to be erected and make the necessary arrangements for the demarcation. 
Once the demarcation is completed, the geographical expert shall submit to the 
Court a report on his work and a map showing the course of the boundary line 
decided upon in this Award"
117
. 
This fragment of the award reinforces the idea that the tribunal continues to 
have an authority over the expert even after rendering the award.  
Unsatisfied with the outcome of that decision, Chile submitted a request of 
interpretation of the award alleging, inter alia, error of fact and that the arbitral tribunal 
"abandon[ed] its responsibility and delegat[ed] it to the geographical expert"
118
. The 
tribunal refused such an argument. It offered an interesting insight on the relationship 
between experts and tribunals when it explained that 
This is what happens, moreover, in any dispute, be it national or 
international, when a technical question (physical, biological, mechanical, 
chemical, geographical, etc.) is the subject of argument. When the question relates 
to whether a given industrial activity produces harmful polluting effects for third 
parties, or whether the collapse of a building was due to faulty construction, or 
whether a product has the chemical composition stated on its packaging, the judge 
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has recourse to an expert on the subject and asks him to make analyses and studies 
and produce conclusions. It is absurd to think that in any of these cases it can be 
concluded that the judge has delegated his responsibility to the expert
119
. 
Furthermore, the tribunal also observed that Chile "had a procedural 
opportunity to verify and monitor all the activities of the expert on the ground" and "it 
preferred to stay away", further concluding that "it does not now seem appropriate to 
use the extraordinary recourse of an application for revision to make good Chile's non-
participation in the demarcation work".
120
 One may wonder whether, had Chile 
participated in the demarcation work, the instrument of the revision of a judgment 
would be the appropriate one to contest the eventual error in an expert report. The 
international judicial practice before arbitral tribunals, ICJ or ITLOS does not offer 
conclusive elements on the issue. With regard to the Mount Fitzroy arbitration, although 
the Tribunal had criticized this attempt by Chile, it performed a judicial control over the 
report and the map presented by the expert. Having considered that "the report and map 
[prepared by the expert] so submitted are in conformity with the provisions of the 
Award of 21 October 1994", in the revision award the arbitral tribunal ordered a second 
post-adjudicatory task to the expert, namely "that the boundary posts are to be erected at 
the points marked on the ground by the expert, in accordance with the (...) 
coordinates"
121
. 
The Mount Fitzroy arbitration reinforces and reveals important elements in 
regard to the expert which is entitled with a function in the post-adjudicatory phase. The 
first is that, even when the award is delivered, the activities of such an expert are still 
subjected to the judicial function performed by the tribunal. The expert had had to 
submit the result of its work to the tribunal with a report, which, ultimately, was 
approved by the tribunal. As the tribunal observed "by virtue of this approval the said 
map is now the cartographic expression of the Award"
122
. 
The second element emerging from this case relates to the absence of a party in 
supervising the work of an expert. Since Chile had refused to participate in the 
demarcation work of the expert, it could not contest via request of interpretation such a 
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work. The last element which seems to have relevance consists in the rejection of the 
argument that the work of experts after the adjudicatory phase constitutes a delegation 
of powers: it is within the powers of the arbitral tribunal and within its judicial 
function's sphere. 
A more recent arbitral decision which touched upon the issue was the Iron 
Rhine Railway(Belgium/Netherlands) arbitration
123
. Although the arbitral tribunal did 
not appointed technical experts by itself, it assumed what was called as a "hybrid 
approach"
124
 with regard to the technical evidence.  
In a nutshell, the dispute concerned the reactivation of the Iron Rhine Railway 
in the Dutch territory. One of the thorny issues was to what extent should the costs be 
borne by Belgium or by the Netherlands. In its answer, the Tribunal "identified the 
principles of apportionment of costs in the various segments" of the railway, but it did 
proceed to the calculation of such costs. Connected with this point there was the 
question of compliance with environmental measures, as to which the Tribunal 
answered that "[it is not] the task of this Tribunal to investigate questions of 
considerable scientific complexity as to which measures will be sufficient to achieve 
compliance with the required levels of environmental protection. These issues are 
appropriately left to technical experts". The Tribunal, then, suggested that: 
To that effect, the Tribunal recommends that the Parties promptly, and in 
any case not later than 4 months from the date of this Award, put into effect the 
conditions necessary for a committee of independent experts to be set up within the 
same time frame, unless the Parties agree otherwise, to engage in the task of 
determining: 
1. the costs of the reactivation of the Iron Rhine railway; 
2. the costs of the autonomous development; and 
3. the particular, quantifiable benefits to the Netherlands – in financial 
terms – of the reactivation resulting from, in particular, improved road traffic 
circulation, enhanced road safety, reduced noise and the potential beyond currently 
anticipated autonomous development for additional use of the track by Netherlands 
trains. This committee of independent experts should conclude its findings as soon 
as possible, and in any case not later than 6 months from the date of its 
establishment. 
125
 
The approach assumed by the Tribunal is interesting for two reasons. First, 
because it clearly refused to perform a technical task that was beyond its knowledge and 
function. The tribunal recalled that that was not something that the parties asked, and, 
since there were no experts assisting the tribunal in that case, it squarely recognized that 
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it was not its task to investigate "questions of considerable scientific complexity". As a 
consequence – and here lies the second reason justifying its importance – the tribunal 
drafted specific suggestions to the tasks to be performed by a group of experts after the 
rendering of the judgment.  
This approach was praised in the literature. Judge Simma and Al Khasawnedh 
in their joint dissenting opinion in the Pulp Mills case, observed that "the Iron Rhine 
Tribunal‘s hybrid approach for appointing experts is thus a positive example which 
could serve the Court; we see no reason why it cannot be considered under Article 50 of 
the Statute"
126
.  
 
2.6. Assessment. 
 
The wealthy practice on the use of experts by arbitral tribunals offers 
indisputable food for thought, especially in comparison to the practice of the 
International Court of Justice. As has been noted by scholars, ―where it is desired to 
entrust resolution of the dispute to persons with particular technical competence, 
arbitration by technical experts or by international adjudicators closely assisted by 
technical experts may be preferred to ICJ adjudication‖127. In a similar note of criticism, 
it was written that ―whilst the ICJ has used experts to educate the judges on some basic 
notions of cartography and geology, it does not make full use of such experts in the 
same way as Arbitral Tribunals, and as a result the judgments given cannot benefit from 
the same detailed scientific consideration‖128.  
The practice of arbitral tribunal reveals some distinctive features that 
differentiate it from the practice of the ICJ. Firstly, arbitral tribunals, perhaps inspired 
by the use of experts in commercial and investment arbitration, have developed 
innovative techniques in relation to the appointment, examination and use of 
independent experts. Some of these solutions might be useful if transposed to the 
context of the ICJ. For instance, the use of experts appointed by the parties in the Trail 
Smelter arbitrations or the drawing of specific suggestions to the use of experts in the 
post-adjudicatory phase in the Iron Rhine Railway could prove to be useful under 
certain circumstances. Perhaps with the exception of the category of experts-arbitrators, 
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none of the practices in relation to the use of experts in arbitration seems to fall off the 
powers possessed by the ICJ under Article 50 of its Statute. To some extent, it seems 
that the recent practice of the ICJ is already somewhat inspired by the flourishing use of 
experts by international tribunals. This seems to ring true in relation to a greater and 
more appropriate use of party-appointed experts and also with regard to the appointment 
of independent experts in the recent Costa Rica v. Nicaragua expert order. 
Another important component of the arbitral practice is a greater focus on the 
transparency of the expert's participation. In almost every case where experts helped the 
tribunal, their identity was known by the parties and the content of their advice was 
disclosed. Sometimes parties had had the occasion to comment upon their conclusion. 
These measures had allowed the parties a greater participation in challenging the 
impartiality and independence of such experts . 
The large use of experts by arbitral tribunals allows some speculation on two 
arguments sketched to offer the reasons why some international tribunals are so reticent 
in appointing expert. The first is that the parties were not willing to have experts in the 
proceedings. The second is that experts in the proceedings undermine the authority of 
adjudicators.  
As to the first argument, as it was examined, parties largely favours the 
presence of experts in the proceedings – an information which should be considered in 
this regard is the reference to the power of appointing experts in arbitral compromis and 
the general agreement in lite to their nominations. 
As to the second argument, it seems hard to sustain that their employment 
undermine the legal authority of the adjudicative body. Their functions are usually 
related to assistance and fact-finding rather than offering interpretations to sensitive 
legal points. Sometimes experts bear the character of a bridge between the parties and 
the tribunal in interacting with the partie's experts. 
That gears onto the last remark, that is the dialogue between procedural 
instruments. Not infrequently tribunal-appointed experts were called to dialogue with 
other categories of experts: expert counsels and party-appointed experts. The main 
effect of this dialogue is adjudicators benefiting from several sources of technical and 
scientific input.  This enrichment is welcomed and certainly contributes to the 
enhancement of the legitimacy of arbitral awards.  
110 
 
3. The experience of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
 
3.1. Scientific and technical evidence in ITLOS case law. 
 
Technical and scientific issues do not rarely appear in the case law of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS or Tribunal), which is one of the 
main compulsory means for dispute settlement provided under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or Convention)
129
. The Convention covers 
a set of situations possessing a highly technical character
130
. As observed by an author, 
"for at least a half century, the law of the sea has looked to science and applied 
scientific tests in several different contexts"
131
. As the Tribunal recently stated, some 
ITLOS provisions "contain elements of law and science, its proper interpretation and 
application requires both legal and scientific expertise". 
In order to clarify the scientific and technical issues raised before ITLOS, some 
examples can be referred to by way of illustration. One of the first cases in which the 
Tribunal was called upon to settle a dispute involving scientific evidence was the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna cases
132
. New Zealand and Australia requested the prescription 
of provisional measures with regard to a dispute against Japan brought before an Annex 
VII arbitral tribunal. According to the requesting States, Japan had been violating a 
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number of UNCLOS provisions through unilaterally designing and undertaking an 
experimental fishing programme which would have been menacing a valuable 
migratory species of pelagic fish, the southern bluefin tuna. Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand considered that the "scientific evidence available" pointed out in different 
directions with regard to the dangers to the southern bluefin tuna stock. The Tribunal 
did not fail to ascertain the existence of "scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be 
taken to conserve the stock of southern bluefin tuna‖. The Tribunal recognized, then, 
that 
"although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific evidence 
presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of 
urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the 
southern bluefin tuna stock"
133
. 
Since the Tribunal understood that the Annex VII arbitral tribunal would have 
prima facie jurisdiction over the dispute
134
, and that the parties "should act with 
prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent 
serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna", it prescribed provisional measures 
requiring the parties not to take any actions which might prejudice a future decision.
135
 
The "precautionary approach" of the Tribunal was vastly commented on academic 
instance
136
. The dispute, however, was not solved by the arbitral tribunal constituted 
under Annex VII, which declared it had no jurisdiction over the dispute
137
. 
Another example can be found in the proceedings on provisional measures in 
the MOX Plant case
138
. The dispute concerned the authorization by the United Kingdom 
of the construction and operation of a plant to make mixed oxide fuel (MOX) at 
Sellafield, on the Irish Sea. According to Ireland, by authorizing the construction, the 
UK would have violated, inter alia, UNCLOS provisions relating to the marine 
environment of the Irish Sea. While the jurisdiction to settle the dispute belonged to an 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal, ITLOS indicated provisional measures, whose content 
aimed essentially at reinforcing the obligation of the parties to cooperate with the view 
                                                 
133
 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, para 80. 
134
 On this issue, see S Rosenne, 'Provisional measures and prima facie jurisdiction revisited', 
in Liber amicorum judge Shigeru Oda (Kluwer 2002) 515-544. 
135
 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, para 77. 
136
 Treves, Boyle. 
137
 Source. To a general assessment of the dispute, see S Rosenne, "Arbitrations under Annex 
VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" in TM Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds) Law of 
the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 996. 
138
 The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures,  [2001] ITLOS 
Reports. On the general questions concerning the case, see RR Churchill, 'MOX Plant Arbitration and 
Cases', [2007] MPEPIL. 
112 
 
of settling the dispute
139
. In the Mox Plant case, there was scientific disagreement 
between the parties in relation to the existence and the degree of risk of pollution from 
the operation of the MOX plant
140
. As seven of the judges noted in their joint 
declaration, the dispute was "characterized by an almost total lack of agreement on the 
scientific evidence with respect to the possible consequences of the operation of the 
MOX plant on the marine environment of the Irish Sea"
141
. Still, the Tribunal did not 
engage in the examination on the prima facie evidence and relied on the fact that the 
United Kingdom, during the oral hearings, made some assurances that there would be 
no activity in the MOX plant until the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal
142
. 
The Tribunal eventually concluded that 
in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal does not find that the 
urgency of the situation requires the prescription of the provisional measures 
requested by Ireland, in the short period before the constitution of the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal"
143
 
What emerges clearly from the judgment and from individual opinions of some 
judges is that the existence of scientific disagreement and scientific uncertainty is not, 
by itself, a sufficient element to trigger a precautionary approach that would compel the 
Tribunal to prescribe conservatory provisional measures. The Tribunal mainly placed 
emphasis in the lack of the urgency justifying the indication of provisional measures. As 
observed by judge Mensah, "the evidence before the Tribunal does not suffice to show 
either that irreversible prejudice might occur to any rights of Ireland or that serious 
harm to the marine environment might occur, solely as a result of the commissioning of 
the MOX plant, in the period between now and the constitution of the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal"
144
.  
Coming back to a more general assessment of  the case law of ITLOS, it may 
be noted that, while in twenty years of activity (1997-2017) several disputes involving 
scientific questions were brought to ITLOS, ITLOS does not seem to have developed an 
unitary and uniform approach to the treatment of technical evidence. Different reasons 
could be given for explaining this feature. Firstly, as the two examples just mentioned 
clearly show, the Tribunal has had few occasions to address the merits of the disputes 
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brought before it. In most cases, the Tribunal dealt with questions of evidence in the 
context of proceedings related to provisional measures
145
 or the prompt release of 
vessels
146
. In relation to this kind of proceedings, the question of evidence has often a 
marginal importance and in any case the Tribunal approaches it on a "prima facie" 
basis
147
. Moreover, since the cases submitted to the Tribunal have raised very different 
issues, this may have prevented the Tribunal from sketching an homogeneous approach. 
Whatever the reasons, it remains that, when it comes to the treatment of 
evidence, notably technical and scientific evidence, a case by case approach seems to be 
the rule
148
. This has allowed the Tribunal a certain flexibility, balancing the respect for 
the will of the litigants with an effective performance of its judicial function. 
 
3.1.1. Common elements between ITLOS and ICJ. 
 
When dealing with the problem of equipping the Tribunal with the means for 
handling scientific and technical evidence, the choice of those who shaped the rules of 
the Tribunal was to use the International Court of Justice as a referring model. Being 
both dispute settlement bodies entrusted with the task of settling interstate disputes
149
, 
several provisions governing the procedure of ITLOS were modeled, almost ipsis literis, 
by the Statute and the Rules of the ICJ
150
. 
With regard to evidentiary questions, there are several common elements
151
. By 
way of illustration, one may mention the wide powers of the Tribunal to determine its 
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own procedure and set out evidentiary issues through orders
152
, the absence of strict 
rules for the admissibility of evidence and the power of the Tribunal to call upon the 
parties to produce evidence
153
. Furthermore, it appears that some non-written principles 
governing the evidentiary field in the ICJ also find their place in the practice of ITLOS, 
such as the duty of the parties to co-operate with the Tribunal in the production of 
evidence
154
 and the principle of free assessment of evidence
155
. 
Commonalities can be also found with regard to the use of experts by the two 
judicial bodies. Given that resort to experts is the main procedural instrument to deal 
efficiently with technical and scientific evidence and to offer scientific input to a court 
or tribunal, it does not surprise that this instrument has a prominent place in the 
procedure before ITLOS. In spite of their "recognized competence in the field of the law 
of the sea"
156
, judges from ITLOS are not necessarily versed in geomorphology, in 
financial assessment of nautical vessels nor in the analysis of the stocks of certain fish 
species. ITLOS' case law has demonstrated how even a specialized judge sometimes 
requires the assistance of experts to properly settle a dispute submitted to it by litigating 
parties. 
In the following sub-paragraphs, each category of expert provided by the rules 
of ITLOS will be separately considered as well as the relevant practice. At the end, a 
general assessment will be outlined in which the possible points of connection between 
ITLOS and the ICJ will be highlighted. 
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3.2. Forms of Expertise in the Law and Practice of ITLOS. 
 
Five are the main sets of rules governing ITLOS procedural law: i) the Law of 
the Sea Convention; ii) its Statute, part of UNCLOS; iii) the Rules of the Tribunal, as 
amended on 17 March 2009; iv) Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice of the 
Tribunal, adopted on 31 October 1997; v) and the Guidelines concerning the 
Preparation and Presentation of Cases before the Tribunal, adopted on 14 November 
2006.  
From the outset, it should be noted that, unlike the ICJ, the Statute of the 
Tribunal does not contain specific provisions regarding the use of experts or 
determining which categories of experts are at the Tribunal's disposal. As a matter of 
fact, the Statute contains few procedural provisions; ITLOS procedural law is 
essentially governed by the Rules of the Tribunal, in conformity with the principle 
according to which it is for the Tribunal to "make all arrangements connected with the 
taking of evidence"
157
. This allows the Tribunal to update and modify its rules of 
procedure easily – the last version of the Rules of the Court are from 2009. Whereas to 
modify the Statute of the ICJ, which contains the main rules with regard to experts, it is 
required the modification of the United Nations Charter, modifying the ITLOS 
procedure only requires the amendment of the Rules by the Tribunal. This flexibility is 
also strengthened by Article 11 of the Resolution on the International Judicial Practice, 
which provides that "the Tribunal may decide to vary the procedures and arrangements 
set out above in a particular case for reasons of urgency or if circumstances so justify". 
For this reason, it seems right to affirm that the procedure regarding experts can be 
adapted depending on the circumstances of a given situation or on agreement between 
the parties. However, in spite of its broad powers regarding the adaptability of its 
procedure
158
, the Tribunal has always demonstrated a rather traditional approach to 
issues of evidence and, particularly, issues regarding the appearance of experts in the 
proceedings. 
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Equivalently to ICJ, the main categories of experts provided for in ITLOS rules 
are: (1) the party-appointed experts (or expert-witnesses); (2) the independent experts 
appointed by the Tribunal; (3) experts appointed under Article 289 of UNCLOS to sit 
with the tribunal. In addition to those categories envisaged by the Rules, it will also be 
examined the practice regarding (4) the expert counsel and (5) the experts appointed 
after the judicial phase. It is not clear whether ghost experts were ever used by the 
Tribunal and therefore this category will not be addressed. 
 
3.2.1. Party-appointed experts. 
 
Party-appointed experts are the most recurrent category of expert employed in 
ITLOS case law
159
. In almost every case raising technical or scientific issues the parties 
nominated an expert to give oral evidence before the Tribunal
160
.  
Similarly to the ICJ Statute, ITLOS Rules set forth that "the oral proceedings 
shall consist of the hearing by the Tribunal of agents, counsel, advocates, witnesses and 
experts" (Art. 44)
161
 and that witnesses and experts shall be indicated "in sufficient time 
before the opening of the oral proceedings" and "with indications of the point or points 
to which their evidence will be directed" (Art. 72)
162
. The same provision also 
establishes that copies of these documents shall be received by the opposite party. This 
provision essentially aims at ensuring the respect of the principle of parity of arms: the 
other party needs to be enabled to properly answer to the evidence that will be 
presented. This principle is also expressed in Article 73 of the Rules of the Tribunal, 
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which provides the right of a party to comment upon the evidence presented by the 
other party
163
. 
The Rules of the Tribunal also incorporate specific provisions for the situation 
in which the parties wish to call a witness or an expert in the course of the hearings 
whose name was not included in the list previously indicated following Article 72. In 
this respect, Article 78
164
 of the Rules of the Tribunal specifies that the party who wish 
to call an expert not indicated previously 
"shall make a request therefore to the Tribunal and inform the other party, 
and shall supply the information required by article 72. The witness or expert may 
be called either if the other party raises no objection or, in the event of objection, if 
the Tribunal so authorizes after hearing the other party". 
Two are the main rights that seem to be protected by these provisions. The first 
is the right of the parties to be heard in regard to the evidence that the other party wishes 
to produce. The second is the right of the parties to indicate experts even if the other 
party objects to the appointment. It is clear, however, that the final decision on whether 
or not an expert should be heard remains with the Tribunal, according to the 
circumstances of a case. 
Once indicated, party-appointed experts will be heard and examined during the 
oral hearings. According to the Rules of the Tribunal, the method of examination of the 
party-appointed experts is determined by the Court on a case-by-case basis, after 
consultation with the parties
165
. From this point of view, the method of examination 
generally employed by ITLOS is identical to the one used in common law courts and 
recently adopted by the ICJ: first, there will occur the examination by the party which 
appointed the expert; then, the cross-examination by the other party will take place; 
finally; finally, the Court will have the possibility of putting questions
166
. In his separate 
opinion in the M/V Louisa case, judge Cot, after noting that the procedures for the 
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examination of witnesses "are modelled on the common-law rules but are not as 
rigorous", emphasized that such procedure ―clearly favours the party with full mastery 
of the techniques of adversary procedure"
167
. However, it may be noted that the fact that 
judges tend to be active, in asking questions to witnesses and experts, especially in 
recent cases
168
, is an element which distinguishes the procedure before ITLOS from the 
traditional common law system, in favour of incorporating elements rooted in the 
continental tradition
169
. 
In the practice of ITLOS three interesting problems emerged with regard to the 
use of party-appointed experts. They concerned a) the use of voir dire in order to 
preliminarily challenge the reliability of an expert; b) the important role played by 
article 72 in protecting the right of the other party to be prepared to comment upon the 
evidence adduced; and c) the importance attributed by the Tribunal to the evidence 
presented by party-appointed experts. I will examine each one of these problems in turn. 
 
a. The voir dire in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case.  
 
In principle, party-appointed experts who testify before the Tribunal are 
considered as independent experts. The impartiality of their testimony is reinforced by 
the solemn declaration they are asked to swear before testifying
170
. In municipal law, 
specially American law, the impartiality of a witness or expert who is going to testify 
before a court can be challenged through a specific procedure called voir dire, which is 
"a preliminary examination to test the competence of a witness or evidence"
171
. Albeit 
rare in international tribunals
172
, the voir dire was used once before ITLOS.  
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In the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, Australia and New Zealand called an expert 
under article 72 of the Rules of the Tribunal. These States had their own scientists 
integrating their legal team. However, they also decided to adduce "scientific evidence 
from an independent British scientist"
173
 in order to strengthen their scientific argument 
that the stocks of tuna would be affected by the Japanese program. By agreement of the 
parties, it was decided that, before the examination and cross-examination of such an 
expert, Japan would be given the opportunity of examining the expert's "capability and 
credibility to offer specialized expertise on matters relevant to the case"
174
. As President 
Mensah observed, "the purpose of the present proceeding is to enable [the parties] to put 
in context something connected with the suitability of expertise"
175
. 
Two problems seem to emerge in relation to this procedure. The first concerns 
the reasons that could affect the suitability of an expert. The second regards the possible 
consequence of such a procedure. The Tribunal offered some elements in relation to the 
first; the second remains a matter for speculation. 
With relation to the first problem, during the voir dire the counsel for Japan 
questioned the fact that the British expert had received material from the parties before 
his testimony. There was an implicit suggestion that this fact would have some impact 
on expert's impartiality. On this issue, President Mensah made the following 
observation: "I think we are dealing here with the question of whether this expert can be 
accepted as an independent expert. If he is an independent expert, the fact that he had 
material sent to him by the parties would not be either extraordinary or improper"
176
. By 
this observation, the President clearly excluded  that the previous contact between the 
expert and the parties could be a reason for considering an expert as being non-
independent. In a later case, judge Cot observed that this contact could be seem as a 
problematic to a judge coming from a civil law background
177
.  
That gears to the second problem. Had the Tribunal considered that the expert 
were not independent, it is not immediately clear what would have been the 
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consequence. President Mensah spoke about "acceptance as an independent expert". 
Two possibilities can be sketched. First, it could be said that the expert is not allowed to 
testify because it cannot be considered independent. Alternatively, the fact that the 
experts is not considered to be independent does not prevent him/her from testifying but 
this testimony would be given little evidentiary weight by the Tribunal. In other words, 
the main issue is whether the testimony could be regarded as being admissible or not. 
Considering that there are very few rules concerning the admissibility of evidence 
before international tribunals, it seems unlikely that an expert appointed by a State 
could not be allowed to testify. 
Incidentally it can be noted that in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the Tribunal 
did not clarify what importance it attached to the evidence presented by the expert since 
there is no direct reference to such evidence in the judgment.  
Even so, it remains the question, already raised in relation to the practice of 
ICJ, of how to assess the independence of party-appointed expert. Theoretically, an 
expert or a witness which is not directly interested in the outcome of a dispute is a 
witness with a higher credibility. As observed by an author, "expert witnesses are not 
disqualified by the mere fact that they are government officials of the party which called 
them. However, the international court or tribunal may take this position into 
consideration when evaluating the evidence and deciding upon the probative value of 
the testimony"
178
. Furthermore, and especially from the perspective of a lawyer 
schooled in the continental system, it is difficult to determine the degree of interest of 
an expert which was paid by a client to testify before a court. 
In sum, the procedure of voir dire had no apparent impact in the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case and it is hard to identify the criteria by which an expert could be 
disqualified. Expert credibility seems to be a matter which touches upon the evidential 
weight to be given to its testimony. This does not exclude that a procedure for testing 
the independence of a party-appointed expert could be used again in the future.  
 
b. The importance of the requisite of previous information under Article 72 and the 
distinction between witnesses and experts in the S/V Saiga. 
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In the M/V „Saiga‟ (No 2) case179, two interesting questions related to the use 
of party-appointed experts have arisen: the importance of article 72 of the Rules in order 
to protect the right of the parties to comment upon the evidence presented by the other 
party and the distinction between witnesses and experts. In spite of the existence of a 
similar provision to Article 72 in the Statute of the ICJ
180
, in the practice of the Court a 
similar problem never appeared and the Court has been rather flexible in relation to the 
strict division between expert and witness. 
In a nutshell, the object of the dispute concerned the arrest and detention of the 
oil tanker Saiga, a vessel registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), by 
Guinea. The reconstruction of the factual background of the case required not only a 
proper establishment of the facts, through the hearing of witness, but also an 
examination of the Guinean legal system, which was provided by an expert in Guinean 
law. Following the proceedings provided in Article 72 of the Rules of ITLOS, the 
parties in the Saiga case informed the Tribunal about the exact content of the 
testimonies to be given by their witnesses and experts. During the oral hearings, the 
expert called by Guinea to present legal evidence
181
 addressed factual questions related 
to detention of the vessel Saiga. In particular, he testified on issues that had been dealt 
with in the testimony of a witness called by SVG. The counsel for SVG objected to such 
testimony. In his words, "[t]he evidence now given has nothing to do with any of those 
questions. It comes as a complete surprise. (...) To present this account without any 
warning, written or oral (...) is in flagrant violation of the Rules of Procedure." President 
Mensah agreed with this argument and observed that  
"It has now been brought to my attention, and I think it is very pertinent, 
that in fact [the expert] has now been asked to give evidence on a completely 
different subject matter. (...) This concerns not only the other party. If the Tribunal 
had been aware that information was to be given and evidence was to be addressed 
to matters involving his relationship with the authorities in Guinea, quite clearly 
the Tribunal would have been interested to know the reaction of Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines. In the event, neither the Tribunal nor, I presume, the other party, 
could have known that this matter was going to be put in evidence. Therefore I 
believe that the evidence that you are now adducing from [the expert] is not the 
evidence that you informed the Tribunal you would be asking of him. That 
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evidence cannot, therefore, be permitted to be given because it would be contrary 
to the Rules of the Tribunal. I think that it is also fair to say that it will be unfair not 
only to the other party but also to the Tribunal. It is, in effect, a surprise to all of 
us"
182
. 
President Mensah made also a distinction in relation to the content of the 
evidence that was given. Since the expert was supposed to testify on matters of Guinean 
law, the President stated that: 
"This is expert evidence. In your letter you said there would be witnesses 
and experts and I have actually marked "experts". That would be the correct 
designation. The evidence that you are adducing now is not expert evidence but 
factual evidence relating to the events leading to the arrest of M/V SAIGA. You 
can question Mr Bangoura on the issues in respect of which you have previously 
informed the Tribunal. Therefore, the information that he has given and the 
evidence that he has given up until now will, in my view, be struck off the record 
because it is contrary to the Rules of the Tribunal. That is my ruling"
183
. 
President Mensah‘s statement addressed a number of interesting issues 
concerning, a) the importance of the Article 72 on the content of the testimony, b) the 
identification of what constitutes "expert evidence", and c) the role of the President of 
the Tribunal in deciding these questions.  
With regard to the first issue, it is interesting to note that the strict application 
of Article 72 led the President of the Tribunal to limit the testimony of the expert to the 
questions previously indicated by the party and restricted within his expertise. Equally 
interesting is the fact that the President stressed that the widening of the content of the 
testimony would have the effect not only of violating the right of the other party but 
also of breaching the limitations imposed by the Tribunal for the proper development of 
the proceedings. This demonstrates that the question at stake is not only the parity of 
arms, but also the proper performance by the Tribunal of its judicial function. 
With regard to the second issue, it seems that the question of what clearly 
constitutes expert evidence
184
 is not as important as the respect of Article 72. In dealing 
with such issue, President Mensah took a different approach from that adopted by 
President Spender in the South West Africa cases before the ICJ. While President 
Spender understood that "it is inevitable that the person who is giving evidence as an 
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expert will both deal with facts and also express his opinion upon the facts" and that 
"[t]hat may bear upon the weight to be given to his evidence, but it does not bear upon 
the admissibility of his evidence"
185
, President Mensah stressed such a distinction. 
Nonetheless, given that in most recent cases ITLOS allowed testimonies touching upon 
both factual and technical questions
186
, in the quality of expert-witnesses, the 
importance of the distinction between factual evidence and expertise in the M/V Saiga 
case appears to diminish. 
A third issue is the broad powers of the President in deciding such matters. The 
legal basis for such power is probably Article 12 of the Rules of the Tribunal. This 
provision establishes that "the President of the Tribunal shall preside at all meetings of 
the Tribunal. He shall direct the work and supervise the administration of the Tribunal". 
In the Saiga case, Guinea accepted the decision of the President. Had Guinea objected 
to the President's decision, the question would arise whether the full Tribunal or the 
president would rule on the issue. Since according to Article 78 of the Rules it is the 
Tribunal (and not the President) that wields the power to decide whether or not a 
witness and expert shall be heard without the previous indication, it is suggested that it 
is for the Tribunal ultimately to decide on such matters. 
 
c. The importance given to the expert opinion by the Tribunal in the assessment of facts.  
 
Although party-appointed experts appeared in a significant number of cases 
before ITLOS, the Tribunal has made little reference, at least directly, to the evidence 
given by them in its decisions. Thus, it is not easy to delineate the general criteria 
resorted to by  the Tribunal for the assessment and evaluation of the testimony given by 
party-appointed experts.  
The Tribunal tends to give weight to an expert testimony when the opinion 
expressed by an expert appointed by a party had not been contested by the other party. 
This criterion clearly finds correspondence in ICJ case law. In the "Camouco" case
187
, 
the evidence given by one of the experts called by Panama to determine the replacement 
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value of the Camouco vessel was not contested by France. The Tribunal took note of 
this fact
188
. In the same sense, judge Treves emphasized that "[t]he expert of Panama 
has assessed such value before the Tribunal  (...) without France raising objections"
189
. 
Ultimately, the evidence given by the expert was taken into account in order to 
determine the bound for financial security set out in Article 282 of UNCLOS.  
Similarly, in the Monte Corfuco case
190
, the parties presented conflicting 
evidence on the exact value of the vessel.  In assessing the several figures placed before 
it, the Tribunal gave weight to the expert testimony offered during the oral proceedings 
"on behalf of the Applicant and not challenged by the Respondent"
191
. After comparing 
the value presented "to the amount for which the vessel was sold" in the past, the 
Tribunal concluded its reasoning by considering "that this assessment is reasonable". 
Another case in which uncontested evidence played an important was the 
Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), which will be analyzed further 
ahead. 
 
3.2.2. The Expert counsel. 
 
The appearance of expert counsel, i.e. experts acting on behalf of a party and 
pleading before the tribunal in such quality, is not very frequent before ITLOS. Indeed, 
in the Land Reclamation case, the expert which Malaysia had used as technical adviser 
and which during the oral hearings had made a statement as a member of the delegation 
of Malaysia, was later "converted" to party-appointed expert and, consequently, sworn 
before the Tribunal and was cross-examined
192
 by Singapore. 
It is not rare, however, to find experts and technical assistants offering advice 
to the defensive teams. There are no rules regulating their appearance. Article 53 of the 
Rules simply establishes that "the parties may have the assistance of counsel or 
advocates before the Tribunal". It does not mention experts giving assistance to the 
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parties. Experts who integrate the legal team are to be assimilated to counsels or 
advocates. Nonetheless, most of the cases before ITLOS had technical or scientific 
advisors in such a quality. It is certainly a way to add epistemological legitimacy to the 
position of the State. 
 An interesting problem relating to this category of expert arose in the Dispute 
concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar 
in the Bay of Bengal, decided in 2012. Differently from the majority of cases which 
dealt with technical or scientific evidence, this is a case decided on the merits and, 
therefore, with a proper and definitive examination of the evidence adduced to the 
Tribunal. In principle, it may be assumed that an expert counsel would offer evidence 
that is not completely impartial. However, in Bangladesh/Myanmar ITLOS relied 
considerably upon the evidence offered by an expert integrating a legal team. 
As in almost every case of maritime delimitation, the dispute touched upon 
strict geographical and geological considerations. With regard to the presentation of the 
technical evidence by the parties, it should be noticed that only Bangladesh had experts 
integrating their legal teams. In particular, the two experts which had written the 
technical reports presented by Bangladesh were included as "Independent Experts" in 
the defensive team
193
. Their "independence" was contested by Myanmar during the oral 
hearings
194
. Counsel for Myanmar argued that "we have noted with a certain amused 
surprise that the Applicant, at least during the hearing, added to the list of its counsel the 
name of two geology professors, which is its right, calling them 'independent experts'. 
The concept of 'independent experts' who are members of a legal team is very 
interesting"
195
. 
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The counsel seemed to have in mind the debate on expert-counsels which arose 
out of the Pulp Mills case before the ICJ. In that instance, as already examined
196
, the 
technical evidence was presented by experts acting as counsels for the parties and 
pleading before the ICJ. The ICJ did not make observations on the independence of 
such experts
197
, but concluded that they "should testify before the Court as experts, 
witnesses or in some cases in both capacities, rather than counsel, so that they may be 
submitted to questioning by the other party as well as by the Court"
198
.  
However, the Tribunal did not extract any inference from the fact that 
Bangladesh's experts were not presented according to Article 72 of the Rules nor did it 
raise the question of their independence
199
. As a matter of fact, in its paragraph 444, the 
judgment makes direct reference to the reports written by the experts
200
 – which were 
not defied by Myanmar. When dealing with the question of the delimitation of the area 
beyond 200nm, the Tribunal observed the presence of "significant uncertainty as to the 
existence of a continental margin in the area in question". Then, it relied on experts 
reports in order to describe the "unique situation" which characterizes the Bay of 
Bengal. In particular, the Tribunal observed that 
 "as confirmed in the experts‘ reports presented by Bangladesh during the 
proceedings, which were not challenged by Myanmar, the sea floor of the Bay of 
Bengal is covered by a thick layer of sediments (...) having accumulated in the Bay 
of Bengal over several thousands of years"
201
  
It then quoted directly the reports to support this finding. That led the Tribunal 
to conclude that  
"In view of uncontested scientific evidence regarding the unique nature 
of the Bay of Bengal and information submitted during the proceedings, the 
Tribunal is satisfied that there is a continuous and substantial layer of sedimentary 
rocks extending from Myanmar‘s coast to the area beyond 200 nm"202. 
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In other words, the uncontested scientific evidence adduced by the experts 
integrating the defensive team helped the Tribunal to identify the existence of 
Myanmar's continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles – a essential issue of the 
dispute. 
On account of the Tribunal's approach in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case, it is 
difficult to affirm that experts integrating the legal team of a party has little role to play 
when scientific and technical evidence underlies a dispute. It is clear that their 
importance in that specific case was enhanced by the fact that Myanmar did not 
contested the evidence presented by them nor asked to cross-examine them. This fact 
was expressly taken into account by the Tribunal. As also noted by Treves
203
, the fact 
that the expert evidence was not contested was crucial. 
Interestingly, unlike in the Pulp Mills case, in the present case the experts did 
not properly acted as counsels since they did not plead before the Tribunal. They wrote 
reports and followed the hearings. This aspect must be taken into account when 
considering the weight attached to their opinion by the Tribunal. This aspect was 
emphasized by judge Lucky in his dissenting opinion. According to him  
"the experts in their reports show no personal interest in the outcome of 
the dispute. They are not employees of the Bangladesh Government. The analysis 
was apparently conducted with care and supported by references. The reports are 
complete and thorough, clear and cohesive. The data were not challenged or 
contradicted. The conclusions in the reports are specific and accurate"
204
 
Judge Lucky appears to refer to two categories of elements. The first category 
relates to elements pertaining to the personal background of the experts and to their 
relationship with the State which appointed them. Some of the criteria were already 
highlighted in the case law of the ICJ, such as the fact that witnesses/experts are 
employees of the Government and the absence of personal interest in the outcome of the 
dispute. The second category is related to the quality of the evidence itself, such as the 
accuracy of the information and the technical grounds on which the report is based. One 
could argue that the fact that Myanmar contested only the first category of elements (the 
"independence" of the experts), but did not challenged the second category of elements 
(the scientific information related to the continental shelf) led the Court to attribute 
some importance to their opinions. 
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3.2.3. Tribunal-appointed experts. 
 
The appointment of ex curiae experts has been regarded as an inherent power 
of international tribunals.
205
 It is thus not surprising that this power is fully 
contemplated in ITLOS rules. Article 77 (2) of the Rules of the Tribunal envisages that 
"the Tribunal may, if necessary, arrange for the attendance of a witness or expert to give 
evidence in the proceedings". This provision shall be read together with subparagraph 1 
of the same Article, which provides that "the Tribunal may at any time call upon the 
parties to produce such evidence or to give such explanations as the Tribunal may 
consider to be necessary for the elucidation of any aspect of the matters in issue, or may 
itself seek other information for this purpose". As it has been noted, Article 77 sets out 
"several ways in which the Tribunal may adopt an active role and seek information in 
the form of written or oral evidence"
206
. It reflects an approach which could be regarded 
as more "continental" if compared to the adversarial party-appointed experts. 
Article 82 of the Rules of the Tribunal sets out the procedure for the 
appointment of experts, which is, ipsis literis, the procedure established in Article 67 of 
the ICJ's Statute: 
1. If the Tribunal considers it necessary to arrange for an inquiry or an 
expert opinion, it shall, after hearing the parties, issue an order to this effect, 
defining the subject of the inquiry or expert opinion, stating the number and mode 
of appointment of the persons to hold the inquiry or of the experts and laying down 
the procedure to be followed. Where appropriate, the Tribunal shall require persons 
appointed to carry out an inquiry, or to give an expert opinion, to make a solemn 
declaration.  
2. Every report or record of an inquiry and every expert opinion shall be 
communicated to the parties, which shall be given the opportunity of commenting 
upon it.  
Even though the Tribunal has been very active in using its powers under 
Article 77 to ask information to the parties
207
, it has never used its powers to call 
witnesses or experts to produce evidence in the proceedings. Similarly to the ICJ, the 
reasons for this non-use of Tribunal-appointed experts are a matter for speculation. 
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A first reason that could explain why ITLOS has never appointed independent 
experts is that circumstances have not so required. As pointed out by an author, since 
"the great majority of Applications [before ITLOS] have been ones of an urgent nature, 
notably applications for the prompt release of a vessel and its crew under article 292 and 
applications for provisional measures"
208
, the Tribunal has not yet had the opportunity 
to decide a case where a fact-intensive and science-heavy factual background required 
the use of such experts.  
Another element that can explain the non-use of Tribunal-appointed experts 
before ITLOS is the fact that these experts shall, according to Article 83 of the Rules, 
"where appropriate, be paid out of the funds of the Tribunal"
209
. This provision could be 
read together with Article 49 of the Rules of the Tribunal prescribes that "the 
proceedings before the Tribunal shall be conducted without unnecessary delay or 
expense". Given that the parties have, until now, appointed several experts and 
witnesses under the procedures of Article 72 of the Rules, a change in this procedure 
and, consequently, a raise in the costs of a proceeding, could explain the caution in the 
appointment of experts by the Tribunal. 
Lastly, one may mention the view according to which international judges are 
reluctant to appoint experts because they are worried to lose ground in the decision-
making process
210
. If one deems this view convincing, it could be said that the reticence 
tends to be greater in the context of ITLOS since the Law of the Sea generally touches 
upon questions with a higher technical nature. 
 
3.2.4. Experts appointed under Article 289 of UNCLOS. 
 
Considered as an important innovation through which "the concept of enlisting 
qualified scientific experts in a binding decision-making process has been introduced 
                                                 
208
 D Anderson, (n), 523. On the prompt release cases, see M White, "Prompt Release Cases in 
ITLOS" in TM Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds) Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of 
Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 1025; as for provisional 
measures, see P Tomka and GI Hernàndez, "Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea" in HP Hestermeyer and others (eds) Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber 
Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 1763. 
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 Article 83 reads as follows: "Witnesses and experts who appear at the instance of the 
Tribunal under article 77, paragraph 2, and persons appointed by the Tribunal under article 82, paragraph 
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 JE Alvarez, 'Are International Judges Afraid of Science? A Comment on Mbengue' (2011) 
34 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 81 and J D‘Aspremont and MM Mbengue, ‗Strategies of Engagement 
with Scientific Fact-finding in International Adjudication‘ (2014) 5 JIDS 240–72. 
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into modern international law"
211
, a third category of expert that can appear in the 
proceeding to assist ITLOS in disputes involving scientific or technical evidence is that 
comprising the experts foreseen on Article 289 of UNCLOS. This provision reads as 
follows:  
In any dispute involving scientific or technical matters, a court or tribunal 
exercising jurisdiction under this section may, at the request of a party or proprio 
motu, select in consultation with the parties no fewer than two scientific or 
technical experts chosen preferably from the relevant list prepared in accordance 
with Annex VIII, article 2, to sit with the court or tribunal but without the right to 
vote. 
In addition, the resolution on the internal judicial practice of the Tribunal 
prescribes the possibility of experts being consulted by the Drafting Committee 
responsible for the tailoring of the judgment
212
. 
This category of experts corresponds to the category of Assessors provided by 
the Statute of ICJ
213
: they sit with the judges during the oral proceedings, take part in 
the private deliberations
214
 and, like judges, receive all the documents related to the case 
in advance
215
. The solemn declaration to be made by experts under Article 289 of the 
Convention are not similar to those made by party-appointed and tribunal-appointed 
experts, but to that made by judges, like that of Assessors before the ICJ
216
. 
The main difference between experts under Article 289 of the Convention and 
Assessors provided by the Statute of the ICJ is the fact that scientific or technical 
experts shall be "chosen preferably from the relevant list prepared in accordance with 
Annex VIII, article 2" of the Convention. Annex VIII is the part of UNCLOS which 
provides a particular procedure for "Special Arbitration", i.e., arbitration following 
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 Article 15 (3) of the Rules of the Tribunal. 
131 
 
special procedures
217
. One of the distinctive features of this kind of arbitration is that, in 
addition to adjudicators versed in law, the arbitral tribunal is also composed of experts. 
The main idea conveyed in this annex was to prepare permanent lists or expert-
arbitrators which States can use in case of a technical dispute on one of the areas 
envisaged. Four are the lists of experts provided under Article 2, in four different areas: 
(1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the marine environment, (3) marine 
scientific research, and (4) navigation, including pollution from vessels and by 
dumping. Each list is draw up and maintained by a different international 
organization
218
. However, States are responsible for the indication of the names who 
will integrate the list
219
. 
The rationale behind Article 289 is quite clear. When a dispute involves 
technical and scientific matters, the composition of the Tribunal may be adapted in 
order to cope with the technical or scientific necessity. Moreover, the Tribunal may 
receive inputs from these experts in the deliberation process and not only during the 
hearings. This is one of the most important distinctive feature of this category of expert. 
However, unlike the arbitral tribunals provided by Annex VIII of the Convention, the 
experts nominated under Article 289 are not arbitrators and perform a "subsidiary" 
function in the decision-process. They do not decide the dispute but rather offer their 
technical contribute to the judges which will decide the dispute. Indeed, they lack the 
right to vote.  
Theoretically, the existence of a pre-established list of recognized authorities 
on each field facilitates the process of choice and appointment of experts. This, in turn, 
could contribute to the celerity of the proceedings for nomination. At the same time, the 
fact that the pre-established list was tailored by an external process of composition 
enhances the legitimacy of the choice of the tribunal. In this regard, little doubts could 
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 According to Article 2 of Annex VIII of UNCLOS, every State Party "shall be entitled to 
nominate two experts in each field whose competence in the legal, scientific or technical aspects of such 
field is established and generally recognized and who enjoy the highest reputation for fairness and 
integrity". 
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be raised on the criteria for the selection of experts by the Tribunal. A third virtue of the 
pre-established list is that it adds transparency to the process of nomination of experts. 
In other words, the parties are enabled to know in advance the numerus clausus list of 
possible experts which could sit with the Tribunal. By contrast, a pre-established list of 
experts only appointed by States could raise some doubt on the independence of the 
same experts.  
It must be stressed, though, that the language of Article 289 is clear in 
establishing the use of the permanent list of experts as optional. If the Tribunal deems 
appropriate, other experts could sit with the Tribunal. The word "preferably", which is 
repeated in the respective provision in the Rules of the Tribunal, is clear to that effect. 
In sum, the power conferred to the Tribunal under Article 289 is not conditioned to the 
existing lists. 
Article 289 also provides the right of each party to request the appointment of 
experts to sit with the Tribunal. Naturally, the right to request the appointment does not 
mean a necessary obligation for the Tribunal. This right of the party has a temporal 
limitation since the request "shall, as a general rule, be made not later than the closure 
of the written proceedings"
220
. However, it is specified that "the Tribunal may consider 
a later request made prior to the closure of the oral proceedings, if appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case".  
The procedure for appointment of experts laid down in Article 15 of the Rules 
of the Tribunal confers to the President of the Tribunal the power to propose the names. 
The parties shall be heard before the proposal. The same provision describes the 
qualities that an expert must possess ("be independent and enjoy the highest reputation 
for fairness, competence and integrity") and reinforces that such an experts "shall be 
chosen preferably from the relevant list prepared in accordance with that annex". 
It could be interesting to identify the reasons for which the Tribunal (likewise 
the Court) never appointed experts under Article 289. According to Treves, "the 
scientific or technical experts as envisaged in Article 289 are too close to being judges 
or arbitrators: they sit with the tribunal and are to be drawn from the lists set out in 
Annex VIII for selecting specialized arbitrators, who should have not only technical, but 
also legal expertise"
221
. Indeed, Article 2 (3) of Annex VIII prescribes that experts 
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should possess "competence in the legal, scientific or technical aspects of such field"
222
. 
Treves‘s view finds confirmation if one glimpses on the composition of the lists223. The 
lists are composed not only by professors, scientists and members of technical agencies 
from governments, but also by legal scholars, diplomats and barristers. Added to the 
possible loss of influence that judges would have in the outcome of the dispute, it could 
be added that the appointment of experts would also have a financial impact on the 
budget of the Court. 
A last point which deserves attention is the fact that the provision of Article 
289 could also be used if the International Court of Justice were to have jurisdiction 
over a dispute. Since the ICJ is one of the possible compulsory means set out in 
UNCLOS
224
 for the settlement of disputes arising from the application and 
interpretation of the Convention, a dispute arising from UNCLOS which involves 
technical and scientific matters can be brought before the ICJ and, in this case, the 
dispute can require the appointment of experts or Article 289. As articulated by Treves, 
in such a case "the rules concerning the appointment of ‗assessors‘ under Article 30, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute will in all likelihood apply, as far as they are compatible with 
Article 289"
225
. 
There are no apparent conflicts between Article 289 and the Statute and Rules 
of the ICJ. Despite the absence in the ICJ's Rules of a requirement of prior consultation 
of the parties on the nomination of assessors or on their number (Article 289 prescribes 
"no fewer than two "), Article 289 should apply being the lex specialis which governs 
this particular situation. In the same vein, Article 293 of UNCLOS provides that "a 
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and 
other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention". Then, the 
silence of the ICJ Rules on Assessors would be filled by the letter of Article 289.  
Conversely, no provision in the Statute or in the Rules prevents the ICJ from 
using the list of experts established in Annex VIII if a dispute requires the appointment 
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of an expert in one of the four areas. Indeed, the use of this pre-established list of 
experts could be a way to legitimize the choice of experts in future. 
 
3.2.5.. Experts appointed after the judicial phase.  
 
As demonstrated in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) and Frontier 
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger) cases, experts may have a role also after the judicial 
phase in order to implement the judgment rendered by an international court. Likewise 
in the ICJ rules, there are no specific provisions in ITLOS' governing instruments 
envisaging such possibility. However, in the Land Reclamation by Singapore in and 
around the Straits of Johor
226
 case, experts were used as an instrument to catalyze the 
cooperation between the parties. As a commentator noticed, the Tribunal showed "a 
hybrid recourse to experts‘ advice"227. Although the situation in the Land Reclamation 
was not exactly similar to that in the Frontier Disputes case before the ICJ, this case 
demonstrates how the Tribunal can make recourse to experts as an instrument to cope 
with scientific uncertainties. 
In this case, Malaysia requested the Tribunal to prescribe provisional measures 
suspending the land reclamation activities that were being performed by Singapore in 
the vicinity of the maritime boundary between the two States
228
. An expert was called 
by Malaysia and cross-examined by Singapore, The Tribunal made no direct reference 
to the evidence adduced by him. In the order granting provisional measures, the 
Tribunal held that  
"the evidence presented by Malaysia does not show that there is a 
situation of urgency or that there is a risk that the rights it claims with respect to an 
area of territorial sea would suffer irreversible damage pending consideration of the 
merits of the case by the Annex VII arbitral tribunal"
229
.  
Eventually, the Tribunal relied essentially on the assurances that Singapore 
offered to Malaysia during the proceedings regarding the activities of the land 
reclamation. Interestingly, during the hearings, the parties agreed to "jointly sponsor and 
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fund a scientific study by independent experts on terms of reference to be agreed by the 
two sides"
230
. Ultimately, the Tribunal prescribed provisional measures under article 
290.5 of UNCLOS, determining that 
"Malaysia and Singapore shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose, enter 
into consultations forthwith in order to (a) establish promptly a group of 
independent experts (...) to conduct a study (...) to determine (...) the effects of 
Singapore's land reclamation and to propose, as appropriate, measures to deal with 
any adverse effects of such land reclamation (...)"
231
. 
The report and proposals provided by the independent expert group were 
adopted by the parties in a Settlement Agreement and later used by the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal and incorporated to the award
232
. They proved to be fundamental to the 
settling of the dispute. 
It is true that in this case the agreement between the parties played an important 
role in favouring the recourse to experts. However, ITLOS also used its powers to 
protect the mandate of experts when it held that  
"having regard to the obligation of the parties not to aggravate the dispute 
pending its settlement, the parties have the obligation not to create an irremediable 
situation in particular not to frustrate the purpose of the study do be undertaken by 
a group of independent experts"
233
.  
According to an author, the approach taken by ITLOS in Land Reclamation 
constitutes a "new method of exercising the [power to seek expert opinions] in 
collaboration with the parties"
234
 and this collaborative approach "promotes party 
contact, and encourages the parties to engage in negotiation, thus increasing the 
likelihood of the dispute being resolved amicably"
235
. The approach adopted by ITLOS 
seems, to a certain extent, similar to ICJ's appointment of experts when the parties so 
require. However, the Tribunal seems to have gone further when it prescribed measures 
for the protection of the activity of such experts. Indeed, the power of the Tribunal to 
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help the parties to the establishment of a group of experts and to protect their activities 
trough provisional measures can be a useful tool when complex technical issues are 
involved in the dispute. However, this situation can hardly be imagined in the absence 
of a previous agreement or an obligation to cooperate between the litigant parties. 
 
4.3. Assessment 
 
The similarities, correspondences and commonalities between ITLOS and ICJ 
allow the drafting of some conclusions, especially on those points which can be relevant 
for the practice of ICJ.  
With regard to the instruments at the Tribunal's disposal, it does not seem that 
ITLOS is better equipped than the ICJ to deal with scientific evidence. The major 
difference between the judicial bodies is that under article 289 of UNCLOS there exists 
a permanent list of experts. The possibility of having recourse to such list may 
contribute to a greater transparency of the method of appointment of experts. This 
possibility could also add some speed to the procedure of choice of experts. The fact 
that the Tribunal had never used the list, though, does not allow further speculation on 
the impact they could have in a dispute.. 
Another interesting aspect relates to Tribunal-appointed experts. The absence 
of tribunal-appointed experts or experts under the meaning of article 289 demonstrates 
that ICJ's reluctance in appointing ex curiae experts is shared by the Tribunal. More 
broadly this seems to be a general feature of tribunals settling interstate disputes. 
The Tribunal seems to favour the use of party-appointed ―independent‖ experts 
in order to obtain scientific evidence, an instrument vastly employed by the parties. The 
voir dire in the Southern Bluefin Tuna and the exchange of views in the 
Bangladesh/Myanmar revealed the difficulties that arise when experts directly 
collaborate with the parties. The main issue related to the question of the independence 
of experts. In both cases, however, such issue was approached in term of weigh of the 
evidence and not in terms of admissibility. Here, again, the approach seems to be the 
same as that of the ICJ. Nonetheless, expert evidence presented in the 
Bangladesh/Myanmar, which was not tested through cross-examination, proved to be 
useful to the Tribunal. That appears to contradict Pulp Mills and the favored use of 
party-appointed experts cross-examined in the Whaling and Certain Activities/Road 
cases. 
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A most general question that can be here speculated regards the future use of 
experts and the relationship of these two judicial bodies. The potential overlapping 
jurisdiction between ICJ and ITLOS may lead, in the future, to an eventual competition 
on which tribunal handles more appropriately technical and scientific evidence. This 
seems to be true particularly if one thinks that the use of experts is a common feature in 
cases concerning maritime delimitation. To attenuate this problem, the initiatives of 
dialogue, ―in particular on legal and practical issues involved in the handling of law-of-
the-sea cases‖236, such as the working meeting that members of both judicial bodies 
held recently, seems to be welcomed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL PROCEDURAL VALUES IN THE USE OF 
EXPERTS BEFORE THE ICJ  
 
1. Introduction: general principles of procedure or procedural values? 
 
The path followed hitherto has focused on the examination of specific 
procedural issues related to the use of experts before the ICJ and other international 
tribunals. This perusal was instrumental not only to the identification of the relevant 
rules and practices concerning the appearance of experts in interstate litigation but also, 
concomitantly, to the recognition of some legal principles and procedural values that are 
of great relevance when experts are involved in a judicial proceeding. 
In addition to Statute and Rules, proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice are governed by, in the words of the ICJ, some "general principles of procedural 
law"
1
 which aim to guarantee its fairness and the good administration of international 
justice
2
. Not infrequently, some of these principles find expression in specific 
provisions in the Rules and Statute. Just to offer a glaring example, one can safely 
contend that article 2 of the ICJ Statute, together with other provisions of the Rules, 
embodies the principle of judicial independence. In other circumstances, they 
correspond to general normative propositions inherent to the judicial function of the 
Court
3
. The existence and the nature of such principles, as well as their position within a 
legal theoretical framework has been largely discussed.
4
 However, little consensus 
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seems to have been so far reached on their exact nature. What is important to underline, 
though, is the existence of certain overarching normative propositions that go beyond 
the Statute and the Rules of the ICJ and can have a bearing on the manner through 
which the Court conducts its proceedings. 
If the clear content and the exact role of these principles is still disputed, a 
tentative explanation might be the rare recourse the Court has made to them in order to 
solve procedural problems, which generally find their solution in the Rules. As 
observed by one author, ―many procedural problems, perhaps the majority, resolve 
themselves into questions of interpretation of the Statute, and are thus governed by the 
law of interpretation of treaties‖5. Questions of interpretation also arise in relation to the 
determination of the specific content of these procedural principles. When one considers 
the problems arising from the use of experts before the ICJ, the extent to which they can 
be solved by the application and interpretation of the Statute and Rules appears to be 
limited: there are not many rules and their content is very precise and concise. 
Additionally, at least in the case of the Rules, these provisions were drafted in the 
middle of the 70‘s, when most of the news problems of international adjudication were 
not yet known. At the same time, while several procedural principles might play a 
relevant role when experts are involved in a proceeding, the indeterminacy of their exact 
content may prove to be hard to overcome. That increases the role of the Court in 
interpreting such a rules. The Court has more terrain for judicial law-making in order to 
fill the potential normative gaps. In this exercise, it is submitted that the Court should 
follow some general principles and procedural values. In doing so, the Court would be 
adding to the legitimacy of the judgment and also of its activity – certainly at the eyes of 
parties, but also from at the eyes of the public. 
At this stage a preliminary remark is in order. A distinction may be tentatively 
introduced between the use of general principles as a set of normative propositions and 
their use as guidelines. The dividing line, if any, seems to be that while the second can 
be considered as hypothetical ideal to be reached, a north to be followed, the first seems 
to display a more delineated content – even if not as clear as a positive rule.  To explain 
this distinction, one could refer to the elaboration tailored by judge ad hoc Dugard, 
according to whom 
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The judicial decision is essentially an exercise in choice. Where 
authorities are divided, or different general principles compete for priority, or 
different rules of interpretation lead to different conclusions, or State practices 
conflict, the judge is required to make a choice. In exercising this choice, the judge 
will be guided by principles (propositions that describe rights) and policies 
(propositions that describe goals) in order to arrive at a coherent conclusion that 
most effectively furthers the integrity of the international legal order
6
. 
An interesting element that can be identified in Dugard's opinion is the 
presence of "policies" as elements guiding the judicial choice and, ultimately, the 
activity of a court. The idea of policies can be similarly applied to the notion of 
procedural values: they are propositions describing the main goals of the procedure.  
By the term "procedural values" I intent to comprise standards that are either 
general principles of procedural law (e.g. independence of the judicial body) or 
principles that are not yet recognized as such (e.g. the requirement of the transparency 
of the proceedings). My main objective is not to elaborate deeply on the nature of these 
values or on the precise relationship of such values with other rules, but to understand 
what role they play when experts appear in the judicial process. Put in other words, the 
main purpose of this chapter is to broad the spectrum of the examination and focus on 
more theoretical implications of the use of experts before international judicial 
proceedings. The broader aim of such an inquiry is to explore how these values could be 
improved and protected in a dispute before the ICJ.  
This chapter shall focus on three main issues which may arise in relation to the 
participation of experts to the proceedings, namely (I) the transparency of the 
proceedings, (II) the role of the principle of due process and (III) the independence and 
impartiality of the experts.  I will deal with problems hindering the observance of such 
values and explore the available possibilities to improve their observance. 
A last methodological clarification is due with regard to the language of this 
chapter. With the purpose of avoiding repetition, when I use the notion of ex curiae 
experts the categories of experts to which I refer are the independent experts nominated 
by a tribunal to perform an inquiry (e.g. envisaged in article 50 of ICJ's Statute) and the 
experts that can sit with the Court to offer technical assistance (assessors or the experts 
employed by arbitral tribunals). The use of the term ex parte experts comprises the 
party-appointed expert which testifies before the Court and is submitted to a process of 
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cross-examination and also the experts which assist the legal team without being cross-
examined (expert counsel). 
 
2. The problem of transparency. 
 
One of the procedural values closely related to the appearance of experts in a 
judicial proceeding is the transparency of the proceedings. Even if transparency does 
not constitute the major characteristic of the work of international tribunals – as 
observed by Weiler, international courts operate in an "diplomatic ethos of 
confidentiality, [...] the hallmark of diplomacy"
7
 – it appears to exist a trend that 
considers transparency as an important (even necessary) value of international 
adjudication
8
. This growing trend seems to stem from, inter alia, the public function 
that international courts and tribunals are growingly called to exercise
9
.  
Paradoxically, the concept of transparency in international law is not as 
transparent as one could expect. This seems to be so due to the absence of general 
normative guidelines dealing with the issue. In spite of the uncertainty on whether 
transparency constitutes a general principle of international law
10
, or whether it is a 
more global concept, a value to be taken into account by international institutions
11
, it is 
nevertheless possible to transpose the notion to the context of international 
adjudication
12
. Several rules in the Statutes and Rules of international courts privilege, 
by way of example, the publicity of the proceedings, the publication of the judgments 
and of the arguments sustained by the parties and the disclosure of sensitive 
information. However, as observed by Neumann and Simma, ―the question may thus be 
asked to what extent this multiplicity of rules and norms may be conceived of as 
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JHH Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and 
External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement (2001) 9/00 Harvard Jean Monnet working paper 6.  
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 As Arman Sarvarian observed, ―[several] arguments point to the general trend of transparency 
becoming an important element of fairness in international law‖ (A Sarvarian, 'Procedural Fairness in 
International Courts and Tribunals'in Sarvarian and others, Procedural Fairness in International Courts 
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9
 In this regard see, generally A Von Bogdandy and I Venzke, In Whose Name?: A Public Law 
Theory of International Adjudication (OUP 2014). 
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journal of global governance 3-15 and T Neumann and B Simma, 'Transparency in International 
Adjudication' in A Bianchi and A Peters, Transparency in International Law (CUP 2015) 436. 
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 A Bianchi and A Peters, Transparency in International Law (CUP 2013). 
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 T Neumann and B Simma, 'Transparency in International Adjudication' in A Bianchi and A 
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forming a comprehensive, overarching legal principle of international adjudication‖13. 
In the absence of a straightforward and definitive answer to such a question, 
transparency can be generally understood, for the purposes of the present chapter, as "a 
culture or scheme in which relevant information (on law and politics) is available"
14
. As 
this definition may suggest, the key element of transparency as a legal value in a judicial 
context seems to be represented by the availability of relevant information to the actors 
involved in the litigation – to the parties, to the judges, to other States and, ultimately, to 
the general public. 
In the context of the ICJ, where ―proceedings before the Court are 
accompanied by elements of publicity‖15, it can be argued that the normative basis for 
transparency can be traced to its public nature, i.e., the fact that it is an organ of a public 
international organization, settling disputes arising from States and whose proceedings 
are open to the public.
16
 Accordingly, article 46 of the Statute of the Court determines 
that the hearings shall be public, a norm which reverberates in other provisions of the 
Rules
17
. Such a provision seems to have been inserted in the Statute in order ―to prevent 
secret proceedings which bear the risk of not guaranteeing a fair trial for the parties‖18. 
Although these rules do not expressly refer to a general principle of transparency, it is 
conceivable to argue that they, to some extent, incorporate and embody such a principle. 
By the same token, some individual judges referred to the importance and even the 
necessity of the transparency of the proceedings in their individual opinions
19
.  
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Peters, Transparency in International Law (CUP 2015) 439. 
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16
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As rightly observed by one author, it is impossible to verify an absolute 
principle of transparency with regard to the ICJ proceedings
20
. Even the publicity of the 
hearings prescribed by article 46 has its exceptions
21
. Evidently there is some room for 
confidentiality and secrecy in the work of the ICJ
22
. In spite of that, when it comes to 
the introduction of experts in the proceedings, it seems defensible that the more 
transparency the better. As it will be examined, greater transparency means not only the 
observance and the feasibility of the full exercise of the rights to comment upon the 
evidence, but it also means greater fairness in the proceedings and greater correctness in 
the outcome. Therefore, with regard to experts, the availability of information required 
by the principle of transparency can be examined in relation to, at least, three issues: (a) 
the process of choice of experts; (b) the transparency of the content of expert advice and 
(c) the way in which the expert evidence contributed to the reasoning of the Court.  
 
2.1. Transparency on the choice of experts. 
 
The manner through which an international court or tribunal chooses the expert 
who is going to assist it in gathering or assessing the evidence underlying a dispute may 
have important implications on the way a judgment is perceived by the parties. When a 
court of law nominates a third person (or group of persons) to participate in the 
proceedings, it introduces a novel element in the decision-making process. While the set 
of rules determining the identity of the judges and their process of choice is clear for 
litigating parties and the public
23
, the same does not ring true for experts ex curiae. 
Even though this new person will not directly influence the outcome of the dispute, it 
can be sustained that there will be a presumption that adjudicators will attribute great 
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weight to their technical opinion. In addition, it seems to be particularly relevant when 
one considers that, in some circumstances, experts not only provide reports but also may 
participate in the Court's deliberations or in the drafting committee responsible for the 
tailoring of the judgment. Therefore, given the alleged and potential importance that 
experts might perform in a judicial proceeding, it is arguable that letting the parties, 
other interested States and the public know their identities and their process of choice 
entails a greater contribution to the transparency of the proceedings. 
A clear harm to the transparency of the proceedings occurs when the Court 
decides to use invisible experts to get scientific or technical assistance. Although their 
contribution might be essential to a proper assessment of the evidence put before the 
Court and by the correctness by the judgment itself, the fact that neither the parties nor 
the public know their presence or their identities is, rightly, a source of strong 
criticism
24
. This is evidently a trite remark well discussed in the scholarship. However, 
a less explored argument with regard to their use is the fact that neither the parties nor 
the public know exactly how they are selected by the Registrar to assist the court. This 
fact may arguably be considered a threat to the transparency of the proceedings. 
With regard to the other experts ex curiae, also in this case the process of 
nomination does not seem to have followed a transparent method of choice.  
In the Corfu Channel case, when the Court identified its necessity of having 
"recourse to experts on a number of difficult points", the Registrar of the Court wrote to 
the representatives of four governments at the Hague (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and 
the Netherlands) asking for names of ―experts qui devraient être des spécialistes de 
questions maritimes, et en particulier de mouillage de mines et de déminage‖25. From 
the correspondence, it is not clear whether the parties were aware of such arrangements 
or had participated in the decision-making process. The method adopted by the Court 
then may seem justifiable in the light of the historical context. It seems reasonable to 
think that, in 1948, the Registrar would follow a diplomatic path and ask for technical 
assistance from states which would probably dispose of well trained naval officers. Had 
a similar method been adopted in recent times, it could constitute a potential source of 
criticism  with regard to the respect of the transparency of the proceedings if the parties 
were not informed on the steps adopted by the Registrar.  
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 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Correspondence) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 170. 
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Since the parties were responsible for the appointment of the expert which 
assisted the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine case
26
, no harm to transparency, at least with 
regard to the knowledge of the parties, seems to emerge in this case. This precedent may 
lead one to argue that when cases are brought by Special Agreement, the problem of 
method of choice of experts tends to be minimized. 
In the Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean 
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), the Court informed the parties that it decided to appoint their 
own experts and that it ―had identified two potential experts to carry out the expert 
mission thus decided‖27. In the Order there is no information available on how the Court 
had identified the two potential experts. From the point of view of the transparency of 
the proceedings, it would be laudable the identification of the criteria adopted by the 
Court in order to identify, choose and appoint such experts. By contrast, one can 
speculate on the reasons leading the Court not to disclose such an information. A first 
possible reason might be the absence of rules requiring the Court to do so. A second 
reason could be a question of judicial economy: since the process of appointing an 
expert might be considered in the outskirts of the dispute, little time should be spent in 
such a process. Whatever the reason, this solution is criticizable. It must be observed, 
however, that while the Court did not reveal the way it chose the expert nor gave the 
parties the opportunity to participate in such a choice, the ICJ offered to the parties the 
possibility to comment upon the Court‘s choice. This is more a matter of guaranteeing 
the right of due process, to which I will revert later. 
 In the light of the previous practice of the Court, and considering the practice 
of other international tribunals previously examined, the main question to be raised is 
whether a case by case approach in choosing the experts for giving assistance in a 
dispute is the best option or whether it would be preferable that the Court follows pre-
established criteria. The fact that the method based on a case by case approach has not 
given rise to specific problem may be regarded as indicative that it is working. 
However, the appearance of problems connected to the nomination of such experts 
cannot be excluded – as it frequently happens in municipal law systems. 
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One may propose a set of potential solutions in relation to the methods for 
selecting experts in a transparent way. Just to give some examples, the Court could 
consult international organizations, other international tribunals, academic institutions 
or private enterprises in order to list the possible names. Alternatively, the parties could 
suggest names to the Court, or the parties could nominate two possible experts which, 
together, could nominate the expert who is going to assist the Court. Finally, the Court 
could select names from previous lists maintained by other tribunals/organizations, such 
as the lists of experts maintained by the PCA or by the Annex VIII of UNCLOS. What 
all these methods have in common is the publicity of the path followed by the Court. It 
is not submitted that the Court should follow a pre-established path in order to identify 
its exerts. What is submitted is that the parties and the public should know how (the 
method) and why (the criteria adopted for the decision making) certain experts were 
chosen to assist the Court.  
When it comes to experts ex parte, it is up to the parties, as a matter of judicial 
strategy, to reveal the reasons why certain experts were chosen to present evidence 
before the Court. It may nonetheless be argued that, if the parties made clear the reasons 
why they performed such a choice, this would certainly contribute to the transparency of 
the proceedings and as well to the enhancement of the evidential value attributed by the 
Court to their testimonies.  
A different situation occurs when the parties omit to call as expert someone 
whose presence appears to be appropriate. For instance, in the Whaling in the Antarctic 
case, it may be observed that Japan had refrained from appointing as experts (or 
witnesses) the Japanese scientists who were involved in JARPA II programme. One 
might suggest that their presence would have been extremely useful in order to better 
understand the scientific premise of the programme. The Court did not fail to notice 
their absence. However, it is hard to infer from the judgment what would have been the 
Court‘s preference on this point. When examining the use of lethal methods in the 
JARPA II programme the Court stressed that it ―did not hear directly from Japanese 
scientists involved in designing JARPA II‖28. A member of the Court asked Japan what 
analysis it had conducted on the feasibility of non-lethal methods prior to setting the 
sample sizes for each year of JARPA II. Japan did not offer any documents to clarify 
this issue and, eventually, the Court concluded that ―[t]he absence of any evidence 
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pointing to consideration of the feasibility of non-lethal methods was not explained‖29. 
From these two passages, one is left with the impression that the Court tacitly criticized 
the absence of a certain type of expert, i.e. an expert that had participated in the JARPA 
II programme and which Japan could have utilized to sustain its position. In this respect, 
the ‗non-explanation‘ of this absence appears to have weakened Japan‘s argument. 
However, as a counter-argument, one could say that the decision not to appoint 
Japanese experts who had participated in the development of the JARPA II programme 
was justified by the need to avoid a ―biased witness‖30. In particular, it could be argued 
that, if Japan had appointed experts who had participated in the JARPA II programme, 
the Court would have given little evidential weight to the evidence presented by them 
since ―a member of the government of a State ( . . . ) tends to identify himself with the 
interests of his country, and to be anxious when giving evidence to say nothing which 
could prove adverse to its cause‖.31 
 
b) Transparency on the content of expert advice. 
 
The transparency of the content of the experts‘ advice constitutes perhaps the 
most relevant issue in relation to the transparency of experts‘ participation to the 
proceedings. That is so because knowing such an advice is not only a contribution to the 
transparency per se, but it is also a necessary step to the sound exercise of the right to 
comment upon the evidence presented. Therefore, the awareness on the content of the 
evidence given by an expert can be considered an element which contributes to the due 
process and the fairness of the proceedings. 
When it comes to ex parte experts, there are no apparent issues relating to the 
transparency of their advice. Consequently, it competes also to the parties, through the 
procedure of cross-examination, to extract sensitive information from the appointed 
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expert. Likewise, the Court can put questions to party-appointed experts in order to test 
the evidence presented by them and ask for clarification of unexplored topics. 
Additionally, it is worth remembering that, depending on the circumstances of a given 
case, and depending on the role of the experts in the context prior to the judicial 
proceeding, it is always available to the Court the possibility of resorting to the power 
provided under article 49 of the Statute, by which it can "call upon the agents to produce 
any document or to supply any explanations". Through this possibility, the Court may 
avoid a harm to the transparency of the content of expert ex parte advice. When these 
experts plead as counsels, this power is obviously diminished and, thus, the 
transparency threatened. 
When it comes to ex curiae experts, the main harm to transparency of the 
proceedings occurs when the parties are not allowed to have access to the content of the 
advice given by invisible experts. Since the exact content of their advice was never 
made clear, it is possible only to speculate on their functions: their advice could range 
from the interpretation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties, the 
explanation of precise concepts involved in the dispute and even the calculation or 
preparation of coordinates and maps related to the dispute. Thus, the potential of their 
advice is decidedly high. As a consequence, the parties' right to comment upon the 
evidence given is also curbed. It was authoritatively argued that ―[w]here technical 
matters are involved, the tribunal should be assisted by a qualified expert or experts 
whose identity, terms of reference and reports the parties should be made aware.‖32 In 
the case the Court decide, in the future, to appoint assessors, a harm to the transparency 
may be envisaged. That is because there are no rules granting to the parties the right to 
know the content of their advise. That would, naturally, impinge upon the right of the 
parties to comment on the evidence presented by them.  
It is worth stressing that the disclosure of the report produced by assessors 
would not be incompatible with the requirement of the secrecy of the deliberations. 
While such requirement is expressly mentioned by the Rules of the ICJ
33
, article 21 of 
the Rules also provides that "[t]he Court may however at any time decide in respect of 
its deliberations on other than judicial matters to publish or allow publication of any 
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part of them". It might be argued that an assessor's opinion is to be regarded as part and 
parcel of the judicial deliberations, and therefore it is covered by secrecy. Admittedly, 
there seems to exist a considerable margin for interpreting what does constitute 
"deliberations on judicial matters". Considerations of transparency should lead to 
privilege a narrow interpretation of the term, thereby suggesting that the advice given on 
the factual background of a dispute shall be available to the parties. In this sense, an 
amendment of the Rules clarifying this point would be commendable.  
A similar issue may arise in situations in which experts are called to help 
international courts and tribunals in drawing lines and preparing maps of a certain 
dispute. The reasons why the Court does not make this information available are not 
clear. Certainly, greater transparency about the individuals assisting the Court in 
performing such functions would be welcomed, also in order to understand the exact 
function these experts performed in the proceedings. That would not only help the 
parties and the public to understand how specific information got in the judgment, but it 
would also eliminate any doubts about the specific function a third person perform in a 
judicial proceeding. 
From the point of view of transparency, undoubtedly the experts provided by 
article 50 are those who best observe its requisites. Article 57 of the Rules of the Court 
expressly sets forth that ―every report or record of an enquiry and every expert opinion 
shall be communicated to the parties, which shall be given the opportunity of 
commenting upon it‖. In this sense, the disclosure of the information and the experts 
reports in the Corfu channel case constitutes a good example of the observance of the 
transparency of the proceedings in relation to the content of the expert advice. The 
manner in which the Court will handle the issue in the Maritime Delimitation in the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) may offer food for 
thought in this regard. 
Whatever the outcome, one could speculate whether the right of the parties to 
have access to the expert opinion offered by article 57 of the Rules should not be 
extended in a general way in order to comprise every form of expertise inserted in the 
judgment. An eventual reform of the Rules of the court should take this possibility into 
account. 
 
c) Transparency on how the experts have contributed to the reasoning of the Court.  
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It can be argued that, generally, a court of law should be clear on how it uses 
the evidence presented by the parties in establishing the facts underlying a dispute. In 
such a circumstance, the requirements of transparency blend with those imposed by the 
requirement to state the reasons of a judgment, the devoir de motivation. According to 
one author, ―la motivation doit indiquer les faits que le juge a considéré comme 
démontrés, les preuves admises et les raisons pour lesquelles il rejette les autres dont la 
véracité lui a semblé douteuse‖34. In other words, since there are no strict rules on 
international law on how judges should weigh the evidence presented by the parties, 
conversely there exists a greater necessity to explain the criteria used to perform such a 
weighing. Ultimately, especially in the context of international tribunals, the motivation 
of the judgments, also in the factual ground, constitutes an element which contributes to 
the fairness and legitimacy of the whole procedure
35
. The function of such a principle is 
threefold, according to judge Guillaume: to assure States that the international judge is 
adjudicating a dispute within its competence; to convince the parties that the judgment 
is well-reasoned and, as a byproduct, it plays the precedential function
36
. In this line, 
one author has argued that ―[l]a motivation des décisions de la CIJ constitue l'un des 
composants de la notion de procès équitable qui, sans appartenir à la terminologie des 
ses arrêts, transparaît dans le procès davant la Court‖37.  
Together with article 56 of the Statute of the ICJ, which prescribes that ―the 
judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based‖, para. 1 of article 95 of the Rules 
of the Court, establishes that a judgment ―shall contain (...) a statement of the facts [and] 
the reasons in point of law‖. Nonetheless, these rules did not set a clear obligation to the 
Court to demonstrate how the evidence presented contributed to the establishment of a 
certain fact. Neither the Statute nor the Rules of ICJ provide rules or criteria for the 
assessment of the evidence presented before the Court, with all the rules and criteria for 
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weighing the evidence instead being developed by the Court through its case law
38
. Nor 
did they set that, when the Court is confronted with complex or uncertain facts, it would 
be under an obligation to demonstrate how it established such facts. It remains that 
greater indications on the factors which contribute to the reasoning of the Court or to the 
formation of the conviction of judges are welcomed. This seems to be particularly true 
in cases where scientific evidence is concerned. Another argument which enhances the 
importance of the correct establishment of facts is that ―the role of evidence before the 
Court becomes central in establishing a faithful historical record, in addition to assisting 
the Court in ascertaining the facts relevant to its legal decision with a view to reaching a 
just and well-reasoned outcome‖.39 Greater indications on how some facts were 
established also reinforce the faithfulness of the judgment as a historical record. 
In the past, the ICJ has had only few occasions to evaluate and to weigh the 
evidential value of expert opinions.  
As to experts ex curiae, in the Corfu Channel case, when referring to the 
independent experts appointed under Article 50, the Court stated that ‗it cannot fail to 
give great weight to the opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in a manner 
giving every guarantee of correct and impartial information‘40. In some passages of the 
judgment, the Court referred to the statements made by these experts in order to 
establish a certain fact
41
. The language used by the Court when referring to the evidence 
presented by the experts confirms the fact that great weight was attributed to their 
findings. For instance, the Court used the opinion of the experts to ―confirm‖ the 
evidence produced by one party
42
, or to establish in a definitely manner a certain 
disputed fact
43
. 
Still with regard to Article 50‘s experts, the Court seems to have developed 
another way to attribute greater weight to their expertise: by appending their technical 
report to the judgment. This is what happened in the Gulf of Maine and the Corfu 
Channel  cases. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, this technique is also skillfully used by 
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arbitral tribunals. Undoubtedly this technique contributes to a greater transparency of 
the proceedings.  
Less transparent is the way in which the Court uses the evidence presented by 
experts ex parte. Two recent cases in the case law of the Court seem to be of great 
relevance to exemplify its approach: the Whaling in Antarctic case, the Certain 
Activities and Construction of a Road cases
44
.  
The cases exhibit some commonalities. For instance, it can be said from the 
outset that, unlike in other cases, in these judgments the Court did not expressly identify 
general criteria relating to the evidential weight to be given to expert opinions. There 
are no statements in the judgment openly identifying factors that increase or decrease 
the evidential weight of an expert opinion. However, the Court has apparently used 
some of the criteria it generally applies to evaluate witness evidence
45
. For instance, it 
seems to have attributed greater weight to uncontested opinions
46
, to the agreement of 
expert‘s opinions47 and when their statements were contrary to the positions defended 
by the party which have appointed them
48
.  
A more problematic situation seems to appear when the Court does not clearly 
dissociate the experts opinion from the positions sustained by the party which had 
appointed them. In some passages of the judgment the Court has referred to expert‘s 
opinions when they coincide with the position assumed by the State which had 
appointed them without attributing any particular weight. Thus, it is not clear whether 
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these references were taken into account by the Court or whether they were only the 
reconstruction of the positions of the parties. This ambiguity renders the exact evidential 
weight of ex parte experts less transparent. 
The analysis conducted so far leads to the conclusion that a greater 
transparency on the weighing of expert opinion have two immediate consequences. 
Firstly, it contributes to the legitimacy of the decision rendered by the Court. Moreover, 
the parties are thus made aware as to how exactly the Court used the evidence presented 
by them and, ultimately, can assess this use. This also add to the predictability as to the 
manner in which the Court treats, assess and evaluates the evidence to be presented by 
experts. 
 
3. The right to comment on the expert‘s evidence: assuring due process. 
 
Once the content of the expert evidence is made readily available to the parties 
to a dispute, the following step is to assure the right of the parties to comment on the 
evidence presented by such experts. This gears onto the question of the observance of 
the due process of law and, as a consequence, the fairness of the proceedings. 
The idea of ―due process of law‖ can be traced back to the protection of 
individual rights within the State environment
49
. According to such an idea, which 
became one of the linchpins of the modern legal thought
50
, every judicial proceeding 
has to observe a minimum set of criteria that protect an individual in the course of that 
proceeding; it serves to avoid abuses from State authorities and to assure an equal and 
fair treatment for individuals. Only through the observance of these criteria a 
proceeding could be considered as being ―fair‖51. 
This legal notion could hardly be transposed to international law without 
adaptations – there is no risk of an abusive authority unfairly conducting the 
proceedings between litigating States. Nonetheless, it can be held that the requirement 
                                                 
49
 The expression is generally associated to article of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which prescribes that ―[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
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Constitutional Law (OUP 2013) 1-37. 
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of due process of law in the context of an international judicial proceeding settling 
interstate disputes is to be construed taking into account values closely connected to the 
identity of the litigants, sovereign States, which are equal before the judge. As the Court 
once observed, "[t]he principle of the equality of the parties follows from the 
requirements of good administration of justice"
52
.  Accordingly, the parties will be 
given equal opportunities to defend their case and to answer to the arguments of the 
other party, i.e., respecting the principle of the equality of arms
53
. Connected to the 
equality of arms, another arguable criterion which composes the idea of due process of 
international law is the guarantee that the parties are to be able to comment on all pieces 
of evidence presented before the Court.  
The principle which assures to the parties the right to comment upon the 
evidence presented seems to become more influential when it comes to technical or 
scientific evidence.  Given the theoretical assumption that judges are not ideally trained 
in complex scientific or technical matters, it is arguable that assuring greater 
participation to the parties does not only serve to protect their procedural rights. It also 
adds to the correctness of the judgment. It allows the testing of the evidentiary material 
put before the Court by the parties through the method of cross-examination. 
Since the right to comment upon the expert advice and cross-examination may 
be regarded as two essential elements of the principle of due process, I will examine 
each one of these elements in turn. 
 
3.1. The right to comment upon expert advice.  
 
The Statute of the Court is silent on the right of the parties to comment on the 
evidence put before the Court. The Rules, however, in several provisions guarantee the 
right to comment on the evidence presented. Just to mention some examples, the Rules 
assure to the parties the possibility of making comments on new documents 
introduced
54
 or on the information offered by a public international organization
55
. In 
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the same vein,  article 58 of the Rules sets out the right of the parties to comment on the 
evidence produced when it states that  
―[t]he Court shall determine whether the parties should present their 
arguments before or after the production of the evidence; the parties shall, 
however, retain the right to comment on the evidence given‖. 
Similarly, article 67 of the Rules provides that ―[e]very report or record of an 
enquiry and every expert opinion shall be communicated to the parties, which shall be 
given the opportunity of commenting upon it‖. Article 63 gives to the Court the power 
to, ―at the request of one of the parties or proprio motu, take the necessary steps for the 
examination of witnesses otherwise than before the Court itself‖. While article 67 and 
article 63 envisage a very precise situation in which the parties have the right to 
comment upon the evidence presented by ex curiae and party-appointed experts, 
respectively, it is not clear whether article 58 assures a general right to comment upon 
technical evidence.  
The silence of the Rules leaves it open the question as to the extent to which 
the parties have the right to comment with regard three categories of experts: invisible 
experts, expert counsels and assessors. 
Since the content of the advice of the invisible experts is not known, the parties 
are not materially allowed to offer any answer or input on the advice given by these 
experts. The harm to due process when they are employed appears to be flagrant. 
Similarly, when expert counsels plead on behalf of the parties on technical issues, the 
right of the opposite party to comment upon the evidence is equally restrained. The 
ideal scenario, as noticed by the Court in the Pulp Mills case, is that expert counsels 
should ―be submitted to questioning by the other party as well as by the Court‖56. The 
appearance of these two categories of experts in a proceeding prevent either the 
opposite party, either the Court, of directly testing the evidence presented. While it 
seems to be clear that the evidential weight to be given to the expert counsel presenting 
evidence in this manner seems to be diminished, it is impossible to verify the impact 
that invisible experts may have in the formation of the conviction of the judge. 
With regard to assessors, although the present Rules do not expressly recognize 
the right of the parties to comment upon the assessors‘ contribution, there seems to be 
some merit in the view that the parties should be given this possibility. Should the 
parties be given the opportunity to comment upon an assessor‘s contributions, some 
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minor adjustments in the Court‘s procedure would be necessary. In this respect, the 
solutions envisaged in commercial arbitration, in the Rules for experts of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration
57
, or in some domestic legal systems
58
, could be a useful source of 
inspiration. For instance, as it was argued elsewhere
59
, where assessors are appointed by 
the Court at the initial stage of the proceedings or during the written phase, it would be 
advisable that they prepare a report on the content of their technical advice, to be 
submitted to the parties before the opening of the oral hearings. This would give the 
parties the opportunity to comment upon the report during the oral hearings and even 
potentially use it in support of their respective positions.  
When assessors offer advice to the Court during and after the oral phase, the 
possibility of the parties commenting upon their advice may present difficulties that are 
not easily overcome – particularly due to the secrecy of the deliberations and the fact 
that, in principle, with the end of the oral hearings, there is no option for the 
presentation of comments by the parties.  However, a number of solutions can be 
envisaged in order to tackle these obstacles. One such solution is elaborated by the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in relation to the use of assessors in commercial 
arbitration. It provides that "(...) [w]here assessors give advice to the tribunal following 
the conclusion of the oral hearing, a convenient mode of ensuring that the parties have 
an opportunity to comment on that advice is to reduce it to writing and to send it, 
together with a draft of the proposed technical sections of the award, to the parties for 
their comments before the award is issued"
60
. In other words, the proposal provides for 
a round of written comments by the parties, aimed exclusively at commenting on the 
report of the assessors. Although this would require an extension of the duration of the 
adjudicative procedure, such inconvenience may be regarded as inevitable when the 
Court is called to settle science-heavy or highly technical disputes. 
                                                 
57
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In an overall assessment of the present practice and problems faced by the ICJ 
in this regard, it is submitted that parties should be given the opportunity to comment 
upon every expert report or every expert advice offered to the Court. This would be in 
consonance with the general obligation laid down in article 58 of the Rules, as well as 
the specific obligation related to expert reports established by article 67, para 2. 
Moreover, assuring the right to comment of the parties seems to fulfill the requirements 
imposed by the principle of due process of law. 
 
3.2.  Advantages and shortcomings of cross-examining party-appointed experts. 
 
Examination and cross-examination of witness and experts are a recent feature 
of international adjudication. The technique of testing witness in court through intense 
questioning, essentially developed within common law legal systems
61
, was not 
favoured in past practice of international tribunals mainly because of the little 
engagement these adjudicative bodies had with factual issues
62
. In consonance with the 
adversarial character of the proceedings in the common law experience, the main 
purpose of cross-examination seems to be 
 ―to elicit information concerning the facts in issue or relevant to the issue 
that is favourable to the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is 
conducted‖, and at the same time ―to cast doubt upon the accuracy of the evidence-
in-chief given against such party‖63.  
In spite of these allegedly reciprocal advantages, the resorting to cross-
examination in municipal level gives rise to some difficulties when it comes to scientific 
evidence. Indeed, either in English or American systems, the introduction and testing of 
scientific evidence through cross-examination has revealed some inherent problems of 
the adversarial system
64
. For instance, the contested expert opinions may lead the lay 
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jury to an inconclusive assessment of the evidence or may require the intervention of the 
judge in the case of abuse – which, at least in theory, could be considered contrary to 
the neutrality of the judges with regard the assessment of evidence in that system. Yet, 
in the context of the ICJ, the absence of a lay jury responsible for assessing the facts and 
the mixed character of the proceedings with civil law elements seems to pose different 
questions when the experts are called by the parties to present technical evidence. 
From the outset, it is worth noting that the Rules contain no indication about 
the method for examining, cross-examining and re-examining party-appointed experts. 
This did not prevent the Court from developing its own method for cross-examination 
of experts presenting evidence orally before the Court, pursuant to the general power 
granted to the Court by article 63 of the Rules. The procedures of examining party-
appointed experts followed in the Whaling in Antarctic, the Certain Activities and 
Construction of a Road cases seems to confirm this point
65
. What is interesting to 
underline, though, is the fact that, in the two recent cases mentioned above, the Court 
seems to have indicated a preference of testing evidence by the method of cross-
examination. Through its Registry and at the beginning of the proceedings, the Court 
even suggested that the parties should call experts who offered technical support to the 
legal teams in the writing phase: 
―the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court would find it useful if, during the 
course of the hearings in the two cases, they could call the experts whose reports 
were annexed to the written pleadings, in particular Mr. Thorne and Mr. Kondolf. 
The Registrar also indicated that the Court would be grateful if, by 15 January 
2015 at the latest, the Parties would make suggestions regarding the modalities of 
the examination of those experts‖66. 
It is not surprising that the Court seems to have favoured such a method for 
testing complex evidence. The clearest advantage of conducting the procedure of cross-
examination is the possibility to test the evidence presented in the light of an adversarial 
logic. In this vein, it is conceded that through the process of cross-examining experts the 
Court is allowed to identify the coherence (and the incoherence) of certain factual 
positions. This appears to be confirmed by the fact that the Court seems to attribute a 
greater weight to the agreement of experts in both cases. 
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 By favouring the cross-examination of experts and asking the parties to submit 
their experts to cross examination, the Court seems to favors also the observance of the 
principle of due process. Allowing the parties to test the evidence put before the Court 
seems to be a good way to guarantee the participation of the parties and also the 
correctness of the judgment. However, there are two issues that seems to arise when 
cross-examination is used to test complex evidence in the context of ICJ. The first (a) is 
the potential difficulties arising from the absence of clear rules on cross-examination. 
The second (b) is the reproduction of the shortcomings arising from municipal law, 
especially the potential risks of clash of expert opinions and, therefore, the overlapping 
of expertise. I will revert to these two arguments in turn.  
* * *  
(a) The assumption that the ICJ‘s procedure strikes a balance between civil law 
and common law systems stems not only from article 9, which urges for the assurance 
of the ―whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal 
legal systems‖. It can also be traced to several features of the Statute, Rules and the 
jurisprudence of the Court
67
. One of the possible consequences of a disequilibrium in 
the reception of techniques from different legal systems is the risk of favouring the 
party which better controls the techniques in which a specific procedure was modeled. 
This question was explored by judge Cot in his separate opinion in the M/V Louisa case 
before ITLOS. After noting that the procedures for the examination of witnesses ―are 
modelled on the common-law rules but are not as rigorous‖, judge Cot emphasized that 
such procedure ―clearly favours the party with full mastery of the techniques of 
adversary procedure‖68. Such an imbalance would jeopardize the parties‘ right of full 
defense and, ultimately, the principles of due process. 
An element that would attenuate the alleged disequilibrium is the fact that, in 
the process of examination of party-appointed experts, judges are also allowed to ask 
questions to experts. Such a possibility would, at least in theory, avoid that the outcome 
of the procedure of cross-examination were exclusively controlled by the parties. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, considering the practice until now developed by the 
                                                 
67
 See E Valencia-Ospina, ‗Evidence before the International Court of Justice‘ (1994) 
International Law FORUM du droit international 202-207. 
68
 The M/V "Louisa" Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain) (Merits, 
Sep. Op. Cot) [2013] ITLOS Rep para 58. In the concrete case, judge Cot observed that ―[i]n the Louisa 
case, the Spanish side did not object to the wording of questions put by the American counsel unless it 
considered the honour of the Kingdom of Spain to be at stake‖. 
160 
 
Court, party-appointed experts usually submit a previous written report to the judges. 
Equipped with these reports, judges are theoretically best prepared for formulating 
questions. Another element which seems to attenuate the potential disequilibrium is that 
the parties usually have lawyers coming from both legal traditions integrating their legal 
teams
69
.  
In any case, clearer rules on the conduction of cross-examination might be a 
way to curb an eventual disequilibrium. In this sense, according to Malintoppi,  
―[t]he Court could provide greater guidance to the parties in setting forth 
specific rules for cross-examination, ie prohibition of leading questions, possibility 
for counsel to raise objections and in what circumstances, clear guidelines on 
interaction with the witness outside the courtroom, etc. This may also be of 
particular assistance for counsel who are not trained in the common law 
tradition‖70. 
It could also be added that, even the counsel who is trained in the common law 
tradition would benefit from clarity in the rules.  
The absence of clear rules on how to perform the cross-examination may lead 
to other problems as well. While the cross-examination conducted in the Whaling case 
occurred without obstacles, the same does not ring true to that in the Certain Activities 
and Construction of a Road cases
71
. In the last cases, the cross-examination was 
characterized by constant objections from the counsels. This led to an intervention by 
the President recalling the parties to follow the rules. An author criticized the fact that  
―President was forced to intervene and remind counsel of the procedure 
that the Court had set out at the beginning of the proceedings and to urge counsel to 
restrict their line of questioning to those issues that were the subject of the cross-
examination‖.72  
In its judgment, the Court made no commentaries nor drew inferences from 
such an episode. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to think that clearer rules on the 
limits and possibilities of cross-examination might help to avoid future complications 
on this issue. 
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* * * 
 (b) As discussed before, one of the rationales behind the cross-examination in 
municipal legal systems is the idea that, if effectively conducted, a likely outcome of 
such a process is the emergence of the ―truth‖. As enthusiastically defended by one 
author in the past, cross-examination is ―beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth‖73. However, the truth might prove to be hard to 
discover when its content is composed by technical or scientific elements and, therefore, 
some problems might arise in the performance of the cross-examination. 
As noted by some authors
74
, a problem may arise when experts take different 
positions on controversial questions of technical and scientific nature, a situation which 
has been labeled by the Court as ―the clash of expert opinions‖75. As an American 
judge, referring to his own national experience, once observed, ―[w]hen there are expert 
witnesses on opposite sides, who therefore clash, often they cancel each other out in the 
eyes of the jurors‖76. The situation does not seem to be different in the context of 
international litigation. Practice reveals that only rarely a legal team is not assisted by an 
expert. International tribunals seem to have developed some techniques in order to deal 
with conflicting expert opinion
77
. For instance, when the ―clash‖ arises, the instrument 
of cross-examination seems to be particularly important for determining the existence of 
a ―common evidentiary ground‖ by the identification of points in which the party-
appoint experts agree. Another technique is the weighing of the evidence by virtue of 
the interest/impartiality of the experts. Obviously, none of these techniques are absolute 
or definitive to deal with the problem of technical or scientific evidence. 
What seems to emerge is that, in the circumstances of clash of expert opinions, 
although observing fully the requirement of due process, the technique of cross-
examination of party-appointed experts may reveal to be insufficient in order to 
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properly tackle the scientific schism. This situation may lead one to wonder whether the 
procedure of examination of party-appointed experts may be conducted in different way 
or may be improved in order to respect the observance of the principle of due process. I 
will revert to this question later. 
 
4. The problem of the independence and impartiality of experts. 
 
The requisites of independence and impartiality are keystones of the idea of a 
fair trial and have been largely explored in the international legal literature
78
.  
According to such requisites, a permanent international tribunal, in order to perform its 
functions properly and soundness, must function without the influence of States and 
without biases of any sort. The perception of impartiality and independence of a certain 
tribunal may impact directly in its role within the legal system. As pointed out by 
Guillaume, independence and impartiality impinge on ―the trust of those subject to its 
jurisdiction‖79; thus, they are elements which contribute to the legitimacy and the 
effectiveness of the tribunal. 
There seems to be little doubt in considering independence and impartiality of 
an adjudicative body as general principles of international law – either because they are 
usually set forth in several rules of international tribunals, or because they find 
correspondence in municipal legal systems
80
. Nonetheless, most of the rules dealing 
with these requisites at the international level usually address almost exclusively the 
manners through which judges are nominated, selected, and tenured. For instance, in the 
context of the International Court of Justice, in addition to article 2 of the Statute, the 
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independence and impartiality of judges are assured by a set of provisions of the Statute 
and Rules (such as, for instance, articles 17 and 24, dealing with the incompatibilities of 
the judicial function).
81
 
The judge is certainly at the focus of the notion of independence and 
impartiality of an international tribunal. However, as observed by some scholars
82
, the 
extent to which an international tribunal can be perceived as independent depends on a 
number of factors, which amplifies the range of application of these principles. It seems 
reasonable to consider that these ideas have an overreaching scope of application. In its 
own perception, the ICJ pointed out that it is not the single judge, but the whole ―Court 
[which] acts (...) independently of all outside influence or interventions whatsoever, in 
the exercise of the judicial function entrusted to it alone by the Charter and its 
Statute‖.83 Therefore, together with the rules addressing directly adjudicators, there are 
undoubtedly other factors that contribute to enhancing or diminishing the independence 
and impartiality of an international tribunal. This argument seems to find confirmation 
in article 5 of the 2011 resolution of the Institut de droit international on the ‗Position 
of the International Judge‘, which sets forth that  
―[t]he independence of courts and tribunals depends not only on the 
procedures of selection of judges and their status, but also on the way in which the 
court or tribunal is organized and operates‖.84  
In this light, it can be held that the way an international Court uses, employs 
and manages the experts which appear before it may constitute factors influencing the 
perception of independence and impartiality of a given tribunal. Every category of 
expert introduces into the judicial process an innovative element through its views and 
opinions. Experts interact, directly or indirectly with the evidentiary body of a dispute. 
The way the Court upholds the experts‘ views, give weight to these views and assure 
that they are not biased contributes to the overall perception of independence and 
impartiality of the Court.  
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 Similarly to the rules employed by some national systems to avoid expert bias, 
the International Court of Justice seems to have developed some techniques in order to 
deal with this issue. In this regard, it must also be recalled that the rules of the ICJ do 
not foresee a specific procedure for contesting the admissibility of expert evidence – 
which does not necessarily prevent the Court from doing it in the future. Therefore, 
when there are signs of partiality and dependence of any specific expert, these issues 
would usually impact on the weighing of the evidence. As previously mentioned, the 
ICJ has not offered much with regard the general criteria it adopts in order to weigh the 
evidence adduced before it. It usually adopts a case by case approach. Nonetheless, 
some criteria were offered by the Court along its case law when assessing witnesses and 
experts and they are useful in order to verify what elements might be adequate to 
improve the impartiality and independence of the involvement of experts in the 
proceedings. The investigation here conducted shall focus, then, on factors that 
contribute to the perception of independence and impartiality of experts and the 
procedural techniques at the Court‘s disposal in order to deal with potential bias. 
Before dealing directly with the abovementioned elements, a distinction must 
be drawn for the present purpose between independence and impartiality. As observed 
by an author, ―essentially, judges are independent if there is no external source of 
control of influence which prevents them from acting in an autonomous fashion; and 
they fulfill their role with impartiality if there is no bias in the disposal of a case‖85. In 
other words, while independence means the absence of connections that may be 
regarded as improper for the exercise of the judicial function, impartiality requires the 
absence of bias pulling the adjudicator‘s intentions towards one of the parties. In 
general terms, this distinction can, to great extent, be applied when it comes to experts. 
While the independence of an expert can be assessed by the absence of improper 
connections compromising the participation of the experts in a proceeding, his/her 
impartiality may be verified by the absence of elements pulling his/her technical or 
scientific opinion towards one of the parties. 
 
4.2. Factors enhancing and diminishing independence and impartiality of experts.  
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There are some elements that can enhance and diminish the perception of 
independence and impartiality of an expert. In relation to the independence, given that it 
has to do mainly with the incompatibilities of the function, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the incompatibilities applicable to ex parte and ex curiae. 
Since ex parte experts are part of the strategy of the parties in order to best 
present its arguments and evidence, it is up to the party to ensure that there are no 
incompatibilities which should prevent a certain individual from acting as the party‘s 
expert. The Court will take into account this issue when determining the extent to which 
it can rely on the evidence presented by the expert. In this respect cross-examination is 
an important component in that it permits to identify any elements of bias. This logic 
seems to be confirmed by the approach assumed by the Court in the Pulp Mills case. In 
that occasion, the Court observed that 
―As for the independence of such experts, the Court does not find it 
necessary in order to adjudicate the present case to enter into a general discussion 
on the relative merits, reliability and authority of the documents and studies 
prepared by the experts and consultants of the Parties‖.86 
Aside to avoiding the discussion on the independence of experts, the excerpt 
seems to confirm the fact that the Court, when possibly faced with a question of 
independence of experts, may deal with the issue by engaging in a discussion on the 
merits, reliability and authority of the evidence – in other words, weighing the evidence 
adduced. 
When it comes to ex curiae experts, the question of incompatibilities appears 
more relevant. Since it seems to exist a presumption that greater weight shall be given 
to the experts appoint by the own Court, the Court should be more careful in the process 
of choice and appointment of experts or assessors. The absence of pertinent practice 
only allows little speculation on the issue. For instance, it is interesting to note that the 
Court avoided – for obvious reasons – to appoint experts having the same nationality of 
the litigants. In the same way, it is defensible to think that the Court should avoid 
appointing experts which had previously participated to some extent in the dispute 
(unless the parties agrees otherwise) or which have offered assistance in similar issues 
and whose opinion could be, to some extent, compromised
87
. In this regard, in order to 
avoid problems with independence of ex curiae experts, the present practice of the 
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Court of consulting the parties in relation to the names it intends to appoint is welcomed 
and in conformity with the requirements determined by that principle. 
Whereas it seems to exist no problems regarding the independence of experts 
which appear before the ICJ, the same is not necessarily true in relation to their potential 
impartiality. This is so especially because it is not easy to assess the factors that may 
contribute to the perception of impartiality of a given expert. As observed in chapter 
one, the Court seemed, to some extent, to employ the criteria it uses to assess witness 
testimony in order to evaluate the evidential weight of an expert opinion given by 
experts ex parte. As observed by one author regarding the witness which testify before 
an international court, 
 ―in general, in so far as they can be established, the antecedents and 
character of a person would influence the probative value to be attributed to his 
testimony, and if conscious untruth is found in a testimony, no weight will be 
attached to such statements‖88 
The most obvious source of bias to experts is its connection to the client – a 
problem well detected before national courts
89
. As observed an American judge in 
relation to his national context, ―[a] lawyer is not allowed to pay a lay witness to testify; 
the potential for corruption is obvious. But he may pay an expert witness — and the 
potential for corruption is obvious‖90. This quote seems to embody the idea that ex parte 
experts may be considered ―hired guns‖ working for their clients and not necessarily for 
the ―scientific interest‖. In other words, their scientific opinion risks to be conditioned 
to the interests of the party which has appointed them.  
That seems to be the major risk of employing exclusively party-appointed 
experts in order to furnish technical and scientific evidence to the Court: forming the 
evidentiary background of a case only based on a potentially biased source of technical 
and scientific evidence. The fact that the ICJ has relied mainly in the agreement 
between experts or used their statements when contrary to the interests of the party 
which appointed them seems to be an indicative that the Court is aware of this risk. That 
allows one to concludes that, in the light of their potential harm to the impartiality of the 
judgment, party-appointed experts have a restricted role in the proceeding. 
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4.3. Procedures envisaging to attenuate biases: the oath and the cross-
examination. 
 
The Statute, Rules and practice of the Court envisage two particular 
proceedings aiming at assuring the independence or impartiality of experts when they 
appear before the Court: the solemn declaration (or oath) that an expert is obliged to 
make before testifying and the procedure of cross-examination, already examined. 
While cross-examination might constitute a skillful way for testing the 
reliability and also the origins of the evidence adduced by experts, one can wonder to 
what extent the solemn declaration contributes to enhancing the impartiality and 
independence of experts. It can be conceded that the solemn declaration might have 
some influence. Experts which testify before an UN Court under oath may certainly feel 
less inclined to make imprecise statements or assertions not coherent with his/her 
scientific findings. They are recalled either of their obligations to their own conscience 
and to their field of work as scientists, but also to their obligations to the own Court as 
agents of the judicial process. However, in practical terms, it is difficult to precise what 
are the real implications of the solemn declaration beyond the symbolic legitimization 
of the process. As held by an author, 
 ―oaths and presumptions have developed in the western legal tradition 
primarily to handle situations where the court has felt that reliable factual evidence 
has come to an end, but that the interests of justice would not best be served by 
ending deliberations‖91. 
 
The historical root of the solemn declarations reinforces the argument that its 
usefulness has a limited scope. It has been argued that ―an oath always enhances the 
probative value of a statement whether emanating from a disinterested person, or from 
an interested party‖92. However, in the practice of the ICJ little elements seems to 
support such an assertion. While the Court in its recent case law has insisted in the 
cross-examination as a necessary element for testing the evidence presented, there are 
no elements that allow further conclusions on the specific weight that solemn 
declarations carries before the Court. 
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In spite of the indetermination of the weight the oath by itself can carry with 
regard the impartiality and independence of experts, there are some interesting elements 
that can be highlighted when comparing the different categories of experts . The Rules 
of the Court determine that either experts ex curiae and ex parte should make solemn 
declarations when they appear before the Court. The content of such declarations is 
distinct and enables some speculations. For instances, very similarly to the oaths of 
municipal legal systems, party-appointed experts are required, according to article 64(b) 
of the Rules, to assert that: 
―I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will speak the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and that my statement will be in 
accordance with my sincere belief.‖ 
One may suggest that when the Rules requires the party-appointed expert to 
testify ―in accordance with my sincere belief‖, this provision has as purpose to stress the 
dissociation between expert and the appointing party. This argument would reinforce 
the alleged impartiality of party-appointed experts. Thus, after the oath, the party-
appointed expert could be considered not as an interested member of the defensive team 
of a State, but an independent scientist having an individual belief on the discussed 
topic. One should be note, however, that there are no other textual elements recalling 
independence or impartiality.  
When it comes to experts ex curiae, the reference to impartiality is textually 
present in almost all the categories. For instances, assessors are required under article 
8.5 of the Rules to make a declaration very similar to those made by judges:  
    ―I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties as an assessor 
honourably, impartially and conscientiously, and that I will faithfully observe all 
the provisions of the Statute and of the Rules of the Court.‖93 
When it comes to Court-appoint experts in the sense of article 50, article 67 of 
the Rules sets forth the requirement of those experts making a solemn declaration, 
without specifying its specific form – probably in order to allow the Court to adapt the 
declaration in consonance to the necessities of the case. For that reason, the declarations 
have changed a little over the years. For instance, in the Corfu Channel case, the 
declaration was 
―I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will perform 
my duties in all sincerity and will abstain from divulging or using, outside the 
Court, any secrets of a military or technical nature which may come to my 
knowledge in the course of the performance of my task.‖ 
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In the recent Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific 
Ocean, the requirement of impartiality was introduced and Court-appointed experts 
were required to swear
94
 that 
―I solemnly declare, upon my honour and conscience, that I will perform 
my duties as expert honourably and faithfully, impartially and conscientiously, and 
will refrain from divulging or using, outside the Court, any documents or 
information of a confidential character which may come to my knowledge in the 
course of the performance of my task‖.95 
A glimpse on the texts of all solemn declarations reveal some interesting 
commonalities and distinctions aiming at guarantee the independence and impartiality 
of these experts. The evident common element is that all declarations appeal to the 
psychological effect invoking honour and conscience of experts. 
However, it seems relevant that in the recent ex curiae experts‘ declarations 
and in the one envisaged for assessors, the ―impartiality‖ is a necessary textual element 
prescribed by the oath. It could be argued that, on account of its similarity with the oath 
made by judges
96
, these categories of experts are more connected with the impartiality 
and independence required by the whole adjudicative body. This point is strengthened 
by the fact that Court-appointed experts are also required to swear upon their duty of 
confidentiality on the issues disclosed by the parties. 
The last point that could be explored with regard the oath is whether the 
categories of experts which are not required to perform the solemn declarations may be 
considered more or less impartial because of the absence of this ritualistic procedure.  
For instance, in relation to the expert counsel, the absence of an oath might 
lead to the conclusion that they are not as independent and impartial as other kind of 
experts are. Against this argument lies the fact that, when the Court criticized their use 
in the Pulp Mills case, although the Court mentioned the absence of cross-examination, 
it made no reference to the absence of the solemn declaration. In relation to municipal 
legal systems, ―parties do not take an oath, although non-parties do, since the factual 
statements of parties do not constitute evidential material in the same way that the 
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statements of third parties do‖97. If this statement can be held true with regard the 
procedure of the ICJ, the opinion expressed by an expert counsel can be regarded as less 
weighty than those of the experts which have sworn before the Court. 
A more sensitive point lies in the contribution given by the invisible expert. It 
is not clear whether, when they were hired to help the Court by the Registry in a given 
case, invisible experts made any kind of solemn declaration. Since, theoretically ―leur 
statut est équivalent à celui d'agens du Greffes engagés pour de courtes durées ou de 
consultants”98, presumably they are required to make the solemn declaration prescribed 
in article 25.2 of the Rules before the President of the Court. If one looks at the 
content
99
 of such a declaration, though, it will find no textual elements recalling their 
impartiality or their duties to be faithful of their scientific opinions – elements present in 
the other declarations – but only duties of loyalty and confidence to the Court. What 
emerges clear after this examination is that even by its solemn declaration the category 
of invisible expert appears scarcely compatible with the ordinary standards of 
independence and impartiality.
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The first impression gathered from the examination of the rules and the 
practice of the ICJ is that the use of experts seems to be allocated in the permanent 
tension between systems of common law and civil law. This seems to be confirmed by 
the blending appearance of experts ex curiae and experts ex parte in the proceedings – 
either visibly or invisibly. Some of the problems arising in the Court‘s practice mirror 
the problems faced in national legal systems regarding experts; some of the Gordian 
knots are the same insurmountable difficulties appearing in those contexts. Nonetheless, 
given the special features of the litigation between sovereign States, the conclusion that 
the Court should tackle the problems the same way municipal courts do seems less 
obvious. 
If one looks to the way the Court and the parties availed themselves of experts 
in its recent case law (2006-2016), it appears to exist a continuous development and 
refinement of the techniques and procedures regarding experts. Comparing the 
procedures employed by the parties and by the Court in the Pulp Mills case (whose oral 
hearings took place in 2009) with those in the Whaling (2014) and Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua (2016, still pending) cases, one can identify a more active approach assumed 
by the Court. The evolutionary approach finds confirmation in the fact that the Court, 
for the first time since the Corfu Channel case, has resorted to article 50 and nominated 
two independent experts to gather evidence in locu.  
This ―evolution‖ might be attributed to two relevant factors.  
First, one is left with the impression that a prolific dialogue has occurred 
between parties, Court and scholarship. On the one hand, the parties to cases have taken 
into account the Court‘s criticism to consult experts in the Pulp Millls judgment. Parties 
have been avoiding to use them as pleaders before the ICJ since. On the other hand, the 
Court seems also to have taken note of the critique made by judges and scholars on its 
potential but scarce use of article 50 by appointing experts in the Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua case. Moreover, it has also improved its method for testing evidence by 
favouring a four-step method of cross-examination employed in the Whaling in the 
Antarctic case and repeated in the Certain activities and Construction of a Road cases. 
The second factor contributing to the amelioration of the procedure on experts 
is due to the fact that disputes touching upon technical issues were and are still being 
brought by States before the ICJ. Given that the Court‘s activity essentially depends on 
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the trust of its ―clients‖, it seems right to assert that the subject-matter of the 
abovementioned cases offered to the Court a real occasion to develop its procedure. It 
can be held that further developments on this issue depend on the subject-matter of the 
disputes brought before the Court. Bearing this in mind, one might expect further 
contributions to the question with the outcome of the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 
Nicaragua v. Colombia and in the Waters of Silala cases
1
.  
* * *  
The comparison between the ICJ and the two potential judicial options to 
litigate interstate disputes, namely ITLOS and international arbitration, have also 
offered interesting elements regarding the treatment of technical and scientific evidence 
by the Court. These elements relate to the questions of whether these tribunals have 
more efficient instruments to deal with this kind of evidence and whether they have 
developed special techniques in employing these instruments. 
In relation to ITLOS, it seems difficult to consider any potential advantage that 
the Tribunal would have in relation to the ICJ. The correspondence of instruments and 
practices between the two judicial bodies does not allow further assertions. The major 
difference between these judicial bodies is that under article 289 of UNCLOS there 
exists a permanent list of experts. In theory, the possibility of having recourse to such 
list may contribute to a greater transparency on the method of appointment of experts. 
The fact that the Tribunal has never resorted to this list or to article 289 does not permit 
further speculation. Furthermore, the fact that States continue to bring their maritime 
disputes to the ICJ is indicative of their reliance on the methods developed by the 
Court‘s case law in dealing with the identification and the drawing of the maritime 
coordinates
2
. 
The potential and theoretical advantages that interstate arbitration possess in 
comparison to the ICJ do not seem to be related to a particular technique developed by 
arbitration, but rather with the inherent flexibility which characterizes this model of 
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dispute settlement. Firstly, perhaps inspired by the use of experts in commercial and 
investment arbitration, arbitral tribunals have developed innovative techniques in 
relation to the appointment, examination and use of independent experts. Some of these 
solutions might be useful if transposed to the context of the ICJ. For instance, the use of 
experts appointed by the parties in the Trail Smelter arbitrations or the drawing of 
specific suggestions to the use of experts in the post-adjudicatory phase in the Iron 
Rhine Railway could prove to be useful under certain circumstances. None of the 
practices in relation to the use of experts in arbitration seems to fall outside the powers 
retained by the ICJ under article 50 of its Statute. As demonstrated in chapter 2, to some 
extent it seems that the recent practice of the ICJ is already somewhat inspired by the 
flourishing in the use of experts by international tribunals. 
Additionally, the recent practice, developed under the auspices of the PCA, of 
having experts sitting with the arbitrators
3
 and helping them with the technicalities of 
the judges appears to be an improvement in the techniques concerning the use of 
experts. Nothing prevents the ICJ from adopting a similar approach. Instead, the resort 
to assessors provided by article 30 or the broad powers granted to the Court by article 
50 of the Statute seems to offer legal basis for consolidating such a procedure. The 
hypothesis that these experts may have an ―excessive influence on the outcome of the 
dispute‖4 does not seem to be confirmed by the practice of arbitral tribunals and might 
be attenuated by assuring greater transparency on their advice. 
* * *  
After examining the practice of the ICJ in the light of selected procedural 
values touching upon the core issues of expert evidence (transparency, due process and 
impartiality) it was possible to draw some conclusions with regard to each of the 
available instruments that the Court can avail itself to deal with technical and scientific 
evidence. 
The recourse to expert counsels, an enshrined practice of litigants before 
international tribunals, seems to be slowly and gradually finding its term. The non-
observance of the requisites imposed by the principle of due process, added to the 
impossibility of enhancing the evidential weight of its testimony by cross-examination, 
makes this category of experts a scarcely useful instrument at the parties‘ disposal. 
Nonetheless, their relevance is not to be entirely denied. One could conjecture the 
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hypothesis of parties resorting to them when the evidence introduced are uncontested. 
Their presence before the Court, although questionable in terms of time and strategy, 
would serve to confirm and illuminate the Court on the technical issues of the dispute as 
a part of the didactical strategy of a legal team. However, in the case of eventual 
challenge by the opposite party, it would obviously be advisable to have them called to 
testify in the quality of party-appointed experts in the terms of article 63 of the Rules. 
The second category of ex parte experts appears to be in ascension. Party-
appointed experts have been used by international tribunals not only because they 
respect the adversarial rationale of the procedure, but also because they servea as an 
instrument that aligns itself with the principles of transparency and due process. Their 
oath and cross-examination contributes to testing the content of their scientific opinion 
and to assure their independence. The recourse to party-appointed experts still presents 
two inherent shortcomings. First, the risk of favouring the party which better masters 
the proceeding of cross-examination, essentially based in common law courts. Second, 
when dealing with sensitive and disputed issues, this system may give rise to an 
unsolvable clash of expertise. Anglo-American law systems also have problems in 
dealing with this clash. Secondly, there is an overreliance on cross-examination as the 
method to find the truth. However, in cases where the evidentiary background of a 
dispute were to be more complex, there is the risk of having this evidence exclusively 
constructed by the parties; in other words, the performance of experts and counsels 
counts heavily in determining the outcome of the process of identification of the ―truth‖. 
A good performance in conducting cross-examination might become a condition to the 
process of identifying and assessing the scientific fact. The high number of 
interventions by counsels in the cross examination of party-appointed experts in Costa 
Rica v. Nicaragua seems to confirm this hypothesis. 
As broadly argued in doctrine, Court-appointed experts envisaged in article 50 
constitutes one of the best ways for tackling complex evidentiary backgrounds. The 
possibilities for its use, the transparency of the procedure, the possibility of the parties 
to interact with the information adduced by them, their independence and impartiality 
are factors that seem to favour their use in a proceeding. Nonetheless, their costs to the 
budget of the Court (an issue recently flagged by the President of the Court to the 
General Assembly) and prolongation of the duration of the judgment associated to their 
use might be factors to be taken into account prior to their appointment. The Court 
might be required to balance these latter elements with the need of receiving impartial 
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scientific input according to the circumstances of a given case. While the duration of a 
judgment might be an important element in assessing the activity of an international 
court, science-heavy and factually complex disputes could agree to take these 
shortcomings in order to add to the legitimacy of the judgment. 
There seems to be little doubt that invisible experts remain a highly  criticizable 
instrument. Their harm to transparency, due process and potential threat to the 
independence of impartiality seems to be enough arguments to suggest that the Court 
should not resort to this category in complex evidentiary contexts. The remaining 
question is to what extent the Court should avail itself of invisible experts when they are 
required to perform minor functions such as the drawing of the maps or ―determining 
the precise geographic coordinates of certain points clearly identified by the Court‖5. 
The interrogative could be reversed. Why should the Court avoid letting the parties 
know when it uses external experts to perform such a function? That would not only add 
to the transparency of the whole proceeding, but it would also facilitate the 
parties/public assessment of their work. It also allows the identification of any potential 
bias or imprecision. The requirement of due process would be equally met. 
Another interesting category which should be explored by the Court is the 
employment of assessors prescribed in article 30 of the Statute. This category of experts 
draws near the practice of arbitral tribunals of having experts sitting with the court. It 
may also satisfy the identified necessity of technical input demonstrated by the Court in 
appointing invisible experts. In practical terms, assessors are already present — what 
seems to be necessary is a refinement of the procedure. Appropriate use of article 30 can 
contribute to a greater observance of the requirements of transparency and due process. 
Furthermore, the Court‘s governing instruments enable a varied and flexible use of 
assessors to cope with the evidence-heavy background of a dispute — whether 
combined with other categories of experts, or otherwise. 
* * *  
Scholars have put forward several suggestions on how to improve the treatment 
of technical and scientific evidence by the ICJ. The most frequent proposition sustains 
that the ICJ should made greater resort to independent experts under article 50 of the 
Statute
6
. Obviously, the independent experts envisaged in this rule have their clear 
                                                 
5
 Gaja (n 4) 413. 
6
 A Riddell, ‗Scientific Evidence in the International Court of Justice – Problems and 
Possibilities‘ (2009) 20 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 229; MM Mbengue, Scientific Fact-
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advantages in a scenario in which the only evidence before the Court is conflicting 
evidence adduced by the parties. 
Two other suggested solutions advanced by scholars involve article 50, but do 
not envisage the appointment of experts in a traditional way. The first is the suggestion 
elaborated by Keith Highet that the Court should employ ―special masters‖ in a similar 
way as the US Supreme Court does
7
. The second suggestion, formulated by Daniel Peat, 
envisages the ICJ using a pre-trial chamber for evidentiary purposes which would deal 
with technical evidences prior to the judgment by the full Court
8
. Both solutions may be 
commendable in specific circumstances, particularly if the parties have agreed with such 
procedures. None of them presents particular difficulties with regard to the requirements 
of transparency, due process and independence/impartiality. Their only apparent 
shortcoming is that they draw too far from the present practice of the ICJ. Additionally 
to these proposals, greater attention has been paid to the possibility of appointing 
assessors as a potential way to curb the deficiencies created by the assessment of  
scientific evidence before the Court
9
. 
Notwithstanding these suggestions, other solutions could envisage a more 
direct contact between experts, facilitated by the Court – solutions which find 
inspiration in the practice of interstate arbitration, municipal legal systems and 
commercial arbitration. It has been rightly argued that ―more judicial interaction with 
experts should facilitate in-depth understanding of the science‖10. For instance, the 
cooperation between experts in the Guyana/Suriname case may be followed to the 
extent that the Tribunal-appointed experts mediated the meetings between the party-
appointed experts. It is not impossible to conjecture a pre-trial meeting between party-
appointed experts and a Court-appointed expert (or assessor) purported to identify 
                                                                                                                                               
finding at the International Court of Justice: An Appraisal in the Aftermath of the Whaling Case (2016) 
29 Leiden Journal of Int. Law 529-550; C Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in 
International Courts and Tribunals (CUP 2011) 341-348; L Malintoppi, ‗Fact Finding and Evidence 
Before the International Court of Justice (Notably in Scientific-Related Disputes)‘ (2017) 7 JIDS 421 JG 
Devaney, Fact- Finding before the International Court of Justice (CUP 2016). 
7
 K Highet, ‗Evidence and Proof of Facts‘ in LF Damrosch (ed), The International Court Of 
Justice At A Crossroads (American Society of International Law 1987) 372. 
8
 D Peat, ―The Use of Court-Appointed Experts by the International Court of Justice‖, 84 
British Yearbook of International Law (2014) 300-302. According to the author, such a pre-trial Chamber 
―would involve a separate pre-trial process led by three members of the Court, to determine the facts 
pertinent to the selection and application of the rules of law necessary for the Court to perform its 
function in the case at hand‖ (301). 
9
 Gaja (n 4) 418 and LC Lima, ‗Expert advisor or non-voting adjudicator? The potential 
function of Assessors in the procedure of the international court of justice‘ (2016) 99 Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale 1123-1146. 
10
  Foster (n 6) 342. 
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points of agreement and crystallize points of disagreement. That would facilitate the 
work of the Court in identifying the well-appreciated points of agreement between 
experts. Stressing expert disagreement would also allow the Court to avoid ruling in 
matters still disputed scientifically. The adoption of a similar methodology seems to be 
consonant with the requirements of transparency and due process of the proceedings. 
Another possible means to improve due process through the examination of 
experts is the so called ―hottubing‖ technique, ―a unique process whereby the court 
takes concurrent testimony from both sides‘ experts, while the experts sit together in the 
courtroom‘s jury box‖11.  In the case of the ICJ, the process of hottubing could be 
conducted by the president, assisted by a Court-appointed expert or assessor. The 
adoption of such a method for examination of experts seems also to be in accordance 
with due process, transparency and impartiality and would furnish the Court with 
reliable and discussed expert evidence. 
* * * 
The argument developed in this thesis is that whatever should be the avenue 
explored by the Court, it should be put to the test of three procedural values: 
transparency, due process and independence. That would certainly add, to a greater or 
lesser extent, to the fairness of the proceedings, to the correctness of the judgment, to 
the effectiveness of the decision-making process and, ultimately, to the over-arching 
legitimacy of the judicial activity. 
The second main general proposal espoused by this thesis after the examination 
conducted is that the Court would benefit from a blended approach to the problem, 
combining techniques of common law and civil law, or more specifically, combining the 
use of ex parte and ex curiae experts when dealing with cases of a complex background. 
That seems to be the successful lesson taught by arbitral tribunals settling interstate 
disputes. A combined approach would also shield the Court from criticisms which 
allege that the method of testing evidence by the use of party-appointed experts is too 
heavily influenced by the common law system. The combined use of experts does not 
                                                 
11
 G Pring and C Pring, ‗Twenty-first century environmental dispute resolution – is there an 
‗ECT‘ in your future?‘ (2015) 33 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 25. On the issue, see also S 
Rares, 'Using the "Hot Tub" How Concurrent Expert Evidence Aids Understanding Issues', paper 
presented by Justice Rares at the New South Wales Bar Association Continuing Professional 
Development seminar: Views of the ―Hot Tub‖ from the Bar and the Bench (available at 
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only strike a balance between the civil law and common law approaches to the 
procedure, but also between the values to be protected by the proceedings. 
  In practical terms, the ICJ seems to be well equipped to improve the cross-
examination of party-appointed experts with the use of assessors or ex curiae experts so 
as to receive technical advice. This solution would not require to Court to adopt a 
measure too far-off from its present procedure.  
If it is true that there is a strong likelihood that technical and scientific matters 
might appear again in the docket of the World Court, then it seems also true that experts 
still have an important role to perform in the proceedings before the ICJ. Testing the 
procedures for refining the fact-finding and fact-assessment by the Court through 
procedural values might constitute an adequate and useful way for refining the 
procedure regarding the appearance of experts. 
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